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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the moderating role of CEO compensation on the associations 
between earnings management and four factors (audit quality, institutional ownership, 
concentrated ownership and cash holdings). This study reveals the effectiveness of the 
incentive power of CEO compensation, in line with the controlling power of other 
corporate governance mechanisms in restraining EM practices. This study is a 
comparative analysis of the UK and the US-listed firms, between 2005 and 2016, to 
analyse if the moderating role of CEO compensation acts differently within the two 
contexts, as they both have different CEO roles and responsibilities on which different 
levels of compensation are granted. The study also analyses the impact of cash holdings 
on EM. In addition, it analyses the impact of the moderating role of CEO compensation 
in low compared to high cash holding firms, to reveal the effectiveness of the moderation 
effect, as well as the corporate governance mechanisms incorporated, in the presence of 
different levels of cash. After conducting the analyses, this study reveals that the 
moderating role of CEO compensation becomes an effective strategy in restraining EM 
practices only in the presence of cash holdings, within the US context. Consequently, 
cash holdings are revealed to have a significant positive association with EM, only in the 
US, while it’s found to have an insignificant impact in the UK. Finally, in low cash 
holding firms, CEO compensation, audit quality, and the joint effect of CEO 
compensation with ownership concentration are proved to add value in restraining EM 
practices in the UK-listed firms, while none of the corporate governance mechanisms or 
the moderation effects proves to be effective in reducing managerial opportunism within 
high cash holding firms within the UK or US-listed firms holding different levels of cash. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Research Background  
Several accounting scandals and corporate failures have been witnessed in the past 
decade, due to the participation of earnings management (EM) (Cornett et al., 2008). 
Managers are found to manipulate the firms’ earnings and present unreliable financial 
statements, to either mislead investors or to reach their private benefits- such as receiving 
bonuses tied to the firms’ reported earnings. They tend to hide the firms’ poor economic 
performance, as well as the participation of their opportunistic behaviours of wasting the 
firms’ resources in achieving their personal desires and intervening in non-value- 
maximizing investments. Two of the most known scandals in the US is the Enron scandal, 
and WorldCom, which eventually led to their bankruptcies in 2002 (Cornett et al., 2008), 
due to the excessive earnings management participated by their CEOs, leading to 
shareholders losing confidence in the firms’ reported earnings. Therefore, enhancing the 
transparency of the financial reporting process, through the reduction of earnings’ 
manipulations by managers became the main concern since then, to reduce the conflicts 
of interests between managers and their shareholders. 
Managers are tempted to engage in EM practices in order to inflate the stock prices of 
their firms, to signal better firm performance for the shareholders, and deserve higher 
compensation accordingly, in addition to avoiding the violation of debt contracts (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999). Moreover, they become concerned with protecting their reputations, 
as well as securing their positions, which become at risk, if they don’t achieve earnings’ 
benchmarks (Graham et al., 2005). Hence, they tend to use their discretionary powers, in 
the presence of cash flows, to maximize the firms’ values (Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006). While accrual-based EM involves accounting methods which are much easier to 
assess and observe by outsiders, the real EM is difficult to track as it’s incorporated in 
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the everyday business transactions (Roychowdhury, 2006). Earnings management 
practice is what creates the information asymmetry between managers and their 
shareholders, according to the agency theory. Hence, the presence of such agency 
problems leads to the investigation of various corporate governance mechanisms and 
compensation schemes, in an attempt of restraining EM practice.  
CEO compensation was believed to align managers’ interests with the firms’ and reduce 
their opportunistic behaviours (Jensen, 1993). Salaries and bonuses, as well as the equity-
based types of compensation, are analysed in previous studies to find their incentive 
power on managers, in motivating them to achieve the firms’ targets. Even though CEO 
compensation is viewed as a reward for managers for leading the firms, it’s criticised to 
increase earnings’ manipulations when firms don’t achieve their earnings’ targets so that 
managers earn their compensation. These financial incentives may not necessarily ruin 
the firms’ values, but rather they require adequate monitoring and control over them 
(Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Therefore, the presence of such incentives may 
motivate managers to work for the firms’ best interests, if managers’ opportunistic 
behaviours are well controlled, in addition to the fact that higher incentives attract higher 
monitoring. Hence, higher equity-based compensation tied to higher earnings does not 
only attract the higher participation of EM but attracts higher monitoring of audit 
committees as well, which makes EM practices more difficult to exercise (Laux and Laux, 
2009). 
Other governance mechanisms, such as the role of auditing, as well as the impact of 
ownership structure are found be effective mechanisms in reducing the information 
asymmetry between the managers and their shareholders (Kouaib and Jarboui, 2014), as 
they tend to exert enough monitoring and control on managers to restrain their 
opportunistic behaviours and reduce EM practices consequently. Instead of being 
restricted to assessing the effectiveness of one governance mechanism at a time, it’s 
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preferred to analyse the impact of their interactions on earnings management, to find their 
joint impact, since the control mechanisms are interrelated and firms don’t employ each 
mechanism separately (Kouaib and Jarboui, 2014). Hence, the failure of one controlling 
mechanism can be offset by the effect of the other mechanism.  
 
1.2. Research Focus 
In order to avoid corporate failures, the excessive participation of EM exercised by 
managers must be restrained, to enhance the transparency of the financial reporting 
process of firms. In doing so, firms are required to present more reliable financial 
information to shareholders, to reduce the conflicts of interests between the two parties. 
Hence, the need for incorporating effective monitoring and controlling mechanisms 
becomes necessary. CEO compensation is expected to motivate managers to work for the 
firm’s best interest and to align their interests with those of the shareholders’, due to its 
incentive power, especially when joined with another corporate governance mechanism. 
This joint effect arising, is suggested to reduce managerial opportunism, leading to lower 
levels of EM, to maximize the firm’s value.  
In addition, due to the existence of different CEO roles within the UK and the US 
contexts, this joint effect relying on the use of different levels of CEO compensation, 
based on the different sizes of responsibilities held in the two contexts of the UK and the 
US, may act differently. Therefore, this study tends to analyse the impact of the 
moderating role of CEO compensation on associations between EM and four factors (the 
audit quality, the institutional ownership, the concentrated ownership, and the cash 
holdings), of the UK and the US-listed firms, for a period of twelve years, from 2005 to 
2016. Nevertheless, it analyses the impact of cash holdings on EM, and tests for the 
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moderation effect as well as the effectiveness of the remaining corporate governance 
mechanisms in low compared to high cash holding firms. 
 
1.3. Research Aim and Objectives  
The overall aim of this research is to identify the drivers of EM reduction, in order to 
enhance the transparency of the financial reporting process in the UK and the US 
contexts. 
This aim is achieved through the following objectives: 
 Analysing the impact of the determinants of EM, as well as the impact of cash holdings 
on the participation of EM, in both of the UK and the US markets.  
 Investigating the impact of the moderating role of CEO compensation in restraining 
EM practices, as well as the strengths of these proposed joint effects, in both markets. 
 Analysing the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms, as well as the 
moderation effect, in the presence of low compared to high cash levels within firms.  
 
1.4. Research Questions 
This research is conducted to analyse the impact of cash holdings, as well as the 
moderating role of CEO compensation, in relation to EM levels. Hence, this research 
study seeks to find answers to the following questions: 
 How do corporate governance mechanisms and cash holding levels impact the 
level of EM in the UK and US markets?  
   
19 
 
 Does the moderating role of CEO compensation have an impact in reducing EM 
practices in the UK and US markets? What are the strengths of the joint effects of 
CEO compensation with each of the above mentioned four factors?  
 Are the corporate governance mechanisms more effective in constraining EM in 
the presence of low or high cash holding levels within firms? Is the moderating 
role of CEO compensation effective in low and high cash holding firms in both 
contexts of the UK and the US? 
To answer the above questions, in an attempt of finding what constrains EM practices 
within the two markets of the UK and the US, to enhance the reliability of the firms’ 
reported earnings, an analysis is conducted on the FTSE 350 index and the S&P 500 
index. To answer the first question, this research analyses the impact of four factors on 
EM, these are the audit quality, the institutional ownership, the concentrated ownership, 
and the cash holdings, in addition to the CEO compensation. To answer the second 
question, the moderating effect of CEO compensation is introduced to each of the four 
associations, between the above-mentioned four factors and EM, to reveal the 
effectiveness and the strengths of these proposed joint effects. Last but not least, to 
answer the third question, the sample is split into firms holding cash levels below median 
and above median, in both markets, to analyse the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance mechanisms, as well as the moderation effects, in both types of firms holding 
different levels of cash. 
 
1.5. Research Motivations 
This research attempts to restrain accruals-based earnings management since the primary 
objective of using accruals is originally targeted towards presenting more reliable pictures 
of the firms’ financial performance, through the recording of the firms’ revenues and 
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expenses in the same accounting periods in which they are incurred, regardless of the 
cash movements. The accruals-based earnings management is considered to be the most 
familiar method of manipulation for managers, which makes it a main point of concern. 
Therefore, the right use of accruals is expected to highly contribute to revealing the firms’ 
true performance and enhancing the transparency of the financial reporting process.  
Even though most studies analysing the impact of equity-based compensation on EM 
found positive association between the two, as managers tend to manipulate the firms’ 
earnings to earn higher compensation, the study conducted by Laux and Laux (2009) and 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) reveal that compensation doesn’t always lead to high 
EM, since higher levels of compensation attract higher levels of monitoring. Meanwhile, 
the short-term component of compensation was observed to have a non-linear 
relationship, as later revealed in section 3.3.1. Hence, the impact of total compensation 
combining the impact of the short-term with the long-term components of compensation 
is worth analysing. Nevertheless, according to Jensen (1993) and Ozkan (2011) CEO 
compensation is considered a reward for managers for leading their firms, as they were 
believed to discourage managers from getting engaged in EM practices and higher 
conflicts of interests, hence, the question arising is whether they will actually help restrain 
EM practices or become a reason behind even higher level of manipulation. The purpose 
of analysing the impact of the moderating role of CEO compensation relies on the demand 
of prior studies such as in Cornett et al. (2008) and Burnett et al. (2012) for analysing the 
impact of joint relations between two or more corporate governance mechanisms on EM, 
in an attempt of better restraining managerial opportunism and EM practices. Therefore, 
the incentive power of compensation along with the monitoring and controlling power of 
another corporate governance mechanism is expected to add value in reducing earnings’ 
manipulations and enhancing the reliability of the firms’ reported earnings.  
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Consequently, the motivation for holding a comparative analysis between the UK and the 
US markets is that they both share many similarities, with some unique differences in the 
core of this study. The two are developed countries, have regulated stock markets, their 
firms have dispersed ownership of shares, and they both contribute towards much of the 
worldwide turnover. Yet, one of the main differences between the two countries is that 
they both follow different regulations. US-listed firms must comply with the GAAP, 
while the UK-listed firms must comply with the IFRS, which are found to act differently 
in terms of the financial reporting quality. According to Beest et al. (2009), higher 
financial reporting quality is provided by the US GAAP, while higher relevance of annual 
reports is provided by the IFRS. Another main difference relies on the roles of their CEOs 
since CEOs of US firms hold the two positions of the CEO and the chairman of the board 
Higgs (2003). Holding higher responsibility results in higher CEO compensation 
accordingly, which may impact EM practices differently (Aguilera et al., 2006 and 
Conyon and Murphy, 2000). According to Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009), firms which 
follow dual leadership pattern, as in the UK, are viewed by auditors to have stronger 
internal control and hence, their demand for external monitoring becomes lower. 
Therefore, a comparative analysis is worth analysing.  
In this study, the impact of cash holdings on EM is analysed, since cash holdings are 
expected to be highly involved with the rise of managers’ opportunistic behaviours, as 
they become tempted to use the firms’ cash towards achieving their personal benefits. 
Relying on the entrenchment and the agency theories, this is very risky as managers seek 
to secure their positions and increase their authorities, leading to higher information 
asymmetry between managers and their shareholders. This is the first comparative 
analysis conducted on the impact of cash holdings on EM, between the US and the UK, 
within these recent years of analysis. The motivation for using the cash and cash 
equivalent figure, rather than the FCFs, is that it is an accumulated figure representing 
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the excess cash available throughout the years (Wild et al., 2012). The presence of CEO 
compensation is expected to reduce this positive association, due to its incentive power 
to align managers’ interests with those of the shareholders’, leading to less participation 
of EM and higher transparency of financial reporting. Therefore, their joint effect is also 
worth analysing. Nevertheless, dividing the sample into high and low cash holding firms 
allows for analysing the validity of the moderation effect of CEO compensation in each 
subsample, to provide better insights of what best restrains managerial opportunism in 
the presence of different levels of cash within UK and US firms.   
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1.6. Research Contributions 
This research study covers the period of twelve years, from 2005- 2016, and covers the 
following contributions: 
1. This is the first study to analyse the impact of the moderating role of CEO 
compensation on the associations between four factors and EM practices, these 
factors are the audit quality, the institutional ownership, the concentrated 
ownership, and the cash holdings. CEO compensation as a whole, including the 
short-term and the long-term components of compensation, is analysed, to reveal 
the overall impact of compensation as an incentive for managers to work for the 
firms’ best interests. Not much analysis has been conducted using the total CEO 
compensation, except for Hassen (2014), Cheng et al. (2016) and Chou and Chan 
(2018), as most of the prior studies focused on either the long-term or the short-
term components of compensation, as previously discussed in section 1.5. Hassen 
(2014) based their analysis on a sample of French firms listed on the SBF 120, 
from 2007-2010, while Cheng et al. (2016) and Chou and Chan (2018) based their 
analysis on the impact of total compensation in relation to real EM practices, 
rather than accrual-based EM. In addition, Ozkan (2011) reports that the use of 
total compensation is considered a more appropriate measure than focusing on 
just one component of compensation while ignoring the other, as it presents a 
more complete picture when analysing the firm performance in the UK. The use 
of total compensation is also supported by Conyon et al. (2001) when analysing 
corporate tournaments. Therefore, analysing the total CEO compensation in 
relation to AEM in the two contexts of the UK and the US is worth conducting. 
The idea behind the moderation effect is suggested by prior studies such as 
Cornett et al. (2008), Burnett et al. (2012) and Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) since 
control mechanisms are interrelated, so the failure of one mechanism can be offset 
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by the other. Hence, the moderating role of CEO compensation is expected to 
have a significant impact in reducing EM practices when combined with other 
corporate governance mechanisms. The monitoring and controlling powers 
exerted by these mechanisms, in line with the incentive power of CEO 
compensation, together are expected to align managers’ interests with their 
shareholders’, restrain EM and enhance the reliability of the reported earnings, 
leading to lower conflicts of interests arising between the two parties. Moreover, 
the strengths of these joint effects are also analysed, to reveal their magnitudes, 
of whether they act as complements or substitutes, in restraining EM practices. In 
doing so, the complementary/ substitutive analysis is performed based on the joint 
effects’ coefficients.   
2. This study is a comparative analysis between the UK and the US, to analyse the 
effectiveness of the moderating role of CEO compensation, in both contexts. The 
reason behind conducting the analysis in the US, compared with the UK, is that 
the two share many similarities, with some unique differences. One of these 
differences is that the two have different roles of CEOs, upon which the level of 
CEO compensation differs. As previously discussed in section 1.5, the UK 
follows a dual leadership pattern, while on the contrary, in US firms, managers 
have greater responsibilities as they hold the two roles (Higgs, 2003). 
Accordingly, the level of compensation differs relying on the level of 
responsibility held by managers, and hence, the impact of the CEO compensation 
as a moderator, on the associations between the different determinants of EM and 
EM levels, may act differently in the two contexts. In addition, as previously 
discussed in section 1.5, the two markets follow different rules and regulations, 
of the US GAAP vs. the IFRS, when preparing their financial reports, which may 
act differently in terms of the quality and relevance of their financial reports 
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(Beest et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the two countries share many similarities as 
previously discussed in the prior section. The underlying structure of their capital 
markets and companies are similar, and they both contribute in generating much 
of the worldwide turnover (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Streeck and Yamamura, 
2001, and Gerakos et al., 2013). Therefore, analysing the above-mentioned 
associations in the two contexts is expected to add value in determining what best 
constrains EM practices in the two countries. Thus, the analysis is performed on 
UK firms listed on the FTSE 350 index, since it includes the economically most 
important firms, in comparison with the US listed firms, listed on the S&P 500 
index since it is the most commonly used index in the US and the benchmark for 
the US stock market. 
3. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first comparative study to analyse the 
impact of the cash holdings on the level of discretionary accruals, as a proxy for 
EM, in the UK and the US contexts between these recent years of analysis. 
Besides, previous studies in this area were conducted using the firms’ FCF levels, 
rather than the total cash which the firm owns, as previously discussed in the prior 
section. Hence, cash holdings are analysed using the total cash and cash 
equivalents, to give a better indication of the amount of cash available at firms, 
since it is an accumulated figure. Firms holding high levels of cash have greater 
flexibility and higher opportunity to enter into new investments, without the need 
for acquiring higher debts and being committed to higher interest obligations. 
However, with the presence of high cash levels within firms, there may appear 
the involvement of higher monitoring or higher managerial opportunism. To 
further clarify, there are two possibilities which appear when holding cash. On 
one hand, higher monitoring and control can be exerted upon firms when high 
cash levels exist, restricting managers from spending this cash opportunistically, 
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leading to lower levels of discretionary accruals participated by the managers, 
hence, restraining EM. On the other hand, it becomes difficult to align the interests 
of managers with those of the shareholders’ in the presence of high cash levels, 
as managers become tempted to use this cash towards their personal desires, 
wasting this cash on non-value-maximizing projects. Therefore, the association 
between cash holding and EM is worth analysing. To further add to this 
contribution, since higher cash levels are perceived to involve higher earnings’ 
manipulations, the effectiveness of the remaining corporate governance 
mechanisms, as well as the moderation effects of CEO compensation, are 
analysed in low compared to high cash holding firms. Based on this analysis, firms 
are advised of which monitoring and controlling mechanisms are most effective 
in the presence of different levels of cash, to reduce the participation of EM. 
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1.7. Summary of the Key Findings 
First, this research finds a positive association between the total CEO compensation and 
EM practices of UK listed firms, even though the US are found to distribute much higher 
compensation compared to UK firms. The audit quality is found to have a positive 
association in relation to EM in the US market. The concentrated ownership is found to 
act differently in the two markets, so even though a positive association is observed in 
the UK market, it is found to be an effective controlling mechanism in reducing EM 
practices in the US market. In addition, the institutional ownership, as well as the cash 
holdings, are observed to have no association with EM practices of UK and US firms.  
Second, when introducing the moderating role of CEO compensation to the model, the 
firm’s cash holding is observed to have a positive association with EM practices of US-
listed firms, due to managers’ intention of hiding their misuse of the firms’ funds. In 
addition, the moderation effect of CEO compensation is found to be an effective strategy 
in restraining EM practices, when joined with the cash holdings. The distribution of CEO 
compensation, in the presence of cash holdings, in the US market is observed to reduce 
managerial opportunism. Meanwhile, none of the corporate governance mechanisms or 
the moderation effects proves to be effective in reducing EM practices, in the UK market.  
Third, in the presence of low levels of cash within UK firms, CEO compensation as well 
as audit fees’ spending, are revealed to restrain EM practices, while ownership 
concentration is observed to increase the participation of EM. Even though the joint effect 
of CEO compensation with audit quality is observed to have a positive association in 
relation to EM, the distribution of CEO compensation in the presence of ownership 
concentration is proved to restrain managerial opportunism in LCASH firms in the UK. 
Hence, if low cash holding firms intend to reduce earnings’ manipulations in the UK 
context, they are advised to allow for a lower percentage of shareholdings to be held by 
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block-holders or to incorporate CEO compensation in line with the presence of ownership 
concentration to reduce their negative impact. As alternatives, these firms may decide to 
increase their spending on audit services or CEO compensation, so that they can limit the 
managerial opportunism. In regards to the UK HCASH firms, or the US firms, neither 
one of the corporate governance mechanisms, nor the moderation effects, prove to add 
value within UK HCASH firms or US firms holding different levels of cash, whether low 
or high.   
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1.8. Research Outline 
This research study analyses the above described three contributions. This research 
consists of eight chapters, of which their outline is presented below:  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter helps to introduce the topic. It presents the background of the topic, the 
research focus, the research aim and objectives, as well as the research questions and how 
this study intends to answer them. It identifies the main contributions of this research 
study and presents a summary of the key research findings. 
Chapter 2: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework of this research. It presents five of the 
main earnings management theories, identifies the relevant theories for my research study 
and explains which of them is applicable to this research. Finally, it presents the 
opportunistic concept of EM. 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
This chapter presents the literature relevant to this research area, of how each variable 
used in this study acts in relation to EM. It also identifies the research gaps, as well as the 
significance of conducting this research to fulfil these gaps. This chapter leads to the 
formation of the research hypotheses which are tested in the following chapters.  
Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
This chapter presents the similarities and differences between the UK and the US markets. 
It identifies the sample size and data collection sources. It presents the research model, 
the research method, and provides a clear picture of how this research is carried out. It 
specifies the variables used in this study, along with their measurements.  
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Chapter 5: Earnings Management Constraints in the UK and US  
This chapter presents the findings of the impact of five factors on EM, these are the CEO 
compensation, the audit quality, the institutional ownership, the concentrated ownership, 
as well as the cash holdings on the participation of EM. It also compares the findings of 
the UK and the US-listed firms.  
Chapter 6: Earnings Management Constraints in the UK and US: The Moderating 
Role of CEO Compensation  
This chapter presents the findings of the impact of the moderating role of CEO 
compensation in restraining EM practices. It compares the findings of the UK and US 
listed firms, to reveal the effectiveness of the controlling mechanisms in the two contexts. 
It concludes with some recommendations for investors about where to invest their funds. 
Chapter 7: Earnings Management Constraints in the UK and US: The Moderating 
Role of CEO compensation in Low vs. High Cash Holding Firms  
This chapter clarifies the impact of the moderating role of CEO compensation in the 
presence of low compared to high cash holdings within firms. It reveals the effectiveness 
of the remaining corporate governance mechanisms incorporated when firms hold low or 
high levels of cash. It also compares the findings of the UK and the US-listed firms.  
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter summarises the research findings. It clarifies what best constrains the 
participation of EM in the UK and the US markets, in an attempt of enhancing the 
reliability of the reported earnings. It identifies the limitations which were present 
throughout this research and concludes with some recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the relevant theories to earnings management and highlights their 
relevance to this study. These are the agency theory, the entrenchment theory, the 
signalling theory, the stewardship theory, and the stakeholder theory. It explains which 
of them is applicable to this research study on the impact of the moderating role of CEO 
compensation. It also explains the opportunistic concept of earnings management and 
presents the conceptual framework of this research in an attempt of restraining earnings 
management practices of UK and US firms.  
 
2.2. Theories of Earnings Management 
2.2.1. Agency Theory 
The agency theory is developed as a result of the separation between the principals- 
shareholders, and their agents- managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Shareholders do 
not engage in the management process of their firms, and hence, they assign the authority 
of making decisions to managers, who have the power to lead the firms on behalf of the 
shareholders and to be responsible for managing operations of these firms. According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), this separation between the ownership and control creates 
conflicts of interests between the two parties, resulting in higher information asymmetry, 
and higher costs associated with resolving these conflicts.  
According to Basiruddin (2011), the presence of information asymmetry between the two 
parties results in two main agency problems: moral hazard and adverse selection. The 
moral hazard problem is involved in the presence of hidden actions, which are exercised 
when managers are tempted to follow their personal interests. These opportunistic 
behaviours arise when shareholders don’t observe the actions performed by their agents. 
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The adverse selection problems, however, are involved with the presence of hidden 
information, as managers hold information from the shareholders. Both of these problems 
result in the appearance of earnings management, which makes it difficult for 
shareholders, debt issuers, and investors to identify the true economic value of the firms. 
Problems arise when managers neglect shareholders’ interests, as well as the firms’ best 
interests, and focus on their own personal benefits (Habbash, 2010). Therefore, 
shareholders must find ways to motivate these managers to perform in the firms’ favour, 
rather than their own, to ensure higher overall performance for their firms and lower costs 
associated with managers’ opportunistic behaviours. According to Leuz et al. (2003), 
managers’ interests tend to increase the firms’ costs in many different forms. These costs 
are associated with the formation of contracts of unfavourable projects, or losses resulting 
from inappropriate decisions made by these managers, or even through the 
implementation of additional costs spent for control purposes.  
According to Davidson et al. (2004), agency costs are associated with the existence of 
earnings management practices, which occur when managers try to manipulate the firms’ 
earnings to provide inaccurate financial reporting information. Managers become 
tempted to manipulate the firms’ earnings in order to meet expected targets or outperform 
those targets, especially if they receive bonuses tied to these targets. Their desire to excel 
in order to receive higher rewards is what tempts managers to manipulate and fabricate 
the reported earnings, leading to higher information asymmetry between managers and 
their shareholders. As a result, a lower reliability of the reported earnings raises the need 
for monitoring and controlling mechanisms to restrain managerial opportunism. 
In order to reduce the agency costs arising from the conflicts of interests between 
principles and their agents, firms must limit managers’ authorities in order to ensure that 
shareholders’ interests are well represented. Corporate governance helps in resolving the 
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principle-agent problem according to Fama (1980). Managers’ practices and their 
opportunistic behaviours are restrained by the implementation of the different corporate 
governance mechanisms (Williamson, 1988). According to Cohen et al. (2004), corporate 
governance influences the credibility of the financial statements and the reliability of the 
firms’ reported earnings.  
Corporate governance tends to eliminate these agency costs and reduce the participation 
of earnings management, as they constrain managerial opportunism in order to enhance 
the financial reporting process (Alzoubi, 2016). The agency theory encourages the use of 
different internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance (Weir et al., 2002). 
The ownership structure of firms is considered one of the main corporate governance 
mechanisms in monitoring managers’ practices and reducing the participation of earnings 
management (Alzoubi, 2016). According to Donaldson (1990) making executives 
owners, by increasing their shareholdings in the firms, help eliminate the conflict of 
interest, as their interests become aligned with those of the shareholders’. Hence, they 
become keen to enhance their firms’ values, to maximize earnings and profitability.  
Another internal control mechanism as presented by Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983) can be through the use of audit committees, which are run by the boards of 
directors who act as decision control systems. According to Watts and Zimmerman 
(1983), high quality of external auditing eliminates the opportunistic behaviours of 
managers. The role of these external auditors, as a result of being independent of the 
management, is to reduce the information asymmetry and enhance the quality of the 
financial reports produced (Piot, 2001). Therefore, the role of external auditing is 
considered an effective mechanism which provides a checks and balances system and 
enables shareholders to monitor and control managerial opportunism.  
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Tosi et al. (2003) indicate the importance of compensating managers in order to align 
their interests and motivate them to make decisions which maximize shareholders’ 
wealth. All these different monitoring and controlling mechanisms help reduce the 
conflicts of interest between managers and their shareholders, to control earnings and 
maximize corporate wealth. Therefore, in this study, the monitoring roles of external 
auditing and ownership structure are analysed, in line with the incentive power of CEO 
compensation, as corporate governance mechanisms for reducing the participation of 
earnings management and the information asymmetry between the two parties. 
 
2.2.2. Entrenchment Theory 
According to this theory, the primary objective of managers is to increase their authorities 
and their discretionary spaces in order to benefit from the firms’ resources (Kouaib and 
Jarboui, 2014). Managers’ logic aims to maintain and broaden managerial discretion, 
which is considered proof of their opportunism (Kouaib and Jarboui, 2014). Hence, when 
managerial ownership is high, it becomes difficult to make favourable decisions to 
enhance firms’ values, as a result of their high discretions and earnings management 
accordingly (Morck et al., 1988). The reason behind this is that managers prioritise their 
personal interests first while placing the value maximization of the firms at second place 
(Kouaib and Jarboui, 2014). 
According to Fan and Wong (2002), gaining control of a firm gives the controlling owner 
the power to determine how profits are distributed among shareholders. Even though the 
minority shareholders are entitled to dividends resulting from their investments, they still 
face an uncertainty that owners in control may prevent them from this right. Controlling 
shareholders may benefit from transactions of which their profits are transferred to other 
firms under their control (Fan and Wong, 2002). They may also chase non-value-
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maximizing objectives just to satisfy their personal needs and desires. Hence, high 
managerial ownership may empower managers, especially if they are exposed to less 
governance by boards of directors (Fan and Wong, 2002). 
According to De Miguel (2004), a high level of managerial ownership tends to have a 
negative impact on firms’ performance as managers become entrenched. The reason 
behind this managerial entrenchment is that the boards of directors are not totally 
independent from the management, which reduces the monitoring upon them and gives 
them the chance to manipulate the firm’s earnings and use the firm’s resources 
opportunistically. This, however, opposes the idea of the alignment hypothesis, which 
indicates that with high managerial ownership, managers’ interests become aligned with 
those of minority shareholders, which pushes managers to care for the firms’ best interests 
instead of their own (De Miguel, 2004). The alignment hypothesis is quite similar to the 
stewardship theory, discussed later, in its concept of increasing the managerial ownership 
in an attempt of aligning managers’ interests, as further revealed in section 2.2.4.  
 
2.2.3. Signalling Theory 
The signalling theory justifies some accounting practices. Accounting figures are 
considered tools which signal market trends. Earnings management is used to transmit 
information to investors, mainly of the expected long-term performance of the firm, 
within the limits of the law (Birjandi et al., 2015). Managers tend to manipulate the 
accounting figures in order to signal a higher firm value to investors. According to Cheon 
et al. (2001), information asymmetry guides stock price reactions during the publication 
of the accounting information. Hence, due to the high competition between firms and 
their desire to attract more investors, managers tend to manage the firms’ earnings to 
signal higher values and attract investors (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
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According to Prior et al. (2008) managers tend to perform discretionary actions to 
manipulate the firm’s earnings in order to hide the firm’s true economic value and 
transmit any favourable or unfavourable information about the firm’s future performance 
to the capital markets. Earnings management can indicate better earnings and future cash 
flows of the firm for the investors. Managers become motivated to voluntarily disclose 
any additional accounting information to enhance the corporate image and signal a higher 
firm’s value in order to attract investors (Sun et al., 2010). According to Gray (2007), 
corporate social responsibility activities performed by firms, signal higher quality of its 
management.  
The quality of the firm’s financial reporting sends signals to the financial markets and 
powerful stakeholders that the firm’s management is capable of controlling the social and 
environmental risks within the firm and that their market value is in a good condition 
(Gray, 2007). Taking part in corporate social responsibility practices helps the firm to 
gain a higher reputation for responsibility and reliability from the financial markets- 
capital and debt markets. From managers’ perspectives, corporate social responsibility 
practices act as signals which draw shareholder’s attention away from managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours on which they can be punished (Sun et al., 2010). 
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2.2.4. Stewardship Theory 
Unlike the agency theory, the stewardship theory suggests that managers’ interests are 
similar to those of the firms’ and their shareholders’ (Donaldson & Davis, 1994). The 
theory suggests that managers are trustworthy and behave in a good manner to protect the 
firms’ resources under managers’ control, which makes the monitoring and controlling 
procedures unnecessary (Donaldson & Davis, 1994). Managers are believed to act in the 
firms’ best interests, without any selfishness to seek their managerial opportunism. It 
encourages shareholders to trust managers to act on their own, without implementing 
monitoring and control measures, but rather to reduce the costs of monitoring.  
Therefore, firms must focus on how to empower and facilitate managers, instead of how 
to monitor and control them, as opposed to the agency theory (Habbash, 2010). Similarly, 
Hung (1998) believes that firms must focus on implementing their strategic roles, rather 
than their monitoring roles. According to the stewardship theory, managers tend to prefer 
a high level of responsibility accompanied by a high level of authority. They are believed 
to be inspired by non-financial motivations, when they perform in a challenging working 
environment, to get recognition for their efforts and become highly satisfied (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1994). Managers are believed to become more satisfied from achieving the 
firms’ goals and objectives than their own interests (Davis et al., 1997). This concludes 
that managers’ decisions are not linked to the presence of financial motives, but their need 
for recognition, achievement and authority.  
According to Daily et al. (2003) managers are believed to act ethically in order to protect 
their reputations as expert decision makers, and hence, they tend to perform in a good 
manner to reflect their good intentions in enhancing the firms’ values. Moreover, 
managers are believed to make huge efforts in maximizing the firms’ profits in order to 
gain higher reputations to better protect their positions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As a 
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result, boards of directors are considered to act as tools which assist CEOs, rather than 
monitor them (Albrecht et al., 2004).  
Nevertheless, managers are believed to make more effective decisions if they have 
relevant and reliable information available at their request. Therefore, boards which are 
dominated by executive directors are believed to outperform others due to their 
knowledge, expertise, commitment and high access to information (Boyd, 1995). This 
indicates that CEOs holding the two positions of the chief executive and the chairman of 
the board result in higher firm performance, due to the clear and unified leadership (Davis 
et al., 1997). They believe that trust, empowerment, open communication, performance 
enhancement and long-term orientation are important factors for the implementation of 
the stewardship theory. 
Choo and Tan (2007), however, argue that boards without non-executive directors can 
tempt managers to manipulate the firms’ earnings which reduce the reliability of the 
firms’ reported earnings, or even to commit fraud. According to Albrecht et al. (2004), 
extreme trust provided by shareholders towards their agents provides managers with the 
opportunities to engage in non-value maximizing projects, to manipulate the firms’ 
earnings, to act towards achieving their personal benefits or to commit fraud. Therefore, 
managers’ interests may not always be aligned with those of the shareholders’ as 
suggested by this theory, which makes the stewardship theory hard to believe.   
 
2.2.5. Stakeholder Theory 
This theory is developed by Freeman (1984). Stakeholders are defined as any groups or 
individuals who influence or are influenced by the attainment of the firms’ objectives 
(Freeman, 1984). Therefore, the term ‘stakeholder’ refers to anyone who has a direct or 
indirect relationship with the firm (Carroll, 1993). Direct stakeholders refer to 
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shareholders, investors, customers, suppliers, and employees, or any of those whose 
interests are aligned with those of the firm’s; the government, however, is considered an 
indirect stakeholder, as it is indirectly affected by the firm (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
The concept behind the stakeholder theory is that firms become responsible towards all 
kinds of stakeholders in order to benefit the society as a whole, rather than only benefiting 
the shareholders.  
There are three attributes which help identify stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997); yet, not 
all three of these attributes must be present. The first attribute deals with the power of 
stakeholders in influencing their firms. Second, the validity of the relationship between 
the firm and its stakeholders. Third, the significance of their claim on the firm. The boards 
of directors are expected to care for the interests of the different stakeholders, rather than 
the interests of just the shareholders, in order to reduce the conflicts of interests and 
achieve the firms’ objectives (Freeman, 1984 and Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
In an attempt of protecting the differing interests of the various stakeholders, the 
stakeholder’s theory suggests that the use of external auditing and corporate governance 
mechanisms are considered effective monitoring tools. The use of external auditors for 
control purposes is also supported by Baker et al (2002). It is found not only to protect 
shareholders’ interests but the interests of all kinds of stakeholders. Managers may be 
able to produce higher value to satisfy all stakeholders’ interests if they can reduce the 
conflicts of interests between them (Freeman et al., 2004). According to Schilling (2000), 
management theories tend to focus on motives driven by firms’ profits and their high 
responsibility towards shareholders, while the stakeholder’s theory, focuses on the 
maintenance and growth of all stakeholder groups.  
According to the stakeholder theory, there is a link between the different stakeholder 
groups and their firms, which causes them to be affected by the firms’ decisions. 
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According to Freeman et al. (2004), managers should be responsible for establishing and 
maintaining good relationships, inspiring stakeholders, and creating suitable communities 
where all stakeholders can jointly act to produce greater firm value. Managers are 
required to maintain good relationships with all stakeholder groups since not all 
stakeholders own equity stakes of the firms. Therefore, new performance evaluation 
measures are demanded, to reflect the interests of the non-equity stakeholders, instead of 
the traditional measures of assessing shareholder wealth and profits. 
This theory, however, is criticised for the difficulty to align the interests of all the different 
stakeholder groups, while overwhelming managers of satisfying the different 
stakeholders’ needs without specific guidelines for solving the resulting conflicts of 
interests (Hoque, 2006). To further explain, not all stakeholders are equally and most 
effectively represented, as a result of their differing and conflicting interests (Etzioni, 
1998). Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) also argue that it is not realistic for managers to take 
all stakeholders’ interests into account, due the large number of stakeholders associated 
with the firm, which creates a huge burden on managers. They further explain that 
maximizing the shareholder value is the only objective which influences the decision-
making process and leads to enhancing the outcomes for all stakeholders.  
In conclusion, the above discussion presents the main earnings management theories and 
their relevance to the financial reporting quality of firms. For the purpose of this study of 
the impact of the moderating role of CEO compensation on the association between the 
determinants of EM, four of these theories are the most relevant to this research study 
and are further discussed in relation to each of the determinants of EM. These four 
theories are the agency theory, the entrenchment theory, the signalling theory, the 
stewardship theory. These theories tend to be the most relevant, as revealed in the 
following discussion, while the stakeholder theory seems to be less relevant to the aim of 
this study since it cannot be confirmed or rejected through the research findings. Besides, 
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this research focuses on protecting shareholders’ interests from the managerial 
opportunism and enhancing the reliability of the reported earnings presented to them in 
specific, rather than considering all types of stakeholders in general. In addition to the 
fact that this theory received much criticism, as previously discussed. 
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2.3. Opportunistic Concept of Earnings Management  
Based on the agency theory, conflicts of interests arise between managers and 
shareholders of firms, as a result of managers using the firms’ resources towards 
achieving their personal desires. Shareholders of firms, which are run by professional 
managers, are expected to experience higher losses due to the high earnings’ 
manipulations performed by those managers, who work for their own benefits, rather than 
the firm’s overall benefit (Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012). Managers tend to engage in 
sub-optimal investment projects or worthless investments, in order to make information 
about cash flows private to the eyes of corporate insiders and to hide them from external 
shareholders. Hence, several controlling mechanisms can be practised in an attempt of 
reducing these earnings management practices.  
The use of financial leverage, for instance, helps in reducing the free cash flow available 
at managers’ disposal, and hence, helps in reducing the agency problem between 
managers and shareholders. Leverage can act as a monitoring and controlling mechanism 
in restraining earnings management practices, since the firm’s reliance on leverage, rather 
than on the firm’s retained earnings, as a source of finance, comes with a great obligation. 
The use of leverage, not only reduces the cash flows in the hands of managers but makes 
firms obligated to fulfil interest payments associated with acquiring these debts (Jensen, 
1986). According to Harvey et al. (2004), the financial leverage tends to reduce the 
agency costs, due to the greater monitoring imposed by the debt issuers to secure their 
debts, leading to lower earnings’ manipulations. 
According to Matsunaga and Park (2001), managers tend to manipulate the earnings if 
they don’t achieve the required earnings’ targets, or in an attempt of increasing their 
compensation and job security according to Healy and Wahlen (1999). This is considered 
an unethical behaviour of managers, as it provides investors and shareholders with a 
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falsified picture about the firm’s performance, which creates information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders, leading to more conflicts of interests between the 
two. Therefore, restraining earnings management practices becomes of great importance 
to enhance the reliability of the firms’ reported earnings, and to provide a clear picture of 
the firms’ performance to their investors. Hence, this research is formed to find the 
appropriate mechanisms for UK and US firms to follow, in order to reduce managerial 
opportunism and their participation of EM.  
 
2.4. Conceptual Framework 
This research is designed to find what restrains earnings management practices within the 
UK and the US markets. Relying on the agency and the entrenchment theories, managers 
tend to hide information from shareholders in an attempt to strengthening their positions 
and gaining control over the firms, which creates information asymmetry between the 
two parties. In addition, managers tend to report higher earnings to signal good firm 
performance to mislead investors and shareholders, according to the signalling theory. 
CEO compensation is considered a reward for managers for leading their firms. 
Therefore, the incentive power of CEO compensation is expected to help in aligning 
managers’ interests with those of the shareholders’, when joined with another monitoring 
and controlling mechanism. These proposed joint effects are expected to reduce earnings 
management practices, leading to lower information asymmetry and lower agency 
problems between the two parties. Moreover, in an attempt of further reducing the 
earnings management practices and improving the integrity of the financial reporting 
processes of firms, the impact of the moderating role of CEO compensation is analysed 
in low cash holding firms. Cash is considered to be the main source for tempting 
managers to engage in non-value maximizing investments and to follow their 
opportunistic desires, according to the entrenchment theory and the agency theory. 
   
44 
 
Managers are believed to be tempted to use the firms’ cash to achieve their personal 
interests and strengthen their positions, regardless of the firms’ best interests, which 
results in a wider gap between managers and shareholders. Therefore, analysing the 
moderating role of CEO compensation in low cash holding firms will help in revealing 
the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms, as well as the impact of the 
moderation effect of CEO compensation, in the presence of low levels of cash. Figure 2.1 
illustrates the conceptual framework of this research study.  
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework 
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2.5. Summary 
In summary, this chapter discusses the opportunistic concept of EM and the conceptual 
framework applied for achieving the aims and objectives of this research. It presents the 
EM theories relevant to this research. The above discussion reveals the purpose of 
conducting this research study on reducing the participation of EM in both contexts. 
Hence, the following chapter presents the relevant literature to this research area, 
discusses the impact of the research variables on EM, highlights the research gaps and 
presents the hypotheses which are tested throughout this research study.  
 
  
   
46 
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter identifies literature relevant to this research of how the different governance 
mechanisms impact earnings management. It discusses earnings management measures 
and four mechanisms for reducing earnings management practices- the audit quality, the 
managerial ownership, the institutional ownership, and the concentrated ownership. It 
also presents the literature related to the impact of cash holdings on EM. It highlights 
some of the research gaps and how these gaps are fulfilled. It presents the relevant 
hypotheses, in an attempt of reducing earnings management practices and enhancing the 
reliability of the firms’ reported earnings. 
 
3.2. Earnings Management Motivations 
Earnings per share (EPS) forecasts are used as indicators of firms’ performance in the 
capital markets (Burnett et al., 2012). Firms which meet or beat these EPS benchmarks, 
tend to enjoy higher credibility (Graham et al., 2005). However, if firms fail to achieve 
these EPS benchmarks, their stock prices fall, which causes the managers’ compensation 
levels to decline accordingly (Matsunaga and Park, 2001). Therefore, managers’ 
reputations become at risk (Graham et al., 2005), and they become encouraged to engage 
in earnings management (EM) practices. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
managers engage in EM practices in order to enhance financial statements and inflate 
stock prices before the securities public offerings, to increase their compensation and job 
security, and to avoid the consequences of breaching debt contracts, in addition to 
reducing regulatory costs.  
There are two common categories of earnings management (Burnett et al., 2012). First, 
the accrual-based earnings management (AEM), which occurs when managers decide to 
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manipulate the firm’s earnings through the use of accounting choices and estimates. They 
intend to use their discretions, with or without restrictions, for the purpose of maximizing 
the firm’s value or fulfilling their opportunistic needs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
Second, the real earnings management (REM), which occurs when managers’ decisions 
affect cash flow levels, as well as the reported earnings (Burnett et al., 2012). Another 
EM method is classification shifting (McVay, 2006). According to Healy (1985), 
managers who receive incentives consistent with those of the firm’s owners may choose 
to follow accounting choices to hide private information from investors or use their 
discretions to inflate earnings and deserve a higher compensation accordingly.  
According to Healy (1985), financial statements must be prepared using some judgements 
in accordance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). These 
judgements may be related to estimating the amount of receivables which have a high 
probability of being collected, as well as in using the suitable method of allocating the 
cost of equipment. Managers may choose accounting methods in an attempt to increase 
the stock price before the expiration of their stock options, or else they may intend to 
undervalue the stock price, depending on the private information they hold and how to 
opportunistically benefit from such methods (Healy, 1985). Even though some 
accounting choices involve EM practices, EM is not restricted to the accounting choices 
made but extends far beyond these choices.  
Neither the AEM nor the REM violates the GAAP principles. They tend to hide the firm’s 
real economic performance (Dechow et al., 2010). According to Luong (2015), there are 
two main types of accruals, current and non-current. Current accruals involve current 
assets or liabilities, while non-current accruals involve depreciation and amortization 
charges. AEM is applied through the under-provisioning of bad debt expenses 
(McNichols and Wilson, 1988), or by changing the depreciation methods for fixed assets 
(Adams et al., 2009) or by delaying assets write-offs (Elliott and Shaw, 1988), which can 
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bias the reported earnings in a specific direction without changing the underlying 
transaction. AEM has no direct effect on the firms’ cash flows and hence is less likely to 
destroy the long-term firm value. 
According to Chung et al. (2005), poor investment projects will be revealed in the firm’s 
future reported profits as earnings will be reduced. Therefore, managers tend to use 
accounting procedures in order to cover-up for the non-value-maximizing investments 
and to display an increase in the reported income, which results in higher market 
valuation. They practice earnings management by managing the discretionary accruals of 
firms. Managers tend to manage earnings when the reported income includes cash flows 
or when there are changes in the firm’s value, which are not reflected in its current cash 
flows. The cash flows are easy to measure, however computing the changes in the firm’s 
value is more difficult to measure as it involves managers’ discretion (Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006). Hence, the accruals of income tend to match the cash flows with the 
reported income.  
Another issue with the current cash flows is that they don’t reflect the consumption of the 
firm’s resources, therefore, the firm’s income needs to be adjusted for the use of the firm’s 
assets, so the difference between cash flows and earnings reflects the depreciation of these 
assets (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Firms can change their earnings by considering 
a higher or a lower rate of depreciation. Furthermore, firms may record expenses, which 
are not expected to generate future profit, as investment expenditures. Additionally, using 
credit sales leave enough room for earnings’ manipulations (Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006). In constructing the firm’s income, some assumptions must be made in regards to 
the speed of collecting the firm’s receivables and the percentage of bad debts. These 
decisions involve managers’ discretion- which creates the potential for manipulating the 
firm’s income.  
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Real earnings management tend to focus on achieving the short-term goals than on 
enhancing the firm’s future value (Roychowdhury, 2006), such as in the R&D 
expenditures, in decisions related to capital investments, and stock repurchases (Burnett 
et al., 2012). Hribar et al. (2006) find that accretive stock repurchases, as a REM tool, 
increase when firms fall below the EPS targets. This method is typically used to increase 
the reported EPS, as firms buy shares of their own stock on the open market (Vermaelen, 
2005). According to Healy (1985), managers may choose to engage in REM through 
increasing production in order to reduce the fixed cost per unit, and reduce the R&D 
expenditures, to display a lower cost of goods sold, which leads to higher reported 
earnings.  
REM are difficult to track by outsiders such as auditors and regulators, compared to AEM 
(Cohen et al., 2008 and Zang, 2012). The reason behind this is that REM is easily 
incorporated in the everyday business transactions, while AEM involves accounting 
methods which are much easier to assess and observe by outsiders (Roychowdhury, 
2006). Both of these EM mechanisms become questionable since managers use them in 
order to hide information related to unsuccessful investments and to mislead stakeholders 
about the firm’s performance (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
Classification shifting is another earnings management mechanism, related to the 
misclassification of recurring expenses- operating expenses, as non-recurring expenses 
reported in the income statement, to meet or beat earnings’ benchmarks (Zalata and 
Roberts, 2016). Classification shifting is achieved through shifting expenses down from 
recurring to non-recurring and exceptional items, to inflate the core earnings. Therefore, 
managers are motivated to misclassify part of their recurring expenses in order to report 
higher core earnings. According to McVay (2006) classification shifting is preferred than 
other EM methods for two reasons. First, it does not change the GAAP net income, which 
does not attract auditors’ attention. Second, it does not affect future earnings, since it 
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doesn’t rely on the use of accruals which reverse in the next period, or the loss of future 
returns arising from wasting good investment opportunities.   
When managers are constrained from manipulating the firms’ earnings using accruals, or 
when the cost of accruals management is high, managers tend to switch to other 
manipulation methods which are less likely to be detected (Fan et al., 2010). Hence, the 
misclassification of recurring operating expenses is considered an alternative method of 
manipulation due to the information asymmetry arising between managers, and the 
boards and audit committees, since information at managers’ side are different from those 
disclosed to the boards and audit committees- who are responsible for checking and 
reviewing the appropriate categorization of expenses reported in the income statement 
(Zalata and Roberts, 2016). Appropriate classification of expenses is subject to managers’ 
discretions (McVay, 2006), which may result in managers disclosing less information to 
stronger boards of directors and audit committees (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). 
Classifying items incorrectly misleads the users of financial statements. According to 
Zalata and Roberts (2017) even though US studies provide evidence that managers use 
classification shifting to avoid reporting negative earnings, there is weak evidence of this 
happening in the UK before the adoption of IFRS. Instead, UK firms appear to prefer 
managing analysts’ expectations rather than managing earnings, and that classification 
shifting is implemented only by a small number of large firms to meet or beat 
benchmarks. Zalata and Roberts (2017) found that classification shifting is participated 
by UK firms, after the adoption of IFRS, to avoid reporting a decrease in the core 
earnings, while it is not used to avoid reporting a core earnings’ loss. They also found 
that firms tend to implement classification shifting before acquiring debts, on their 
analysis of UK firms, over the period from 2008- 2010.  
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Finally, the primary objective of using accruals is to present the real financial 
performance of firms by recording revenues and expenses in the same periods in which 
they are incurred, instead of relying on the cash movements. Hence, the right use of 
accruals will help reveal the true performance of firms for the investors. Therefore, this 
study focuses on analysing AEM as it uses a great deal of managers’ discretions, in an 
attempt of finding what factors constrain them, to reduce managerial opportunism and 
enhance the transparency of the financial reporting processes of UK and US firms.     
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3.3. Mechanisms of Reducing Earnings Management 
3.3.1.  CEO Compensation and Earnings Management 
One of the main concerns arising is the agency theory- the conflict of interest arising 
between external investors and managers- who are responsible for determining the firms’ 
investment projects and the pay-out decisions. Managers tend to choose investments 
related to their private benefits regardless of what reduces their exposures to business 
risks (Aggrawal and Samwick, 2003). Managers were believed to be under incentivized, 
which led to the increase of the performance-based compensation, as they were believed 
to discourage managers from getting engaged in earnings management practices (Jensen, 
1993). CEO compensation is one of the corporate governance mechanisms, as expressed 
by Cornett et al. (2008). According to Mehran (1995), a firm’s performance is positively 
related to the number of shares held by managers and to the level of equity-based 
compensation. Hence, CEO compensation is expected to reduce EM and improve the 
firm’s performance, resulting in lower conflicts of interests. 
According to Goergen and Renneboog (2011), basic salary and bonuses are considered 
short-term compensation for managers, which is based on the firm’s size and the weight 
of the responsibility held by the managers. Equity compensation, however, emphasizes 
long-term compensation- pay for performance, in an attempt of encouraging managers to 
engage in investments, which increase the long-term value of the firm, in order to increase 
the value of the equity and the pay-outs of executives’ ownership. Hence, equity 
compensation seems to be more sensitive than cash incentives in motivating and 
enhancing the shareholder’s value.  
According to Healy (1985), performance plans, as well as bonus schemes, are two main 
forms of compensation which depend on earnings. Performance plans reward managers 
for achieving long-term earnings’ targets, in the form of stocks. These earnings’ targets 
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are usually expressed in terms of earnings per share, return on equity, or return on total 
assets (Healy, 1985). Bonus contracts are very similar to performance contracts, but they 
reward managers for achieving short-term (annual) earnings’ targets instead (Healy, 
1985). Firms may operate the two plans simultaneously, however, the differences in the 
definition of earnings and the time horizons of the two plans make it difficult to determine 
their joint effect on executives’ accounting decisions (Healy, 1985). 
Healy (1985) analysed a sample of 94 large US industrial firms, over a period of fifty 
years, from 1930- 1980. He found that high discretionary accruals are expected in all 
years, except when earnings fall below the lower limit eligible for a bonus or above the 
upper bound “big bath”, in order to guarantee future bonuses. Consequently, Gaver et al. 
(1995) extended the study by analysing a sample of 102 US firms for the duration from 
1980- 1990. They used discretionary accruals as an earnings management measure, unlike 
Healy (1985) who used total accruals. They found that high discretionary accruals appear 
when earnings fall below the lower limit eligible for a bonus, as opposed to Healy (1985), 
in order to maintain their bonuses at a constant level. 
According to Sloan (1996), a firm can increase its stock price for a short period of time 
by inflating the current earnings through the use of aggressive accruals assumptions. 
Periods of abnormally high accruals are associated with the increased sale of insider 
shares, while stock returns tend to be poor after the “event period” (Beneish and Vargus, 
2002). They found that options and stock compensations are considered ways by which 
managers can increase their wealth by inflating stock prices in periods surrounding stock 
sales or option exercises.  
Equity compensation has been criticized to involve a higher degree of earnings 
management. Burns and Kedia (2006) found that firms in which CEOs have a large 
amount of options positions are more likely to manage the firm’s earnings. Firms make 
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more aggressive assumptions about returns on selected benefit pension plans during the 
periods in which managers exercise their options (Bergstresser et al., 2006). According 
to Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Cheng and Warfield (2005), the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals is higher, as well as earnings management, at firms in which 
managers’ compensation is tied to the stock value, especially through stock options. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) found that the accruals-based measures of earnings 
management are highly used at firms with higher level of equity-based compensation, 
during the 1990s.  
Additionally, they found that managers tend to manipulate earnings and experience high 
levels of accruals during periods of high CEO option exercises and higher sales of shares 
exercised by insiders and CEOs, which complements the findings of Beneish and Vargus 
(2002). Cornett et al. (2008) also found that earnings management, through the use of 
discretionary accruals, moves in line with managers’ incentives, so it increases with the 
increase of options compensation of CEOs. They found that earnings management can be 
reduced, however, by monitoring managers’ discretion, either through the existence of 
institutional ownership of shares, or institutional representation in the board or through 
independent outside directors in the board.  
Similarly, Almadi and Lazic (2016) found that the presence of institutional factors impact 
the relationship between CEO incentives and EM, on their analysis of UK firms listed on 
the FTSE 100 index and Australian firms listed on the ASX 200 index, as well as German 
and Austrian firms listed on the 100 FWB Prime Standard and the 100 Wiener Börse 
indices, from 2005-2014. They found that CEOs of British and Australian firms are less 
engaged in EM practices in order to maximize their personal benefits, compared with 
CEOs of German and Austrian firms. Additionally, they found that the presence of more 
qualified institutions has a great impact on making CEO incentives more capable of 
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restraining EM practices. This impact is not standard for all contexts but depends on the 
country as well as the institutional factors incorporated. 
Moreover, Li and Kuo (2017) found a positive association between the equity-based type 
of compensation and earnings management, for firms with low growth opportunities. 
They found that the presence of growth opportunities can moderate this positive 
association, on their analysis of US non-financial firms, over the period from 2005-2009.  
They found that as growth opportunities arise, the positive association between the 
equity-based type of compensation and EM becomes weaker. These findings are also 
apparent in the period of financial crisis. 
Meanwhile, Laux and Laux (2009) found that an increased need for board oversight arises 
with the use of an equity-based type of compensation for CEOs, in order to limit their 
opportunistic behaviours and reduce earnings’ manipulations. They found that the 
relationship between CEOs’ incentives and earnings management is less obvious than it 
appears. They explained that the existence of equity-based compensation not only 
encourages CEOs to manipulate the firm’s earnings, but it encourages the audit 
committees to oversee the accounting process as well, which restricts earnings 
management. Hence, the level of earnings management can increase or decrease 
depending on which side is stronger.  
This is also supported by Armstrong et al. (2010), as they didn’t find evidence of a 
positive association between the equity-based compensation and earnings management. 
Instead, they found evidence that earnings’ manipulations occur less frequently in the 
presentence of high equity-based compensation, on their analysis of US firms between 
2001 and 2005. Hence, a negative association is found between the two, which helps align 
managers’ interests with their shareholders’ in relation to the financial reporting process. 
Moreover, Kim et al. (2018) found equity-based compensation to be an effective tool in 
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improving market forecasts’ disclosure quality, as a positive association is found in the 
presence of low levels of equity compensation. 
Even though most of the above studies support the idea that the presence of equity-based 
compensation has a negative impact on managers, as it tempts managers to manipulate 
the firms’ earnings in order to earn a higher compensation accordingly, they ignored the 
fact that higher equity compensation comes with greater monitoring efforts from the audit 
committees as well as other monitors. This monitoring can cause lower interventions of 
managers in earnings’ manipulations as a result. The picture may not be complete, 
however, as the focus is mainly on long-term compensation, putting aside the joint effect 
of short-term compensation. The impact of the equity-based compensation may change 
when combined with the short-term compensation. What if the short-term compensation 
has a major role in changing the overall impact of compensation after all?!  
According to Murphy (1999), most components of CEO compensation are measured in 
accordance with the base salary. Bonuses are measured as a percentage of the base salary, 
option grants are measured as a multiple of the base salary, while pension benefits also 
rely on the base salary. Hence, as the base salary increases, other components of 
compensation increase accordingly, since they all rely on the base salary. Therefore, risk-
averse managers tend to prefer an increase in salary, rather than an increase in bonuses 
or other variable compensation (Murphy, 1999). Relying on this, salaries, as a type of 
short-term compensation, have a major importance, and hence, when combined with the 
long-term compensation, the impact of total compensation as a whole may act differently 
in regards to EM practices.  
To further explain the idea, the short-term compensation such as the salaries and the 
bonuses can reward managers on their performance and encourage them to work for the 
firm’s best interest rather than their own. This can lead managers to align their interests 
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with those of the shareholders’, and hence, lead them to make decisions which increase 
the firms’ values, and to actually deserve the long-term compensation as a result.  Hence, 
the total CEO compensation may act as an incentive for managers, leading to lower 
participation of earnings management after all. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) suggested that financial incentives don’t necessarily 
destroy the firm’s value on average. Instead, financial incentives require a very careful 
consideration of their pros and cons and of managers’ opportunistic behaviours, coupled 
with adequate monitoring, to control managers’ discretions in reporting a firm’s 
performance. In doing so, financial incentives may not necessarily increase earnings 
management, but rather, act as a corporate governance mechanism in restraining EM 
practices of managers.  
Even though several studies analysed this relationship between the CEO compensation 
and earnings management, the findings are mixed and the association between the two 
remains an open question. All the above analyses were based on either the bonuses or the 
equity-based type of compensation. Hassen (2014), however, analysed the impact of the 
total compensation on earnings management. The researcher found a negative 
relationship between the total compensation and the absolute value of accruals, on their 
analysis of French firms listed on the SBF 120, from 2007-2010. These results align the 
interests of managers with those of the shareholders’, as suggested above, leading to the 
reduction of EM practices and the agency problems arising between managers and their 
shareholders, as a result. The explanation behind this is that when CEO compensation 
increases, managers become less opportunistic, and hence they are less likely to 
manipulate the firms’ earnings, in addition to their desire to maintain their leadership 
powers and avoid the risk of being replaced (Hassen, 2014). 
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The impact of total compensation is also analysed by Cheng et al. (2016) but in relation 
to real earnings management practices. They found a negative association between the 
two on their analysis of US firms between 1993 and 2011. Moreover, this relation is also 
analysed in the US banking industry by Chou and Chan (2018). On their analysis, they 
found a positive relationship between total compensation and REM in banks with low 
pay-performance- sensitivity, between 2004 and 2007. According to Conyon et al. 
(2001), the use of total compensation, including the short term and the long-term 
components, represent the full value awarded to managers during the year, on their study 
of corporate tournaments.  
Ozkan (2011) also uses the total CEO compensation on their analysis of firm 
performance. According to her, one criticism for using cash compensation, such as 
salaries and bonuses, is that it excludes the impact of the long-term component of 
compensation, which does not present a complete picture of the impact of the executive 
compensation. Hence, the use of total compensation appears to be more appropriate to 
use, than the cash component of compensation. Following these studies, the impact of 
total compensation becomes of interest when analysed in relation to AEM, since no other 
studies analysed this area apart from Hassen (2014). According to Sun and Cahan (2009), 
the cash portion is viewed as the ex-post compensation which relies on past and current 
performance while the stock-based compensation component relies on the firm’s future 
performance. Therefore, analyzing the impact of the total compensation awarded to 
managers becomes of interest. 
From the above analysis of the relevant literature, Laux and Laux (2009) found that the 
existence of equity-based compensation not only motivates CEOs to engage in EM 
practices, but it encourages the audit committees to oversee the accounting processes as 
well, to restrain EM. Hence, the level of EM can increase or decrease depending on which 
side is stronger. In addition, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) also suggested that 
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financial incentives may act as a controlling mechanism, as they attract adequate 
monitoring to control managers’ discretions and enhance the transparency of the reported 
earnings. Nevertheless, although Cornett et al. (2008) found a positive association 
between options compensation of CEOs and EM levels, they suggest that EM can be 
reduced in the presence of institutional investors, or institutional representation in the 
board, or independent outside directors in the board. 
Hence, the impact of the CEO compensation on EM is worth studying, on its own and in 
line with other corporate governance mechanisms, in both contexts of the UK and the US. 
First, this will help reveal the incentive power of CEO compensation in restraining 
managerial opportunism and earnings’ manipulations conducted by these managers, 
accordingly. Analysing the CEO compensation, as a whole, reveals the joint effect of the 
short-term and long-term components together since the short-term component is 
expected to be more powerful to overcome the impact of the equity-based compensation- 
which is found to increase EM, as indicated above. Not much analysis has been conducted 
using the total CEO compensation, in relation to AEM, in this area of study. This could 
be due to its difficulty in determining the joint effect of short-term compensation with the 
long-term compensation on executives’ accounting decisions, as previously reported by 
Healy (1985). Apart from Hassen (2014), there are no other studies in this area, relying 
on total compensation as a whole. 
Second, the UK follows a dual leadership pattern of which the CEOs have separate roles 
from the chairmen of the boards, while the US does not separate these two roles, as 
explained earlier. Accordingly, the level of responsibility they hold, affects the level of 
their compensation, as previously explained by Goergen and Renneboog (2011). Hence, 
analysing the impact of CEO compensation in both contexts of the UK and the US, is one 
of the main contributions in this research, as it helps reveal how this mechanism acts in 
the two countries, as they both have different CEO roles and responsibilities.  
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Third, as another main contribution to this research, the moderating role of CEO 
compensation is also worth studying, to reveal its joint effect with other corporate 
governance mechanisms. CEO compensation is expected to align managers’ interests 
with those of the shareholders’, and to act as a moderator with other monitoring and 
controlling mechanisms to contribute towards a lower level of EM. The purpose of using 
these joint effects is to find the best ways to reduce managers’ opportunistic behaviours 
and the participation of EM, to enhance the transparency of the financial reporting 
process, in the UK and the US. From the above discussion, the relevant hypotheses can 
be generated and presented below in section 3.6.   
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3.3.2.  Audit Quality and Earnings Management 
One of the purposes of financial reporting is to provide reliable information about the 
firm’s value to their shareholders, investors, creditors, and all other users of financial 
statements, in order to make investment decisions. According to Chen et al (2005), firms 
should prepare up to date information which is reliable for investors and creditors to 
enable them to participate in the capital markets. Auditing plays a significant role in 
verifying the accuracy of the firm’s stated earnings (Zhou and Elder, 2004). Hence, the 
audit quality is considered an effective corporate governance mechanism to reduce the 
information asymmetry and the agency problem between managers and shareholders, and 
to ensure the reliability of the financial reporting process, as it restricts earnings 
management practices performed by managers.  
According to Palmrose (1988), audit quality is defined in terms of the level of assurance 
since the purpose of an auditor is to provide assurance on financial statements to ensure 
that they are free of material misstatements. Similarly, Davidson & Neu (1993) defined 
the audit quality as the auditor’s ability to detect and report material misstatements and 
earnings’ manipulations in the firm’s financial statements, to confirm the reliability of 
the financial reporting process to shareholders and investors. Based on the above 
definitions, the audit quality should play a significant role in reducing earnings 
management performed by managers and enhancing the transparency of the firm’s 
financial reporting process.  
According to Chen et al (2011), high audit quality improves the quality of the financial 
information presented to investors and shareholders, while limiting the use of accruals by 
managers. This reduces managers’ discretion of the firm’s resources and enhances the 
transparency of the financial reporting process in the Chinese Stock Market. Additionally, 
high audit quality is found to be highly associated with the presence of industry-specific 
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auditors. According to Bedard and Biggs (1991), when an auditor’s experience increases 
in a certain industry, his/her ability to locate data errors also increases. Hence, industry-
specialist auditors are more likely to identify unusual transactions performed by the 
management.  
In addition, industry-specific auditors are more exposed to the industry’s best practices 
and are more capable of identifying inherent and control risks associated with a certain 
industry (Krishnan, 2003). This use of industry-specific auditors is found to reduce 
violations of the accounting standards and to increase the disclosure quality (Dunn and 
Mayhew, 2004). Similarly, Balsam et al. (2003) also provide evidence that firms dealing 
with high-quality auditors are found to have constrained accrual-based earnings 
management. This indicates that clients of industry-specialist auditors are found to have 
lower discretionary accruals and hence, limited managerial opportunistic behaviours. The 
existence of high audit quality limits the use of AEM due to the high risk of the behaviour 
being discovered. 
According to Cohen and Zarowin (2010), firms audited by ‘Big’ auditors are more likely 
to engage in real earnings management, instead of accrual-based earnings management, 
in a seasoned equity offering. This finding implies that the presence of ‘Big’ auditors is 
very much effective that it leaves no room for managers to use AEM, which is the reason 
behind getting engaged in REM practices as a consequence. Similarly, Chi et al. (2011) 
also found a negative association between the existence of ‘Big’ auditors and AEM, while 
they found a positive association between the presence of ‘Big’ auditors and REM. This 
is due to the strong motives to manage earnings in order to meet or exceed the expected 
earnings.  
Burnett et al. (2012) also found evidence that firms which deal with high-quality auditors 
are more likely to participate in REM, by using accretive stock repurchases as a means, 
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instead of managing accruals, to meet analyst’s forecasts. Their findings are based on 
their analysis of US firms, for the period of 22 years, between 1988- 2009. They found 
three implications. First, their findings prove that the decision to hire high-quality audits, 
in order to eliminate AEM, results in at least one REM mechanism used by managers- 
such as the accretive stock repurchases.  
Second, they suggested that other corporate governance mechanisms must be 
implemented, along with the decision to engage a high-quality auditor, in an attempt of 
limiting this participation of REM as a result. Hence, corporate boards and audit 
committees may want to consider compensation-related issues for managers to limit their 
unfavourable behaviours which result in decreasing the firms’ values. Third, they believe 
that the use of accretive stock repurchases may have negative consequences on the short-
term, as well as on the long-term performance of the firm. This is due to the high 
opportunity costs resulting from the use of resources in accretive stock repurchases 
instead of using them in beneficial investments. This is expected to impact the firm’s 
operating performance and impose unnecessary costs on the firm and its shareholders.  
Chen et al. (2011) also examined the effects of audit quality on earnings management, 
but on two groups of Chinese firms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and non-state-
owned enterprises (NSOEs). They studied a sample of 3,310 firm-year observations of 
firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, for the period of six years, 
from 2001-2006. According to them, these two groups differ in the nature of their 
ownership and agency relations, which leads to differences in the effectiveness of 
auditing in limiting managers’ discretion in the financial statements. They believe that 
the impact of audit quality on earnings management varies with the firm’s incentives to 
manage its accounting performance. As these incentives get stronger, the value of 
auditing as a monitoring device becomes greater.  
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They argued that SOEs tend to have weaker incentives to manage accounting 
performance than NSOEs, due to the different ownership structures and agency relations. 
They find that NSOEs demonstrate a greater reduction in earnings management compared 
with the SOEs when they both hire high-quality auditors. They found that NSOEs which 
are audited by the ‘Big’ eight auditors, experience significantly lower level of earnings 
management than NSOEs audited by Non-Big eight auditors; while on the other hand, 
SOEs are not found to experience any difference in the level of earnings management 
when hiring Big eight auditors or Non-Big eight auditors.  
This is also observed by Fan et al. (2007). They found that CEOs of around 28 per cent 
of listed SOEs are politically connected, during the period from 1993 to 2000. They tend 
to be either current or ex-government bureaucrats. CEOs are normally appointed in order 
to be linked to the government’s objectives of using corporate resources for social or 
political goals, regardless of whether they maximize the firm’s value or not. Hence, the 
CEOs compensation contracts do not rely on the accounting performance as in the profit-
maximizing NSOEs. Therefore, managers of SOEs tend to have weaker incentives to 
manage earnings, compared with managers of NSOEs. As a result, the value of auditing 
as a controlling device does not play a significant role in SOEs as in NSOEs.  
According to Chen et al. (2011), even though CEOs of SOEs may not have the same 
strong incentives to manage earnings as in NSOEs, they may still do. They may manage 
earnings in an attempt of increasing accounting-based compensation or obtaining a higher 
initial public offering (IPO) price; in addition to attracting foreign investments and 
applying for permission to issue more shares in the equity market. All these advantages 
may still attract CEOs of SOEs to manage the firms’ earnings.  
Gul (2006) found that firms with political connections tend to spend higher audit fees 
compared to non-politically connected firms in their study of Malaysian firms, between 
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1996 and 1998. This is due to the Asian financial crisis and the higher chances of 
misstated financial statements, which increases the need for higher audit effort to be 
implemented and higher audit fees accordingly. According to Hoitash et al. (2007), higher 
audit fees are associated with their higher audit efforts, which eventually result in higher 
audit quality, on their study of US firms, between 2000 and 2003. 
Gul et al. (2007) found that the existence of higher audit fees lowers the appearance of 
biased financial reporting in firms with long auditor tenure, on their study of US firms, 
between 2000 and 2001. Their justification is that the longer the relationship between the 
auditor and the client firm, the higher the audit quality is, as auditors become familiar 
with the business core processes and procedures, and hence become capable of providing 
more effective monitoring of earnings management practices. However, they found that 
in the existence of higher non-audit fees with a shorter auditor tenure, reduces the 
monitoring effectiveness of firms, as they become concerned with losing their client 
firms. 
According to Mitra et al. (2007), prior studies provided evidence that the existence of 
corporate governance mechanisms raises the need for the implementation of high-quality 
audits to reduce the appearance of earnings management practices and the rise of agency 
problems, between the managers and their shareholders, leading to higher spending of 
audit fees. Conversely, the existence of these corporate governance mechanisms is seen 
to limit managerial opportunism, leading to lower earnings management and agency 
problems, in addition to reducing the need for audit services and audit fees accordingly.   
According to Hay et al. (2008), prior studies suggested that internal corporate governance 
control mechanisms can substitute for external auditing, leading to lower audit fees. 
Similarly, Griffin et al. (2008) found that firms tend to increase audit fees if they demand 
higher monitoring and control, and effective corporate governance. However, if these 
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firms have strong internal corporate governance, the task of the external auditors becomes 
easier, reducing the audit risk and the cost of auditing, which results in lower audit fees. 
According to Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009), firms which follow dual leadership 
pattern, separating the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board, tend to be viewed 
by auditors to have strong internal control, leading to the reduction of the audit effort and 
the audit fees consequently.   
Mitra et al. (2007) suggested the existence of an association between firms’ ownership 
structures and their audit fees. They explained that large shareholders, in an attempt to 
monitor their firms, they require managers to purchase high-quality audits to prevent 
earnings management practices. However, managers tend to purchase these high-quality 
audits to signal higher credibility of their financial reporting processes, in order to attract 
more investments from those large shareholders, especially if they seek personal-related 
benefits. These factors, according to Mitra et al. (2007), is what determines the amount 
of audit service fees to be spent. However, managers tend to use a strategy of acquiring 
low audit coverage to have an opportunity to use the firms’ resources under their control, 
in achieving their personal benefits, as suggested by the agency and the entrenchment 
theories, on their analysis of US-listed firms in 2000. 
According to Burnett et al (2012), auditors do not inspect real earnings management 
practices, instead, they are responsible for providing reasonable assurance that financial 
statements follow the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles- GAAP. Their role is to 
ensure that financial statements represent the firm’s real activities, but not exploring 
managers’ motives behind their decisions linked to these real activities (Burnett et al., 
2012). REM affects long-term costs, as it negatively impacts the firm’s future cash flows, 
while the AEM results in greater short-term costs (Roychowdhury, 2006). As a result, 
REM becomes an attractive choice for managers who are concerned with achieving short-
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term earnings targets, when restricted with high audit quality and unable to use the AEM 
techniques.   
Conversely, Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) and Hassen (2014) found an insignificant 
relationship between the audit quality and EM levels. Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) found 
an insignificant association between the audit quality- represented by the presence of 
‘Big’ four auditors and EM, on their analysis of Tunisian Commercial firms, between 
2007 and 2011. Their justification behind this insignificant relation is that the presence 
of one of the ‘Big’ four auditing firms does not necessarily constrain managerial 
opportunism, in addition to the fact that small percentage of firms in their sample were 
audited by one of the ‘Big’ four auditing firms. Hassen (2014), however, based their 
analysis on a sample of French firms, between 2007 and 2010, but did not justify this 
insignificant relation.  
From the previous analysis of the impact of the audit quality on EM, it appears that the 
existence of audit quality by itself may not exert sufficient monitoring on the firm’s 
performance, as suggested by Burnett et al. (2012) and Roychowdhury (2006). Hence, 
there comes the need for an additional corporate governance mechanism to be 
implemented along with acquiring high-quality audits, in order to limit the participation 
of earnings management practices, as suggested earlier by Burnett et al. (2012). CEO 
compensation, as suggested by Burnett et al. (2012), may be a good suggestion to reduce 
the unfavourable behaviours by managers in manipulating the firm’s earnings. In 
addition, Fan et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2011) suggested that CEO compensation 
contracts differ across SOEs and the NSOEs, which makes its impact worth studying. 
Nevertheless, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009), found that firms which follow dual 
leadership pattern, separating the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board, such 
as in the UK, tend to be viewed by auditors to have strong internal control, which results 
in lower audit effort and audit fees as a results.  
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Hence, analysing the impact of the audit fees- as a proxy for the audit quality- on EM is 
worth studying in the UK, in comparison with the US, to indicate its effect in different 
contexts following different roles of CEOs, as previously discussed. In addition, since the 
presence of high-quality audits may not be sufficient on its own, unless joined with 
another corporate governance mechanism to impose sufficient control, as previously 
suggested, one of the main contributions to this research is analysing the moderating role 
of CEO compensation on this relationship. CEO compensation is expected to moderate 
this association between the audit quality and EM, as it acts as an incentive for managers 
to work for the firm’s best interest, to reduce their opportunistic behaviours and EM 
practices as a result. The strength of this joint effect is also worth studying, as part of this 
contribution. Therefore, the relevant hypotheses can be generated and presented below in 
section 3.6.  
 
3.3.3.  Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management 
The managerial ownership is considered an internal corporate governance mechanism. 
The level of shareholdings held by managers influences the level of earnings 
management. Lower level of managerial ownership encourages managers to focus on 
achieving their personal interests, rather than the firm’s and shareholders’ best interest 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). They practice their opportunistic behaviours as they spend the 
firm’s resources in an unfavourable way, and manipulate earnings consequently (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders can be reduced if insider individuals, such as 
managers, directors and other executive officers, increase their ownership in the 
company. This helps to align the interests of both parties, the managers’ with the 
shareholders’.  
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They further explained that managers with low ownership of firms, tend to manage the 
accounting numbers in order to increase earnings-based compensation or relax 
contractual constraints. So the higher the percentage of managerial ownership in the firm, 
the lower the earnings management expected to be conducted by managers and the lower 
the gap between the two. Additionally, Warfield et al. (1995) found that the insider 
ownership seems to be a good control mechanism to constrain managers’ behaviours, 
reduce the level of discretionary accruals and, hence, reduce the need for outside 
monitoring.  
Gul et al. (2002) added to the findings of Warfield et al. (1995). They believed that this 
relation is apparent when an auditor quality is involved. They found that when managerial 
ownership increases, the level of discretionary accruals decreases when the firm is audited 
by one of the ‘Big’ six auditors. Therefore, insider ownership may be considered as a 
mechanism for controlling managerial opportunistic behaviours (Klein, 2002). Alzoubi 
(2016) analysed a sample of 62 firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, for a period 
of eight years, from 2006- 2013. He found that the managerial ownership type of 
corporate structure is an effective way of monitoring managers’ behaviours, leading to 
lower earnings management and higher financial reporting quality.  
This negative relation is also observed by Alves (2012) on their analysis of non-financial 
Portuguese listed firms, between 2002 and 2007. They explain that as managers become 
more involved with their firms when they hold large amounts of the firms’ shares, their 
interests become aligned with the shareholders’ interests, as they too become owners. 
Hence, they are less motivated to manipulate the reported earnings. Therefore, managerial 
ownership is found to be an effective monitoring and controlling mechanism to constrain 
managerial opportunism and EM practices as a result.  
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Conversely, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) found that the presence of managerial ownership 
leads to increasing EM practices, on their analysis of Jordanian industrial firms, between 
2001- 2005. This finding is consistent with the entrenchment theory. In the presence of 
high managerial shareholdings, managers tend to have the motivation and opportunity to 
manipulate the firm’s earnings, to maximize their private benefits, away from the 
minority shareholders’ benefits. They further justify that these shareholdings are typically 
owned by the founders or their family members, who participate in the management, 
whether directly or indirectly, and are capable of influencing managerial decisions. As a 
result, this positive relation creates a gap, due to the existence of information asymmetry, 
between the managers and their shareholders, as suggested by the agency theory. 
High managerial ownership encourages managers to engage in reporting misstated 
financial information, which is in their favour, as reported by Klassen (1997). They found 
that when managerial shareholdings decrease in firms, managers tend to face fewer 
pressures from the capital markets to signal a firm’s value up to the market’s expectations, 
hence, they pay less attention to the short-term financial reports, leading to lower 
earnings’ manipulations. Hence, managers with high ownership become stressed to 
manipulate the earnings, to reflect their personal motives, instead of the firm’s real value. 
Similarly, according to Morck et al. (1988) when insider ownership is high, it becomes 
an ineffective mechanism in making decisions deriving firms’ values up, which leads to 
an increased level of earnings management. Hence, management entrenchment in line 
with the lack of market discipline are considered factors for producing lower earnings’ 
quality in firms consisting of high managerial ownership.  
Yeo et al. (2002) found a non-linear relationship between insider ownership and the level 
of discretionary accruals on their analysis of Singapore firms, from 1990-1992. They 
found that the relation between the two differs with the different levels of insider 
ownership. They found that when managers hold less than or equal to 25 per cent of the 
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firms’ shares, the managerial ownership tends to have a negative relation with the level 
of discretionary accruals, acting as a controlling mechanism. When they exceed this level, 
however, the relationship reverses and turns into a positive relation, and hence the 
existence of high managerial ownership tends to increase the level of earnings 
management, leading to an agency problem.  
Similarly, Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) also found a non-linear relationship 
on their study of a sample of 64 Spanish firms, listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange, 
from 1999-2002. They also found that the alignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders rely on the proportion of shares held by insiders. Hence, when insider 
ownership is lower than 40 per cent, a negative relationship appears, as it constrains 
earnings management practices. Otherwise, when the ownership by managers is higher 
than 40 per cent, the controlling mechanism becomes ineffective and the relationship 
reverses to a positive association, leading to a higher level of discretionary accruals and 
less informative earnings.  
Additionally, Teshima and Shuto (2008) also found a non-linear relationship in their 
study of Japanese firms, from 1991-2000. They found a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and the absolute value of discretionary accruals when the level of 
managerial shareholdings is either low or high, but a positive relation within intermediate 
levels. Hence, managers become entrenched to participate in EM, if they hold moderate 
amounts of shares, while the alignment of interests appear if they hold either high or low 
shareholdings, as EM practices are reduced, leading to higher reliability of the reported 
earnings. 
From the above analysis, due to the presence of different findings, as presented above, 
the relation between managerial ownership and EM is worth studying. This will help 
reveal the effectiveness of this corporate governance mechanism in aligning managers’ 
   
72 
 
interests and restraining their opportunistic behaviours, to reduce EM practices. In 
addition, the impact of the moderating role of CEO compensation on this association is 
also worth analysing, as one of the main contributions of this research. The reason behind 
this is to find if the managerial ownership can be more effective on its own or when 
combined with another monitoring mechanism, in an attempt to find what’s best in 
motivating managers and aligning their interests, to enhance the financial reporting 
process. This joint effect is expected to reduce earnings’ manipulations, leading to the 
presentation of more reliable accounting information. Nevertheless, the strength of this 
joint effect is also worth studying1.  
 
3.3.4.  Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management 
Monitoring performed by institutional investors is considered an effective mechanism of 
corporate governance, as apparent by previous studies. According to Ferreira and Matos 
(2008), institutional ownership plays a great role in monitoring managers’ discretion, in 
an attempt of reducing the agency problem between managers and shareholders, as 
proposed by the agency theory, and enhancing the quality of the financial reporting 
process. This is due to their ability to access and process information about the firm’s 
performance, and their ability to restrict earnings management practices. Therefore, 
institutional ownership is expected to reduce the participation of EM and the agency 
problem, consequently.  
According to Alzoubi (2016), the presence of institutional shareholders can help control 
managers and limit their opportunistic behaviours, to reduce the associated costs. They 
have significant resources, which they can use to access information, to exercise control 
at the lowest cost. Hence, the presence of institutional investors reduces the participation 
                                                          
1 The managerial ownership cannot be analysed due to the unavailability of its data. 
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of EM practices, enhancing the reliability of the reported earnings. Their analysis is based 
on firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, between 2006- 2013. Similarly, Gul et al. 
(2007) also found a significant negative relationship between the presence of institutional 
investors and EM practices, in their study of US firms, between 2000 and 2001.  
Consistent with the above findings, is the finding of Hoitash et al. (2007), whose analysis 
is also based on US firms, in the same period, from 2000-2003. Moreover, Wang (2006) 
also analysed a negative association between the two, whose analysis is also based on US 
firms, listed on the S&P 500 index, between 1994 and 2002. Nevertheless, Cornett et al. 
(2008) also found a negative relation between the two, when they analysed US-listed 
firms, from 1994-2003. These findings are justified on the basis that higher institutional 
ownership, limits managers’ discretions, resulting in lower earnings manipulations by 
these managers, and higher transparency of the financial statements produced by the 
firms, which makes institutional ownership an effective monitoring mechanism.  
Conversely, institutional investors may decide to reduce their monitoring and voting 
powers against managers, as it can affect their business associations with the firm, which 
makes managers focus on achieving higher short-term financial results (Bushee, 2001). 
According to Charitou et al. (2007), EM can occur even in the presence of institutional 
shareholdings, among highly distressed firms. They further justify that managers of 
distressed firms engage in EM practices, on behalf of these institutions, when firms are 
stressed to meet short-term earnings’ targets or to avoid the violation of debt contracts 
and the possibility of going bankrupt. Hence, the presence of institutional investors does 
not act as a controlling mechanism to constrain managers’ discretions, who report higher 
earnings in such cases, as they become concerned with the survival of their firms in the 
short-term.  
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Relying on Hadani et al. (2011), lower level of participation by institutions for achieving 
the short-term objectives is recommended because when they increase their level of 
participation, they become greatly involved with the firm and hence conflicts of interests 
arise. Therefore, the argument is that as institutional investors become more involved in 
the long-term, they impact the firm’s behaviour positively, as managers become 
discouraged to engage in earnings management practices since institutions focus on the 
long-term performance, rather than the short-term financial reports. Hence, based on the 
level of participation, the institutional ownership may or may not act as a monitoring 
mechanism to reduce the appearance of earnings management practices.  
According to Koh (2003), he found a non-linear relationship between institutional 
ownership and income increasing DA, on his analysis of non-financial Australian firms, 
between 1993 and 1997. Low level of institutional investors is found to increase EM 
levels, as they tempt the managers to manipulate the earnings upward, while the presence 
of high level of institutional investors is found to reduce EM, as they limit managerial 
discretion. This finding, according to Koh (2003), can act as a complementary corporate 
governance mechanism in constraining earnings’ manipulations, in the presence of high 
institutional shareholdings. Taking this into consideration, the proposition of using CEO 
compensation, as an additional corporate governance mechanism, in line with the 
institutional ownership, is expected to reduce the participation of EM, as one of this 
research’s main contributions.  
Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) analysed a sample of 61 Tunisian firms, listed and unlisted on 
the Tunis Stock Exchange, throughout the period of five years, from 2007- 2011. They 
found that the joint effect of the presence of institutional ownership along with the high 
audit quality combined together, reduces EM practices for industrial firms, while 
increases EM levels for commercial firms. González and García-Meca (2014), however, 
found an insignificant relationship between the institutional ownership type of corporate 
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structure and the level of earnings management, on their study of the main Latin 
American stock markets, between 2006 and 2009. Similarly, Peasnell et al. (2005) also 
found an insignificant relation between the presence of institutional investors and the 
level of EM, on their study of UK listed firms, between 1993 and 1996. Additionally, Al-
Fayoumi et al. (2010) also found an insignificant relationship between the institutional 
ownership and the participation of EM, in their analysis of Jordanian industrial firms, 
between 2001- 2005. They justified that this may be due to their lack of expertise or their 
strategic alliance with the management.  
From the previous analysis, due to the presence of different findings in regards to the 
association between institutional ownership and EM, the relation is worth studying, in 
relation to both contexts of the UK and the US, to analyse if acts differently in the two 
countries. This analysis will help revealing the effectiveness of the institutional 
ownership as a corporate governance mechanism in constraining managerial opportunism 
and reducing the participation of EM. In addition, as a contribution to this research, the 
moderating role of CEO compensation on this relationship is analysed, to reveal if the 
institutional ownership can be more effective on its own, or when combined with another 
corporate governance mechanism, such as the CEO compensation. The joint effect of the 
two factors is expected to be effective in restraining EM practices, as previously 
suggested by Koh (2003), as CEO compensation acts as an incentive for managers to 
align managers interests with those of the firms’ interests, in line with the monitoring 
power of institutions. Nevertheless, the strength of this joint effect is also worth studying. 
Therefore, the relevant hypotheses are generated and presented below in section 3.6.  
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3.3.5.  Concentrated Ownership and Earnings Management 
The concentrated ownership refers to shareholdings held by large investors, referred to 
as block-holders, who hold a large percentage of shares. These block-holders hold at least 
5% of the firm’s shares, and hence, they become concerned about the managerial 
decisions and the firms’ performance, for the purpose of protecting their large 
investments (Ullah et al., 2012). Since these block-holders own a large amount of the 
firms’ shares, they tend to exert an influence on the firms and their decisions. 
According to Yeo et al. (2002), large shareholders have a significant impact on the firms’ 
internal control. They become highly motivated to influence and monitor the firm’s 
strategies and performances, in which they invest. Hence, block investors are found to 
exert high monitoring and control to prevent managers from manipulating the firms’ 
earnings and to enhance the transparency of the financial reporting processes. Their 
analysis is based on the firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange, between 1990- 
1992. Similarly, Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014) also found a significant negative 
association between the ownership concentration and EM, on their analysis of the main 
Latin American stock markets, between 2006 and 2009, indicating that block-holders 
have high monitoring and controlling powers in restraining managerial opportunism. 
According to De Miguel et al. (2004), when large block-holders exercise their monitoring 
powers, they tend to restrain manager’s motives of taking over the minority shareholder’s 
rights and wealth, resulting in reduced agency problem, as proposed by the agency theory. 
The monitoring performed by these block-holders reduces earnings’ manipulations 
performed by managers, leading to higher reliability of the firm’s reported earnings. Their 
analysis is based on Spanish listed firms, between 1990 and 1999. Hence, the 
concentrated ownership is found to be an effective corporate governance mechanism in 
monitoring and controlling accounting decisions made by managers, which restrains EM, 
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leading to a higher transparency of the firms’ practices and operations (Bos and Donker, 
2004).  
In addition, Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) found a negative relationship between the 
combined effect of the concentrated ownership and audit quality on earnings 
management, on their analysis of Tunisian industrial firms, from 2007- 2011. They found 
that when Tunisian industrial firms employ high audit quality combined with high 
ownership concentration, the earnings’ manipulations performed by managers tend to be 
lower. Hence, when the monitoring power in the hands of large block-holders combines 
with the monitoring power of ‘Big’ auditors, managers find it difficult to manipulate the 
firm’s earnings and therefore their opportunistic behaviours are restricted, resulting in 
lower participation of EM.  
Conversely, when the level of block-holders becomes excessively high, they tend to work 
for their own interest instead, resulting in agency problems, as they tend to take over the 
minority shareholders’ interests (Boubakri et al., 2005). They exercise their control rights 
to benefit from special advantages, regardless of other shareholders’ benefits. Relying on 
this, Halioui and Jerbi (2012) found that the presence of large block-holders pushes 
managers towards manipulating the firm’s earnings upward, in order to hide declining 
firm performance, to reach their private benefits, which indicates that ownership 
concentration is not such an effective monitoring mechanism. Their findings are based 
on their analysis of firms listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange, between 1998 and 2009.  
Zhong et al. (2007) also found a positive association between the presence of ownership 
concentration and EM, on their analysis of US firms, between 1994- 2003. They explain 
that large block-holders are highly concerned with higher returns arising from their 
investments, which tempts them to intervene in the firm’s management. They tend to 
increase managers’ incentives, to lead these block-holders to their private benefits, hence, 
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resulting in income increasing EM. According to Zhong et al. (2007), the concentrated 
ownership is not considered such an effective monitoring mechanism for restraining EM 
participated in firms which are regulated by the GAAP.  
Peasnell et al. (2005), however, did not find any association between the concentrated 
ownership and EM practices, on their analysis of UK listed firms, between 1993 and 
1996. Similarly, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) found an insignificant association between 
ownership concentration and the level of EM, on their analysis of Jordanian industrial 
firms, from 2001- 2005. They explain that this insignificant relation may appear due to 
their lack of expertise or their strategic alliance with the management. 
From the above analysis, concentrated ownership seems to play a major monitoring role 
as a corporate governance mechanism, in reducing earnings management practices, as 
block-holders are keen to protect their large investments. However, the presence of 
ownership concentration may turn to be risky, if their shareholdings are excessively high, 
as it has negative implications, as they tend to influence managerial decisions to be in 
their favour, which creates an agency problem with the minority shareholders. Their 
excessive powers may push managers towards manipulating the firms’ earnings, in order 
to lead block-holders to their private benefits. Hence, this relationship is worth studying, 
in both contexts of the UK and the US, to find out if the relation differs between the two 
countries.  
In addition, the need for testing the effectiveness of the ownership concentration, as a 
corporate governance mechanism, when combined with another monitoring mechanism, 
becomes of interest. Hence, as one of this research main contributions, the impact of the 
moderating role of CEO compensation on this association is worth studying. This will 
help reveal if the concentrated ownership can restrain EM practices on its own, or when 
combined with another corporate governance mechanism such as the CEO compensation. 
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The joint effect of the two factors is expected to be more effective in restraining EM 
practices, since CEO compensation may impose incentive power on managers to align 
their interests with those of the shareholders’, in line with the monitoring power of the 
large investors. Therefore, the strength of this joint effect is worth studying. To test these 
relations, the relevant hypotheses are presented below in section 3.6.  
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3.4. Impact of Cash Holdings on Earnings Management 
Cash is viewed as one of the most valuable assets which controlling managers can take 
over from firms under their control (Myers and Rajan, 1998). One of the advantages of 
firms holding excess cash reserves is that they provide flexibility for firms to enter into 
investment opportunities, without the need for acquiring external financing and paying 
interest for those borrowings. However, these excess cash reserves may have negative 
implications as controlling managers invest these resources in value decreasing activities, 
such as acquisitions and capital expenditures (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007), which 
increases the agency problem and the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders. This is also consistent with the agency theory.  
Firms tend to hold high levels of cash flows in order to hedge against any future cash 
flow uncertainties, especially when there is high volatility of cash flows (Mikkelson and 
Partch, 2003). According to Sun et al. (2012), poor earnings quality of firms positively 
affects the level of their cash reserves. They examined a sample of US publicly traded 
firms, for the period from 1980- 2005. The reason behind this is that the low level of 
earnings quality results in creating information asymmetry, which widens the gap 
between managers and shareholders and increases the conflict of interest between them. 
This information asymmetry makes it difficult and more expensive for firms to raise 
external capital. Hence, the need for holding higher levels of cash within firms becomes 
necessary for starting investments and avoiding external financing costs. 
Al-dhamari and Ku Ismail (2015) found that Malaysian investors tend to value earnings 
figures produced by firms holding higher cash flows more than firms holding lower levels 
of cash. Their study was based on the top 100 Malaysian listed firms, throughout the 
period of five years, from 2007-2011. The reason behind this finding is that managers of 
high cash holding firms are expected to hold cash to protect the firms against 
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unfavourable situations and to avoid underinvestment problems. Hence, they are expected 
to hold cash for precautionary purposes rather than self-interest motives. Consequently, 
a firm’s performance and earnings quality are perceived by investors to be higher for high 
cash holding firms than low cash holding firms. 
According to Pinkowitz et al. (2006), however, there is a high risk associated with the 
existence of excess cash within a firm, as opposed to other firm resources, as managers 
can easily transform this excess cash into their private benefits. They analysed a sample 
across 35 countries for a duration of eleven years, from 1988-1998. They found that when 
the minority shareholders exert less power to control managers’ opportunistic behaviours, 
managers tend to abuse the cash left at their disposal in order to expand their empire. This 
act results in increasing the agency problem- the conflict of interest between the two 
parties- managers and shareholders, which leads to decreasing the firm value. Therefore, 
firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms along with high cash holdings are 
perceived to have lower firm value. This is also consistent with the entrenchment theory, 
as managers are entrenched to use the firms’ resources towards achieving their personal 
benefits.  
According to Jensen (1986), firms with higher levels of free cash flows experience more 
conflicts between managers and minority shareholders, as managers hold more 
discretionary powers, leading to an agency problem between the two. Holding higher 
levels of FCF may tempt firms to repurchase their own shares, which negatively affects 
firms’ financial positions in the long-run, leading to lower stock prices and to managers 
being replaced as a result (Richardson, 2006). Therefore, managers tend to use their 
discretionary powers to manipulate the firms’ earnings in order to hide their misuse of 
the firms’ funds and their opportunistic behaviours. According to Mun and Jang (2015) 
in case of good economic conditions, holding excess cash doesn’t seem to be a wise 
decision due to higher opportunity costs; however, holding excess cash seems to be 
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important during poor economic conditions to avoid any associated risks. Conversely, 
according to Jensen and Murphy (1990), managers tend to overinvest in the presence of 
poor growth opportunities, in order to promote the firm’s growth, their discretions and 
the level of their compensation accordingly.  
Nekhili et al (2016) analysed a sample of 85 French listed firms, on the SBF 120, through 
the period of ten years, between 2001 and 2010. They found that when firms hold higher 
levels of Free Cash Flows (FCF), managers tend to manipulate the firms’ earnings 
upward. In the existence of higher FCFs, the level of discretionary accruals participated 
by managers depends on the firm’s ownership structure and the effectiveness of its 
corporate governance mechanisms incorporated. Specifically, they found that the 
existence of an independent audit committee and high audit quality, along with high 
institutional or managerial ownership types of corporate structure, tend to result in a lower 
level of earnings management. However, other corporate governance mechanisms such 
as the existence of independent boards or independent directors’ ownership, are no longer 
significant tools in controlling managers’ opportunism and reducing earnings 
management, when high levels of cash flows exist. 
Similarly, Chung et al. (2005) also found a positive association between FCFs and the 
level of discretionary accruals, in low growth firms. An explanation behind this is that in 
the case of low growth opportunities, holding high levels of FCF tempts managers to 
spend this excess cash on non-value maximizing projects, instead of distributing 
dividends. Hence, managers tend to manipulate earnings upward to conceal the lower 
firm value and signal a higher firm performance, in order to secure their positions. They 
found that the existence of high-quality auditors- represented by the Big six auditors, and 
institutional ownership moderate this positive relation, to reduce EM practices, on their 
analysis of US firms, between 1984 and 1996. Additionally, Rusmin et al. (2014) found 
a positive relationship between FCFs and income increasing EM, in the case of low 
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growth firms, on their analysis of listed firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, 
between 2005- 2010. They also found that the existence of high-quality auditors- 
represented by the ‘Big’ four, moderates this positive relationship and reduces EM 
practices. Moreover, these findings are similar to the findings of Farahani et al. (2016), 
whose analysis were based on firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, between 2009 
and 2014, as they also found a positive association between the two, in low growth firms. 
Nevertheless, these findings are also consistent with the findings of Bukit and Iskandar 
(2009) who found that the existence of independent audit committees within firms, 
moderates the positive relationship between FCFs and EM, to reduce income increasing 
EM practices, on their analysis of 155 listed firms in Malaysia in 2001.  
According to Afza & Adnan (2007), the trade-off theory indicates that the optimal cash 
holding level appears when comparing the marginal benefits with the marginal costs of 
holding cash. Holding cash has many advantages as it reduces financial distress, 
facilitates entering into new investment opportunities, and reduces the cost of acquiring 
external capital or liquidating existing assets. According to Ma (2012), this theory focuses 
on the transaction and precautionary motives. The transaction motive is what encourages 
firms to hold higher levels of cash in order to avoid transaction costs of liquidating assets 
or raising funds to avoid uncertainties. The precautionary motive is what encourages 
firms to hedge for the risk of lower cash levels in the future, especially when the external 
financing is costly. Ma (2012) studied a sample of 17,653 observations for 1,758 publicly 
traded firms in 11 European countries, from the year 1999- 2011. In her study, the results 
confirm the two motives mentioned above of the transaction and precautionary motives 
mentioned by the theory.  
Firms follow the precautionary motive when reserving cash to avoid any financial distress 
such as the one occurred during the financial crisis (Pinkowitz et al., 2015). Kang and 
Kim (2014) studied a sample of firms listed in the US stock markets- NYSE, AMEX, and 
   
84 
 
NASDAQ, for a duration of eight years, from 2004-2012. They found a positive 
relationship between information asymmetry and EM levels. They found that holding a 
higher level of cash reduces the significance of this positive association between the 
information asymmetry and EM, due to the high governance exerted by firms on holding 
higher cash levels.  
From the previous analysis, holding cash at firms tends to have a great advantage. It tends 
to provide great flexibility for firms to enter into new investments without the need for 
external borrowings and being committed to interest payments as mentioned by Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007). It helps firms hedge against any future uncertainties, according 
to Mikkelson and Partch (2003). In fact, the firm’s performance and earnings quality are 
perceived by investors to be higher for firms holding higher FCFs, since cash is known 
to be held for precautionary purposes in order to protect firms from any unfavourable 
situations as found by Al-dhamari and Ku Ismail (2015). However, holding higher levels 
of FCF tends to have a negative implication, as it gives managers the chance to waste 
these excess cash reserves on their private benefits as mentioned by Pinkowitz et al. 
(2006), especially in the existence of weak corporate governance mechanisms. 
Therefore, the impact of cash holdings on earnings management is worth studying for 
three reasons. First, cash holdings seem to be useful for firms, yet vulnerable to managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours. Second, none of the above-mentioned studies in this area was 
based on the UK and the US contexts, during this period of analysis. Third, all the above-
mentioned studies analysed the impact of just the FCFs on EM, but none of them analysed 
the impact of the total cash present in the firm- represented by the cash and cash 
equivalents, on EM practices. The FCF measure, however, does not give a complete 
picture of the levels of cash available at firms, since it only represents the excess cash 
resulting from one year, unlike the cash and cash equivalent figure, which is an 
accumulated figure representing the level of cash available for firms throughout the years 
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(Foley at al., 2007). According to Foley at al. (2007), the amount of cash and cash 
equivalents represent a “consolidated measure of cash holdings”.  
In addition, Opler et al. (1999) argued for a positive association between cash flows and 
cash holdings, explaining that firms which generate higher cash flows tend to accumulate 
cash holdings to become capable of financing any future investments, indicating the 
importance of the total cash and cash equivalents present at firms. Similarly, Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004) observed a positive relationship between the level of cash flows and cash 
holding levels in the UK context. In their analysis of UK firms, between 1984 and 1999, 
they used cash and cash equivalents to indicate cash holdings. According to them, holding 
large amounts of cash and cash equivalents provides low financing costs for firms. 
Moreover, according to Brandon (2015), FCFs involve risk, due to the presence of 
uncertainties which can affect the firms’ operations during the year, affecting the free 
cash flow levels, consequently. Hence, the FCFs indicator can be reliable only when 
planning for short-term investments but is not such a reliable measure for long-term 
investments as the firms’ operations can be affected throughout the years. Nevertheless, 
it is not such an efficient indicator for investors unless the firms’ operations are 
completely transparent to indicate the true level of the firms’ FCFs (Brandon, 2015).  
Hence, analysing the cash holding variable, using the total cash and cash equivalents, is 
one of the main contributions to this research, as it’s the first comparative analysis 
conducted on the relation between cash-holdings and the participation of EM, to the best 
of my knowledge, which helps to fulfil a research gap. A positive relationship is expected 
between the two, relying on the agency theory and the entrenchment theory, as managers 
are expected to use the firm’s cash on achieving their personal benefits and to use their 
managerial discretions to hide these opportunistic behaviours from the minority 
shareholders.  
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In addition, CEO compensation is expected to moderate this relationship between cash 
holding levels and EM. The joint effect arising from using the moderating variable is 
expected to reduce the participation of EM. To further clarify, CEO compensation is 
expected to act as an incentive for managers to work for the firm’s best interest and to 
reduce their opportunistic behaviours accordingly, leading to fewer wastes of the firm's 
cash available and lower need for EM practices as a result. Therefore, the strength of the 
joint impact is also worth studying, since a substitutive effect is expected, resulting from 
the positive association of the cash holding variable. This variable is added to my research 
model, as indicated in the following chapter, and discussed further in details in the 
following chapters. Based on the above discussion, the relevant hypotheses are generated 
and presented below in section 3.6.  
Furthermore, as an additional analysis, the research model is analysed again in high cash 
holding (HCASH) firms as well as in low cash holding (LCASH) firms, in both contexts 
of the UK and the US, to reveal the impact of the remaining corporate governance 
mechanisms incorporated, as well as the moderation effect. This is built on the concepts 
of the entrenchment and the agency theories since firms holding low levels of cash are 
expected to experience fewer earnings’ manipulations by their managers. Hence, the 
corporate governance mechanisms presented in this research are expected to be more 
effective in controlling managerial opportunism in firms holding low cash levels, due to 
the lower opportunity for managers to use the firm’s cash holdings. This analysis will 
help determine what best constrains EM practices in the presence of high as well as for 
low cash levels in the firms, hence, revealing the differences in the controlling 
mechanisms in the two subsamples. 
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3.5. Critical Evaluation of Literature 
One of the research gaps observed from the review is analysing the impact of the CEO 
compensation as a whole, on the participation of EM, since all of the above-mentioned 
literature focus on either the bonus compensation or the equity-based type of 
compensation. Hence, in this research, the impact of the overall CEO compensation is 
analysed. Another research gap is conducting a comparative analysis of the impact of 
cash holdings on EM in the UK and the US markets, within these years of analysis. 
Therefore, the impact is also analysed in this research study in both contexts of the UK 
and the US. Furthermore, several studies suggest analysing the joint impact of two or 
more corporate governance mechanisms on EM, in an attempt of restraining managerial 
opportunism and enhancing the reliability of the reported earnings. Thus, the moderating 
role of CEO compensation is proposed in this research, to analyse its joint effect with all 
of the above-mentioned mechanisms in restraining EM practices, in both of the UK and 
the US markets. To further expand this analysis, the moderating role of CEO 
compensation is analysed in high vs low cash holding firms to reveal the effectiveness of 
the moderation effect, as well the remaining corporate governance mechanisms, in firms 
with high as well as low cash levels, in both contexts of the UK and the US.  
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3.6. Hypotheses Development 
The research hypotheses are formed to analyse the impact of the determinants of EM, as 
discussed earlier in the conceptual framework in section 2.4, as well as their joint effect 
with CEO compensation. As previously discussed in section 3.3.1, the bonus type of 
compensation is found to have a non-linear relationship with EM. The option-based 
component of compensation is revealed to have a positive association with EM, while the 
equity-based type of compensation is found to have both a positive and a negative 
relationship with EM. Most prior studies support the idea that higher equity-based 
compensation is involved with higher earnings manipulations, as managers become 
tempted to manipulate the firms’ earnings in order to earn even higher compensation. 
Yet, some researchers support the concept that higher compensation comes with greater 
monitoring and control exerted by the audit committees and other monitors as in Laux 
and Laux (2009), indicating that the relationship depends on which side is stronger. 
Moreover, the total compensation is found to have a negative relationship with EM, due 
to its incentive power of aligning managers’ interests with those of the firms’. 
Furthermore, the entrenchment and the agency theories support the idea that higher 
compensation becomes attractive for managers to use towards increasing their authorities 
and strengthening their positions, leading to agency problems resulting from the 
information asymmetry between managers and their shareholders. Therefore, a 
relationship is expected between the total CEO compensation and EM which is worth 
analysing. Hence, the following hypothesis can be generated: 
H1: There is a relation between the total CEO compensation and EM.  
 
As discussed in section 3.3.2, the audit quality is found to have a negative relationship 
with EM, since higher spending of audit fees implies higher audit efforts exerted by 
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highly experienced external auditors to restrain managerial opportunism, leading to lower 
levels of earnings manipulations. However, few studies found insignificant associations 
between the two, since a small percentage of their sample firms acquired auditing efforts 
from one of the ‘Big’ four auditing firms, besides the fact that the presence of ‘Big’ 
auditors doesn’t necessarily guarantee constraining managerial opportunism. In addition, 
relying on the signalling and agency theories, high audit fees spending performs as a 
signal to the market and shareholders that firms are operating in a good manner. 
Therefore, a relationship is expected and is worth analysing. Hence, the following 
hypothesis can be generated: 
H2: There is a relationship between the audit quality and EM. 
 
As previously explained in section 3.3.3, the institutional ownership is found to have a 
negative relationship with EM due to the high monitoring powers exerted by institutional 
investors to prevent managers from manipulating the firms’ earnings. On the contrary, 
the relation is observed to have a positive association with EM, as institutional investors 
can exert their powers to push managers towards manipulating the firms’ earnings in an 
attempt of reaching their private benefits. In addition, this relationship is also observed to 
be non-linear or to have no association at all, due to their lack of expertise or their strategic 
alliance with the management. Relying on the agency theory, if a higher level of 
institutional ownership leads to higher levels of earnings management, agency problems 
will be created due to the rise of conflicts of interests. Therefore, a relationship is expected 
and is worth analysing. Hence, the following hypothesis can be generated: 
H3: There is a relationship between institutional ownership and EM. 
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As previously discussed in section 3.3.4, the concentrated ownership is found to have a 
negative relationship with EM, due to their control powers enforced in an attempt of 
constraining managerial opportunism, for the purpose of protecting their large 
investments. On the contrary, this relation is observed to be positive, as block-holders can 
force managers into leading them to their private benefits by manipulating the firms’ 
earnings. An insignificant relationship is also found, due to their lack of expertise. If 
higher levels of EM become associated with the presence of higher ownership 
concentration, agency problems will arise due to the unreliable financial reporting. 
Therefore, a relationship is expected and is worth analysing. Hence, the following 
hypothesis can be generated: 
H4: There is a relationship between the concentrated ownership and EM. 
 
As previously discussed in section 3.3.5, the cash holdings are found to have positive 
associations with EM, since higher cash levels become tempting for managers to abuse 
in expanding their empires, which pushes them towards manipulating the earnings to hide 
this misuse of funds. Relying on the entrenchment and the agency theories, higher cash 
levels available at managers’ disposal can be tempting for managers to spend on non-
value maximizing investments in an attempt of securing their positions, leading to higher 
information asymmetry due to the conflicts of interests arising between managers and 
shareholders. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected. Hence, the following 
hypothesis can be generated: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between cash holdings and EM. 
 
According to Kouaib and Jarboui (2014), the control mechanisms are interrelated, so the 
failure of one mechanism can be offset by the other. According to Cremers and Nair 
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(2005) and Ozkan (2011) interrelationships between various corporate governance 
mechanisms can act as complements or substitutes for each other. Berry et al. (2006) 
observed that governance attributes act as complements. Nevertheless, Henry (2008) 
argues that the interrelationship between internal governance mechanisms along with the 
external governance mechanisms, such as institutional ownership and concentrated 
ownership, are worth analysing to determine whether they have complementary or 
substitutive impacts. Based on these prior studies, the interaction effect involving the 
presence of CEO compensation in the presence of either one of the governance 
mechanisms such as audit quality, or institutional or concentrated ownership, are 
expected to be complementary. Therefore, the moderating role of CEO compensation is 
suggested to reduce the appearance of EM practices, and the strength of the joint effects 
proposed in H6, H7, and H8 are expected to have complementary effect on EM, to 
indicate even higher effectiveness of the proposed joint relations. This prediction of the 
existence of complementary effect, however, is not consistent with the presence of cash 
holdings, since cash holdings are expected to have a positive association with EM, relying 
on previous studies discussed in section 3.4, which is expected to reduce the strength of 
its joint effect. Hence, the following hypotheses containing the moderation effects of 
CEO compensation are suggested to have complementary effects, except for H9 which is 
suggested to have a substitutive effect since the presence of cash holdings may involve 
higher participation of EM, as previously explained in section 3.4. Therefore, the 
moderation effect of CEO compensation is worth analysing and hence, the following 
hypotheses can be generated: 
H6: The joint effect of CEO compensation and audit quality on EM is complementary. 
H7: The joint effect of CEO compensation and institutional ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
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H8: The joint effect of CEO compensation and concentrated ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
H9: The joint effect of CEO compensation and cash holdings on EM is substitutive. 
 
As previously discussed in section 4.2, the US GAAP is observed to present more faithful 
financial reports than those produced in accordance with the IFRS (Beest et al., 2009). 
Hence, the following hypothesis can be generated:  
H10: EM constraints are more effective in the US, compared to the UK, in reducing EM 
practices. 
 
3.7. Summary 
This chapter discusses the literature relevant to this research area, related to the 
motivations of EM and the mechanisms for reducing EM practices. It also discusses the 
impact of cash holdings on EM. It presents the research hypotheses developed from the 
discussion of the literature review and how these hypotheses achieve the research 
objectives. It also summarizes the research gaps and how they are fulfilled. The following 
chapter presents the sample size and the data collection sources, as well as the research 
model and the measurements of the variables used in this study.   
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
This applied research analyses the impact of the CEO compensation on the association 
between four determinants of EM and EM levels in the UK and the US contexts. These 
four factors are the audit quality, the institutional ownership, the concentrated ownership, 
and the cash-holdings. This research uses a deductive approach, as it is based on existing 
theories, which are tested and observed throughout my research hypotheses (Walliman, 
2011). In doing so, a quantitative approach is used through the observation of data 
collected on the FTSE 350 index and the S&P 500 index. This research uses a positivism 
philosophy as it relies on resources, and is guided by this quantitative research, of which 
hypotheses are tested and confirmed (Walliman, 2011).  This chapter compares between 
the UK and the US markets, highlights some of the main similarities and differences 
between them, and indicates the importance of conducting a comparative study. It also 
describes in details the sample size, the data collection sources used throughout the study, 
the research method, and the research model used, along with its variables. 
 
4.2.  Comparison between the UK and the US Markets 
The UK and the US markets are very much alike (Gerakos et al., 2013). On one hand, the 
UK and the US share the same features of the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system in the priority of the shareholders’ benefit, along with the importance of equity 
financing, dispersed ownership of shares among shareholders, in addition to the active 
markets for controlling corporations- as a mechanism of managerial accountability 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Streeck and Yamamura, 2001). According to Gerakos 
et al. (2013), the UK and the US have similar underlying economics and regulation and 
contribute towards much of the worldwide turnover.  
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Additionally, the UK and the US have low family ownership of firms, as well as low 
concentrated individual block-holders and cross-shareholdings, compared to the 
Continental and Japanese systems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Moreover, the control laid 
by institutional investors over the equity market as a whole, increased rapidly in the past 
20 years in both countries (Aguilera et al., 2006). As of December 2003, institutional 
investors controlled around eighty per cent of the UK equity market according to Mallin 
et al. (2005), and around sixty per cent of the US equity market in 2002 according to 
Binay (2005). Therefore, institutional investors may have an influence on earnings 
management practices, which is worth analysing.  
On the other hand, there are differences between the aspects of the corporate governance 
systems in the UK and the US. One of the differences is the major constraints 
implemented on the exercise of CEO power in the UK, compared to the US. According 
to Higgs (2003), ninety percent of the UK’s largest firms follow a dual strategic 
leadership pattern, of which they split the roles of the CEO with the Chairman of the 
Board, as suggested by the Cadbury Committee in 1992 (Cadbury, 1992), and which is 
also incorporated into the Combined Code of Corporate Governance of 2003.  
Conversely, in around eighty per cent of the US firms, the CEO is also the Chairman of 
the Board (Higgs, 2003). This concentration of power is more likely to prevent effective 
monitoring. In an attempt of enhancing the effectiveness of the Board and reducing the 
power of the CEO, both the US Congress and the New York Stock Exchange had to take 
actions (Aguilera et al., 2006). Hence, the Congress required that the audit committee be 
fully comprised of independent directors, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; while in 
the listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange, listed firms were required to have 
a majority of independent directors (Aguilera et al., 2006). 
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There is a difference in the CEO pay between the UK and the US, which is consistent 
with the corporate governance structure and the greater power of CEO in the US 
(Aguilera et al., 2006). According to Conyon and Murphy (2000), the CEO pay and stock-
based incentives are much higher in the US than in the UK. Another difference between 
the two countries is in the relationship between firms and their equity investors. As 
previously mentioned, institutional investors have become key owners over the past 20 
years, in the two countries. In the US, institutional investors reached 58% in 2002 (Binay, 
2005) and around 80% in the UK in 2003 (Mallin et al., 2005). Hence, even though 
institutional ownership is high in both markets, it’s higher in the UK than in the US, and 
their compositions are different- which offer different pressures on the firms and their 
shareholders.  
In regards to their legal systems, US-listed firms are required to follow the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), while the UK listed firms must comply with 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Beest et al., 2009). UK firms 
complying with the IFRS, publish a commercial annual report, while US firms complying 
with the GAAP, publish their annual reports in two forms one for domestic listed firms 
and another for foreign private firms or cross-listed firms. Beest et al. (2009) found higher 
financial reporting quality provided by the US GAAP, compared to the IFRS, in relation 
to the quality of financial reports related to both, the country and the accounting 
standards, on their study of the US, UK, and Dutch stock exchanges, between 2005 and 
2007. They found a higher faithful representation of US GAAP annual reports, compared 
to IFRS annual reports, while they found a higher relevance of the IFRS annual reports, 
compared to the US GAAP annual reports. This difference, however, does not indicate 
poor quality of either one of the financial reports produced, but rather indicates that both 
types of annual reports are comparable.  
   
96 
 
According to Wright et al. (2006), managers of both the UK and the US firms manage 
earnings downward before a management buyout, while the US managers are found to 
be much more aggressive than the UK managers. This finding indicates that the relation 
between the legal environments of countries and the level of participation of earnings 
management differs across countries, which makes the level of EM in both contexts worth 
analysing. Based on prior studies, the average level of discretionary accruals found by 
Sun et al. (2010) is 6.4%, based on their analysis of UK firms, listed on the FTSE All-
share, for the period between 2006 and 2007. Alali (2011), however, found a higher 
average DAC of approx. 9%, in their analysis of US firms, between 2000 and 2006. 
In conclusion, the UK has an exceptionally dispersed ownership (Franks and Mayer, 
2002), which is similar to that of the US. The underlying structure of their capital markets 
and companies are very much alike, and they both contribute towards much of the 
worldwide turnover. Therefore, the US is considered a very important country against 
which to compare the UK governance, since the two are developed countries and have 
regulated stock markets. In addition, the main difference between the two countries exists 
in the roles of their CEOs, as apparent from the above discussion, as the UK split the roles 
of the CEO and the Chairman of the Board, while the US combines those roles- leading 
to higher CEO compensation accordingly. Therefore, this difference in the CEO 
compensation is also worth analysing, as well as its impact on EM practices. In addition, 
analysing the impact of the moderating role of CEO compensation on the associations 
between the determinants of EM is worth observing in the two countries. Nevertheless, 
analysing this moderation effect of CEO compensation in low cash holding firms will 
help in revealing the effectiveness of these strategies in constraining EM practices and 
enhancing the transparency of the financial reporting processes within these two markets.       
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4.3. Data Collection Sources and Sample Size 
For the purpose of this study, the analysis of the above-mentioned hypotheses is 
performed on UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange- on the FTSE 350 index. 
The FTSE 350 index is analysed as it includes the economically most important firms 
according to Abdullah and Page (2009). The index follows a dual leadership pattern since 
2004, as 93% of the non-financial firms listed there had separated the roles of the CEO 
and the Chairman of the Board (Abdullah and Page, 2009). The data is obtained from 
Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters databases. The analysis is performed starting from 
2005, since all listed EU firms were required to follow the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) when preparing their financial statements, for years starting 
on or after January 1, 2005 (Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006; and Beest et 
al., 2009). Therefore, the analysis is performed since firms were regulated, until the most 
recent data available when collecting the data, for the year 2016- a duration of 12 years.  
In comparison with the UK, US-listed firms are also analysed, since the two are 
developed countries and have many similarities, as discussed in chapter 2. Dispersed 
ownership in the US is similar to that of the UK, in addition to the similar underlying 
structure of their capital markets and companies (Gerakos et al., 2013). They also 
comprise much of the worldwide turnover (Gerakos et al., 2013). Hence, US firms listed 
on the S&P 500 index are analysed. The S&P 500 index can be traded on either the New 
York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ (Carr, 2013). The S&P 500 index is the most 
widely used index in the US, as it includes the largest firms in America and hence, is 
viewed as the benchmark for the US stock market (Carr, 2013). These data are also 
obtained from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters databases and are analysed through the 
same period of 12 years, to allow for comparison. The currency is unified across the two 
samples, using the US dollar, so the findings can be comparable. In addition, the 
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significant findings of the two countries are compared based on the strengths of their 
coefficients.   
The financial sectors- such as banks, insurance firms, investment funds, and real estate 
firms, are excluded from the analysis since their financial statements have unique 
characteristics (Sun et al., 2010), as they follow a certain set of rules and regulations in 
addition to certain accounting standards in preparing their financial statements (Kouaib 
and Jarboui, 2014). Valuing financial firms is difficult due to two characteristics 
(Damodaran, 2009). First, the difficulty in estimating their cash flows, in the existence of 
their capital expenditures, working capital, and debt, which are not clearly defined. They 
have different accounting rules for recording the value of earnings and assets, in 
comparison with the rest of the firms. Debt for financial firms is considered an asset, 
rather than a source of capital. Second, financial firms are strictly regulated to govern 
how they are capitalized, and where they invest, along with their growth opportunities.   
Firms with missing data are excluded from the analysis. Sectors with less than ten 
observations are also excluded from the analysis (Cheng et al, 2016). Data is organized 
so that all years are present across all the sectors. This research also matches for the year 
and industry, in order to control for their effects on the analysis as in Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006), Sun et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2011), Liu et al. (2014), Okoh (2015), 
and Cheng et al. (2016). Data is analysed to test the association between each of the four 
factors, independently, on earnings management, and the impact of CEO compensation 
on these associations to test the significance of the hypotheses generated. These four 
factors are the audit quality, institutional ownership, concentrated ownership, and cash 
holdings.  
For the UK sample, there were a total of 2986 observations of non-financial sectors 
available, of which 2,496 observations related to compensation, audit fees, firm size and 
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sectors’ data were missing. Hence, leaving only 490 observations available. Meanwhile, 
for the US sample, there were a total of 2,837 observations of non-financial sectors, of 
which 104 observations related to compensation and sectors’ data were missing. Hence, 
the final US sample of 2,733 is available, which is almost five times as much that of the 
UK sample. This gap in the number of observations is due to the huge number of missing 
data in the UK sample, as presented below. 
Table 4.1: Research Samples 
 UK Sample US Sample 
Obs. of Non-financial Sectors 2,986 2,837 
Missing Data 2,496 104 
Final sample 490 2,733 
 
4.4. Research Model 
In this study, a moderated multiple regression equation is formed (Aguinis, 2004), as it 
incorporates an extra variable which has a moderating effect. The Hausman specification 
test is performed to determine which regression is more appropriate, the random effects 
or the fixed effects, since this study uses panel data (Okoh, 2015; Nekhili et al., 2016; 
Alzoubi, 2016; Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2017; Hassanein et al., 2018). The 
Hausman test implies that the fixed effect regression is more suitable for this analysis. 
Hence, the fixed effect regression is performed for the purpose of this study. The fixed 
effect regression is capable of dealing with endogenous variables, which values are 
affected by other variables in the model (Greene, 2007; Alzoubi, 2016). The analysis is 
conducted using the computer software Stata 11. The research model is formed to analyse 
the impact of the CEO compensation, as a moderator, on the association between each of 
the above mentioned four factors and EM, as indicated in the conceptual framework- 
figure 2.1, presented in chapter 2. Hence, the following research model is generated: 
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EM= α+ β1 COMP+ β2 AUDQ + β3 (AUDQ x COMP) + β4 INSTOWN+ β5 
(INSTOWN x COMP) + β6 CONOWN+ β7 (CONOWN x COMP) + β8 
CASH+ β9 (CASH x COMP) + β10 LEV +β11 SIZE + β12 ROA+ β13 MTB+ 
β14 CFO + β15 LOSS+ ε 
 
Where: 
EM is earnings management. 
COMP represents CEO compensation. 
AUDQ is the audit quality.  
INSTOWN is the institutional ownership.  
CONOWN is the concentrated ownership. 
CASH is the firm’s cash holdings. 
LEV is the firm’s leverage.  
SIZE is the firm’s size. 
ROA represents the firm’s profitability. 
MTB represents the firm’s growth. 
CFO represents the firm’s cash flow from operations 
LOSS represents the firm’s loss. 
Βi represents the regression coefficient, where i= 0, 1, 2 … 15  
ε represents the error term. 
 
As further analysis, to compare the findings of both contexts of the UK and the US in order 
to reveal the marginal impact of the EM constraints in influencing EM practices within the 
two markets, a dummy variable is created to indicate the country type “C”, as in Wright et al. 
(2006). Hence, the country type variable takes a value of “1” for US firms, and “0” for UK 
firms. The model is run again using this interaction effect of “C” with each of the independent 
variables, after controlling for the firm’s leverage, size, profitability, loss, cash flows and 
growth, as follows:  
EM= β0+ β1 COMP+ β2 AUDQ + β3 INSTOWN + β4 CONOWN+ β5 CASH + β6 
(COMP x AUDQ) + β7 (COMP x INSTOWN) + β8 (COMP x CONOWN) + β9 
(COMP x CASH)+ β10 C+ β11 (C x COMP) + β12 (C x AUDQ) + β13 (C x 
INSTOWN) + β14 (C x CONOWN) + β15 (C x CASH) + β16 (C x COMP x AUDQ) + 
β17 (C x COMP x INSTOWN) + β18 (C x COMP x CONOWN) + β19 (C x COMP x 
CASH)+ β20 LEV +β21 SIZE + β22 ROA+ β23 MTB+ β24 CFO + β25 LOSS+ ε 
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Where: 
β0+β1+…+β8+β9 represent the impact of EM constraints in UK firms. 
β0+β1+β2+…+β18+β19 represent the impact of EM constraints in US firms. 
β10+β11+…+β18+β19 represent the marginal impact of the EM constraints on EM 
between UK and US firms 
 
When the country type variable “C” takes a value of “0” to represent UK firms, the impact 
of EM constraints in UK firms appears to be the sum of the coefficients of the independent 
variables only (β0+β1+…+β8+β9), since the interaction effects equal “0”. However, when 
the country type variable “C” takes a value of “1” to represent US firms, the impact of EM 
constraints in US firms appears to be the sum of the coefficients of the independent variables, 
as well as, the interaction effects created using “C” (β0+β1+β2+…+β18+β19). Hence, the 
difference between the two, which is the sum of the coefficients of the interaction effects 
generated (β10+β11+…+β18+β19), represents the marginal impact of the EM constraints on 
EM between UK and US firms (Gujarati, 2011). This is further discussed in sections 5.4, 6.6, 
7.11 and 7.12, chapters 5, 6, and 7, respectively.  
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4.5. Measurements of Variables 
This section explains in details the measurements of the variables used in the research 
model. First, the dependent variable- earnings management represented by the 
discretionary accruals. Second, the measurements of five independent variables are 
discussed in details- of which only four are analysed. In addition, a moderating variable- 
CEO compensation is also used in this research model. Finally, six control variables are 
held constant to set aside their effect and influence on the dependent variable- EM. These 
are the firm’s leverage, size, profitability, growth, cash flows and loss. 
 
4.5.1. Dependent Variable 
4.5.1.1. Earnings Management 
A number of measures of earnings management have been developed in previous studies. 
The accruals are divided into two components: discretionary accruals and non-
discretionary accruals. This assumes that a high level of discretionary accruals involves 
a high level of earnings management practices performed by the management (Alzoubi, 
2016). This study uses the discretionary accruals component as a major indicator of 
earnings management since managers’ accrual choices are associated with various 
performance measures, such as predicting cash flows, earnings, dividend changes and 
stock price movements, while affecting the reliability of the firms’ reported earnings 
(Subramanyam, 1996). The Modified Jones model is the most widely used model for 
dividing the accruals and measuring the discretionary accruals component. Hence, this 
research first uses a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model (1991) in 
measuring the discretionary accruals component as an earnings management indicator. 
This research uses the cash flow method to measure the total accruals, using the following 
equation (Sun et al., 2010; Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2017). 
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TACit = NIit – CFOit  (1) 
Where:  
TACit  is total accruals for firm i in year t. 
NIit is the net income before extraordinary items of firm i in year t. 
CFOit is the net cash flows from operations of firm i in year t. 
 
NDACit  = αi [1/ TAit-1 ] + β1i [ (Δ REVit – Δ RECit)/ TAit-1 ]+ β2i [PPEit / TAit-1 ]  (2) 
  
Where: 
NDACit is the non-discretionary accruals for firm i in year t.   
TAit-1  is the total assets for firm i in year t-1. 
Δ REVit   is the change in revenues of firm i between years t and t-1. 
Δ RECit   is the change in receivables of firm i between years t and t-1. 
PPEit   is the level of gross property, plant, and equipment of firm i in year t. 
α, β1,2,3 are the industry-specific coefficients. 
 
DACit = TACit - NDAit (3) 
 
Where: 
DACit   is the discretionary accruals for firm i in year t.  
 
Kothari et al. (2005), however, found that it is important to adjust for the accrual 
performance of a matched firm when measuring the discretionary accruals, in order to 
control for the impact of the firms’ performance on their accruals. Hence, it is suggested 
to match the accrual performance of firms on the basis of the return on assets (Kothari et 
al., 2005). Cohen and Zarowin (2008), Jones et al. (2008), Sun et al. (2010), and 
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017) used the current year’s ROA; while Gul (2006), 
Jones et al. (2008), Rodriguez-Perez and van Hemmen (2010), Chen et al. (2011), Nekhili 
et al (2016), Jackson (2017), and Shin et al. (2018) used the lagged ROA, defined as the 
net income divided by the beginning of the year total assets. Therefore, the performance-
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matched discretionary accruals are also used to indicate earnings management, on the 
basis of the lagged ROA- since it’s the most widely used, as an additional analysis, in 
order to confirm the validity of the results.    
TACit = NIit – CFOit  (1) 
Where:  
TACit  is total accruals for firm i in year t. 
NIit is the net income of firm i in year t. 
CFOit is the net cash flows from operations of firm i in year t. 
 
The discretionary accruals are represented by the residuals generated from the difference 
between the total accruals and the non-discretionary accruals (NDAC) (Sun et al., 2010). 
 
TACit/ TAit-1  = αi [1/ TAit-1 ] + β1i [ (Δ REVit – Δ RECit)/ TAit-1 ]+ β2i [PPEit / 
TAit-1 ] + β3i [ROAit-1 / TAit-1] + ε it 
 
(2) 
Where: 
TACit is total accruals for firm i in year t. 
TAit-1  is the total assets for firm i in year t-1. 
Δ REVit   is the change in revenues of firm i between years t and t-1. 
Δ RECit   is the change in receivables of firm i between years t and t-1. 
PPEit   is the level of gross property, plant, and equipment of firm i in year t. 
ROAit-1  is the lagged return on assets of firm i in year t-1, computed as the net income 
of firm i in year t divided by the total assets of firm i in year t-1. 
α, β1,2,3 are the industry-specific coefficients. 
ε it the error term representing the discretionary accruals. 
 
For the purpose of this research, the absolute value of the abnormal accruals is used, since 
managers may engage in either income-increasing or income-decreasing earnings 
management (Sun et al., 2010). Hence, the absolute value of DAC acts as a proxy for the 
mixed effect of higher or lower earnings (González and García-Meca, 2014).   
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4.5.2. Moderating Variable 
4.5.2.1. CEO Compensation 
CEO compensation is considered a main source of motivation for managers for leading 
the firms, yet it may have a negative implication as managers become concerned with 
increasing their compensation tied to the firm’s earnings, which may encourage them to 
get involved in earnings management practices. According to Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006), financial incentives may not necessarily result in lower firm’s value, if they are 
coupled with adequate monitoring, to control managers’ discretions in reporting a firm’s 
performance. Hence, the joint effect of CEO compensation coupled with other 
determinants of EM is worth studying.  
CEO compensation is measured in various ways in previous studies. Shuto (2007) 
measured CEO compensation as the total cash salary and bonuses paid to all directors- 
focusing only on the short-term component. Teshima and Shuto (2008) measured the 
CEO compensation as the change in the total cash compensation paid to all directors as a 
proportion of the total assets. Erickson et al. (2006) measured all types of compensation. 
They measured salaries, bonuses, and stock option grants, in addition to a stock-based 
mix variable measuring the ratio of long-term compensation as a proportion of the total 
compensation.  
Meanwhile, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) examined the CEO stocks and options 
holdings resulting from a one per cent change in a firm’s stock price. They constructed a 
measure using the Compustat Executive Compensation data in order to calculate the 
variable Incentive Ratio. This measure of incentives is constructed to indicate the portion 
of a CEO’s total compensation resulting from a one per cent increase in the equity value. 
Cornett et al. (2008), however, separated the compensation into salaries and options 
compensations and measured them in US dollars. Meanwhile, Conyon et al. (2001), 
   
106 
 
Cadman et al. (2010) and Ozkan (2011) measured the total compensation in thousands of 
dollars, while Hassen (2014), Cheng et al. (2016) and Chou and Chan (2018) measured 
it using the log value of the total compensation, to reduce the dispersion in the distribution 
of compensation paid to CEOs. 
In this study, CEO compensation is measured using the log of the total compensation, 
similar to the studies of Cheng et al. (2016), Hassen (2014) and Chou and Chan (2018), 
to reduce the dispersion on the results when analysing the impact of the CEO 
compensation as a whole. This variable is presented in my research model as COMP. My 
first contribution is to analyse the CEO compensation, as a moderating variable, to 
indicate its joint effect with four determinants of EM, and their impact on the level of 
EM. Nevertheless, the strengths of these joint effects are also analysed to determine 
whether the magnitudes provide complementary or substitutive effects in relation to EM. 
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4.5.3. Independent Variables 
4.5.3.1. Audit Quality 
It appears that the existence of audit quality by itself may not exert sufficient monitoring 
on firms, as mentioned by Burnett et al. (2012) and Roychowdhury (2006). Hence, there 
comes the need for an additional corporate governance mechanism to be implemented 
along with acquiring a high-quality auditor, in order to limit the participation of earnings 
management practices, as suggested by Burnett et al. (2012). Hence, the existence of CEO 
compensation may moderate this relationship between the audit quality and EM, it can 
be a successful mechanism in complementing audit quality to reduce the unfavourable 
behaviours by managers in manipulating the firm’s earnings.  
Audit quality is recognised as the ability of an auditor to perform an independent audit to 
provide reliable financial statements which are free from material misstatements (Okoh, 
2015). Many studies use the auditor size, such as the Big 4/5/6/8 versus the non-Big 
4/5/6/8 to differentiate audit quality levels (Krishnan, 2003). Hassanein et al. (2018) used 
the auditor size for indicating the audit quality and found that 80% of their sample is 
audited by one of the Big Four auditing firms, on their analysis of UK firms listed on the 
FTSE all-shares index, between 2005 and 2014. Even though the auditor size is the most 
commonly applied measure for audit quality, other measures have also been used, such 
as audit fees, non-audit service fees, total fees paid to the auditor, auditor tenure and 
industry specialist auditors.  
According to Palmrose (1986), there is a significant relation between audit fees and 
auditor size as the two are considered measures of audit quality. They found that the 
higher audit fees associated with the big 8 auditor firms are charged in return for either 
the higher audit quality they provide or due to their monopoly in pricing these auditing 
services. According to Rajgopal et al. (2015), if applied researchers want to use a proxy 
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for audit quality, they are recommended to use either the existence of Big N auditors or 
audit service fees. They conclude that other audit quality measures, as a result of 
conducting their analysis, “suffer from construct validity issues”. In addition, they found 
that high premiums charged by Big N auditors may not be all directed towards providing 
higher quality audits. This indicates that these premiums may be paid in return for their 
high reputations and brand names, which does not necessarily indicate higher audit 
quality.  
Copley (1991) found audit fees to have greater power in measuring audit quality than the 
dichotomy of Big 8 versus non-Big 8 auditors in explaining variance levels of government 
disclosure. According to Hay et al. (2008), the ‘Big’ 4/5/6 audit firms, are perceived to 
have higher audit quality and to receive higher audit fees in return. According to Craswell 
et al. (1995), the development of the ‘Big’ auditors’ reputations, brand names and 
industry specialization are costly, which results in higher audit fees. This indicates that 
higher audit fees are involved with higher quality audits by the ‘Big’ audit firms. Mitra 
et al. (2007) explained that higher business risks demand audit firms to assign more 
professional and experienced auditors, to detect any material misstatements, leading to 
greater audit efforts and higher audit service fees. This also indicates that higher audit 
fees indicate more professional audit services exerted by the audit firms.  
According to Chen et al. (2005), based on the Australian audit market, the industry 
specialists are found to receive significant audit fee premium. This audit fee premium is 
also found to be a significant part of the fee premium received by ‘Big’ audit firms. This 
indicates that high audit fees give an indication of high audit quality performed due to the 
contribution of industry specialist auditors as well as those of ‘Big’ audit firms. 
According to Gul (2006), Alali (2011), Okolie et al. (2013) and Bamahros and Wan-
Hussin (2015), audit fees is a measure of auditor independence and is measured by the 
log of audit fees paid by firms, while Mitra et al. (2007) and Gul et al. (2007) analysed 
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the audit fees in US dollars. While the audit fees are found to constrain earnings 
management practices, the non-audit service fees are criticised to increase earnings 
management (Frankel et al., 2002; Gul et al. 2007).  
Non-audit service fees are argued to influence an auditor’s judgement, reducing the 
auditor’s independence, preventing the auditor from enforcing the GAAP, and leading to 
lower quality audits and higher earnings management accordingly (Hoitash et al., 2007). 
According to DeFond et al. (2002), auditors may become financially dependent on their 
clients because of the high non-audit service fees, and as a result unwilling to report any 
misstatements out of fear of losing their clients. Based on this, the total fees are also 
criticised for increasing earnings management as found by Hoitash et al. (2007) and 
DeFond et al. (2002). Even though the Non-audit service fees were highly criticized, they 
were also found to restrain earnings management (Causholli et al., 2014). The argument 
behind this is that it provides the auditor with useful information about the client, enabling 
the auditor to build a deeper understanding of the client, which helps auditors to produce 
more effective and efficient audits and reduce earnings management accordingly.  
Longer audit firm tenure was argued to increase earnings management as it reduces 
auditor’s independence (Bell et al., 2015; Tepalagul and Lin, 2015). The reason behind 
this is that long association between auditors and their clients can create confidence and 
familiarity between the two, resulting in a lack of innovation and less strict audit 
procedures, which results in impaired audit quality and increased earnings management 
practices (Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Okoh, 2015). On the contrary, longer audit firm 
tenure is found to reduce earnings management as a result of auditors being able to 
evaluate the risk of material misstatements (Casterella and Johnston, 2013). Longer audit 
firm tenure is perceived to help auditors gain valuable knowledge about their clients, 
become more experienced and have better insights into the client’s business operations 
and the internal audits of their financial reporting processes (Casterella and Johnston, 
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2013). The auditor tenure is measured by the number of years in which auditors audit 
their clients (Bamahros and Wan-Hussin, 2015).  
In this study, the audit quality is measured using the audit fees as a proxy for audit quality, 
as it indicates auditor’s independence and signals the expected audit effort. The audit 
service fees are used in this study for three reasons. First, as it is considered an indication 
of higher audit quality, as it’s earned by Big audit firms, as mentioned by Hay et al. 
(2008), and industry specialist auditors, as indicated by Chen et al. (2005), in return for 
their expertise and professional audit services and efforts, as indicated by Mitra et al. 
(2007). Second, the UK is found to be mostly audited by ‘Big’ audit firms, as found by 
Hassanein et al. (2018), which reduces the need for its analysis. Third, audit fees may be 
tricky as they may be actually spent for monitoring and controlling purposes, or may be 
used just to signal higher credibility of the financial reporting processes of firms in order 
to attract investors, as suggested by Rajgopal et al. (2015). Therefore, the audit quality 
represented by the amount of audit service fees is worth studying, to indicate its real 
impact on EM practices, in the UK and US contexts. The audit quality is measured using 
the log value of audit fees paid to auditors, to reduce the dispersion on the results, as 
measured by Gul (2006), Alali (2011), Okolie et al. (2013) and Bamahros and Wan-
Hussin (2015). These data are provided by Bloomberg database and the variable is 
presented in my research model as AUDQ. 
 
4.5.3.2. Managerial Ownership 
Gul et al. (2002) and Alzoubi (2016) found a negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and earnings management. Hence, managerial ownership makes managers 
owners to constrain their opportunistic behaviours and reduce the earnings’ 
manipulations, and hence reduce the need for outside monitoring. Conversely, Klassen 
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(1997) and Gabrielsen et al. (2002) found a positive relationship, as with high managerial 
ownership, managers face more pressures from the capital markets to signal a higher firm 
value to match the market’s expectations, and hence it becomes an ineffective tool in 
constraining earnings management. This positive relation is also supported by the 
entrenchment theory. The existence of two different opinions makes the variable worth 
studying and hence a significant relationship is expected. However, Yeo et al. (2002), 
Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007), and Teshima and Shuto (2008) found a non-
linear relationship between the two.  
Additionally, the existence of CEO compensation is expected to moderate this 
relationship between managerial ownership and EM. This joint effect is expected to 
reduce managers’ opportunistic behaviours and their earnings’ manipulations. In fact, 
CEO compensation can be a successful mechanism in complementing or substituting the 
effect of the managerial ownership on the level of EM. Hence, the strength of this joint 
relationship is worth studying as well. Managerial ownership is measured by Teshima 
and Shuto (2008) as the fraction of all shares held by all directors.  
Peasnell et al. (2005), Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007), and Alzoubi (2016) 
measured the insider managerial ownership as the proportion of common shares held by 
inside members of the board of directors- executive directors; while outsider managerial 
ownership is measured by Alzoubi (2016) as the proportion of common shares held by 
independent non-executive directors. According to Gabrielsen et al. (2002), the 
managerial ownership is computed as the percentage of outstanding shares held by 
directors, officers, and principal owners holding at least 10 per cent of the firm’s shares. 
Similarly, Bos and Donker (2004) defined managerial ownership as the total percentage 
of block-holdings held by managers and supervisors. According to Ullah et al. (2012), 
managerial ownership is computed as the total proportion of managers, directors, and 
executives divided by the total capital shares of the firm.  
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Hassanein et al. (2018) analysed the managerial ownership presented by the percentage 
of total shares held by employees and those holding positions and have voting powers at 
the annual general meetings, using the Datastream code ‘NOSHEM’, on their study of 
UK listed firms between 2005- 2014. This definition, however, has changed on 
Datastream to indicate the percentage of strategic shareholdings higher than 5%, held by 
employees, or by individual investors, using this same Datastream code at the point of 
collecting the data. This recent definition by Datastream does not specify the involvement 
of managerial ownership. Hence, due to the absence of a clear definition indicating the 
percentage of managerial ownership, this variable will be excluded from the analysis. 
Therefore, in this study, the managerial ownership presented by MANOWN is excluded 
from the research model and is not analysed due to the unavailability of its data on either 
Thomson Reuters or Bloomberg databases.  
 
4.5.3.3. Institutional Ownership 
Michel et al. (2014) and Alzoubi (2016) found that high institutional ownership tends to 
restrict managers’ opportunistic behaviours and reduce earnings management practices. 
This negative relation is justified by the institutions’ ability to monitor and control 
managerial opportunism since they have significant resources and access to the relevant 
information. Conversely, Bushee (2001) and Charitou et al. (2007) found that high 
institutional ownership tends to increase earnings management practices, as managers 
face pressures from institutions to meet the short-term targets, which pushes managers 
towards manipulating the firm’s earnings. The existence of two different opinions makes 
the variable worth studying and hence a significant relationship is expected. Additionally, 
CEO compensation is expected to moderate this relationship between institutional 
ownership and EM. This joint effect is expected to be a successful mechanism in reducing 
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the level of EM. Hence, the strength of this joint relationship is worth studying as well, 
as part of this study’s contribution. 
According to Peasnell et al. (2005), Wang (2006), Gul et al. (2007), Hoitash et al. (2007), 
Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) and Alzoubi (2016) the institutional ownership is measured by 
the number of shares held by institutional investors as a proportion of the firm’s total shares. 
Ullah et al. (2012) measured the financial institutional ownership by the total proportion of 
banks, investment firms, insurance companies, and pension funds divided by the total capital 
shares of the firm. Mitra et al. (2007) categorised institutional ownership into two- diffused 
and block. They computed the diffused institutional ownership as the percentage of shares 
held by institutional investors holding less than 5% of the firm’s common shares, while the 
block-institutional ownership is computed as the percentage of shares held by institutional 
owners holding more than 5% of the firm’s common shares.  
Similarly, Bos and Donker (2004), institutional ownership is defined as the total percentage 
of block-holdings held by banks, insurance firms, investment firms, and pension funds. In 
this study, the institutional ownership is measured by the total percentage of strategic 
shareholdings of at least 5%, as in prior studies of  Bos and Donker (2004) and Mitra et al. 
(2007), held by investment banks, institutions, pension funds and endowment funds. This 
percentage of institutional ownership is computed by Thomson Reuters database and 
presented into two categories. These two are- the percentage of shares held by investment 
banks and institutions, using the Datastream code NOSHIC, and the percentage of shares held 
by pension funds and endowment funds, using the Datastream code NOSHPF. Hence, the 
two are added together to represent the total institutional ownership to be used in this study, 
and the variable is presented in my research model as INSTOWN. 
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4.5.3.4. Concentrated Ownership 
The concentrated ownership is found to reduce earnings management since block-holders 
are keen to protect their large investments (De Miguel et al., 2004). However, if the 
concentrated ownership turns to be excessively high, it may have negative implications, 
as they tend to work for their interests instead, which causes them to have an agency 
problem with minority shareholders (Zhong et al., 2007). Their excessive powers may 
push managers towards manipulating the firms’ earnings, in order to lead block-holders 
to their private benefits (Boubakri et al., 2005). The existence of two different opinions 
makes the variable worth studying and hence a significant relationship is expected. 
Additionally, as part of my contribution to this study, CEO compensation is expected to 
moderate this relationship between the concentrated ownership and EM. Moreover, the 
joint effect resulting from the moderation is expected to benefit the firms in reducing their 
earnings’ manipulations. Therefore, the strength of this joint relation is worth analysing.  
Klassen (1997) measured the inside ownership concentration by computing the 
percentage of shares owned by the largest five insider owners. Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) 
measured the capital concentration using a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
capital is held by the main shareholder and a value of 0 otherwise. Similarly, Peasnell et 
al. (2005) also use a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the main investor holds more 
than 10% of the firm’s shares, and 0 otherwise. An et al. (2016) measured block-holder 
ownership using a dummy variable as well, for two groups of 1% and 5%; so for the 
ownership by institutional block-holders greater than 1%, as a proportion of market cap, 
they took a value of 1 or 0 otherwise, and the same concept is applied to the 5% group. 
Additionally, Mitra et al. (2007) use two categories of block-holders; one representing 
the institutional block-holders, holding above 5% of the firm’s common shares, and the 
other for non-institutional block-holders, holding above 5% of the firm’s common shares.  
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According to Bos and Donker (2004), Ullah et al. (2012) and Alzoubi (2016), block-
holder ownership is defined as block-holders owning at least 5% of the firm’s shares. In 
this study, the concentrated ownership is defined as the total percentage of strategic 
shareholdings of at least 5%, as computed by Thomson Reuters, using the Datastream 
code NOSHST. This percentage, however, includes all block-holders above 5%, 
including the institutional ownership, as previously explained. Therefore, this 
concentrated ownership percentage is used after the deduction of the INSTOWN 
percentage computed above, in order to avoid the duplication of data. Hence, the 
concentrated ownership would include all block-holders, other than institutional 
investors. It includes all other types of investors holding above 5% of the firm’s shares 
and not displayed in my research model, such as families, employees, governments and 
foreign investors. This variable is presented in my research model as CONOWN. 
 
4.5.3.5. Cash Holdings 
Holding cash tends to provide great flexibility for firms to enter into new investments 
without the need for external financing and for the commitment towards their interest 
payments (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Cash is known to be held for precautionary 
purposes in order to protect firms from any unfavourable conditions (Al-dhamari and Ku 
Ismail, 2015). According to Kang and Kim (2014), the level of excess cash holdings is 
found to reduce the positive association between the information asymmetry and EM due 
to the high governance exerted by firms on higher level of cash holdings. Conversely, 
holding higher levels of FCF gives managers the opportunity to waste these excess cash 
reserves on their private benefits (Pinkowitz et al., 2006).  
Bukit and Iskandar (2009) analysed the impact of the excess FCFs available. Chung et al. 
(2005), Ma (2012), Rusmin et al. (2014), Farahani et al. (2016), and Nekhili et al. (2016) 
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analysed the cash flow as cash from earnings, after the deduction of interest, dividends, 
and tax, and before accounting for depreciation, in relation to the book value of assets. 
Ma (2012) analysed free cash flow as an indicator for cash holdings. Meanwhile, 
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) use a cash regression model and Kang and Kim (2014) use the 
residuals from a cash equation as an indicator for excess cash holdings. However, Mun 
and Jang (2015) defined cash holdings as the sum of cash and cash equivalents- after the 
deduction of current debts, as a proportion to total revenues.  
According to Al-dhamari and Ku Ismail (2015) cash holdings are measured as the log of 
cash and cash equivalents in relation to net assets- which is computed as the total assets 
after the deduction of cash and cash equivalents. Similarly, Ogundipe et al. (2012) also 
measured cash holdings as the sum of cash and cash equivalents as a proportion of the 
net assets. Meanwhile, Sun et al., (2012) measured the cash holdings as the proportion of 
cash and marketable securities in relation to the book value of assets, and Farinha et al. 
(2018) measured cash as the cash and short-term investments over the firm’s total assets. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) also measured the ratio of the total cash and cash equivalents in 
relation to total assets. Nevertheless, Opler et al. (1999), Foley at al. (2007), and Shin et 
al. (2018) analysed the log of the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to net assets. 
Prior studies in this area are conducted on the relation between free cash flow levels in 
relation to EM, but none of them analysed the impact of the total cash in firms- using the 
cash and cash equivalents on EM practices, in the UK and the US contexts, during this 
period of analysis, as previously discussed in section 3.4. They present cash holdings in 
terms of the FCF, rather than the total cash which the firm owns. A positive relationship 
is expected between the two, in accordance with the entrenchment theory and the agency 
theory, since higher cash levels are expected to be involved with higher managerial 
opportunism, resulting in higher EM practices and a wider gap between managers and 
their shareholders.  
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In addition, CEO compensation is expected to moderate this relationship between the 
cash holding levels and EM. The joint effect arising from using the moderating variable 
is expected to reduce EM participated by managers. It is expected to weaken the positive 
relation when managers receive incentives. Hence, the strength of this joint effect is also 
worth studying. Hence, as one of this study’s main contributions, the impact of cash 
holdings on EM is analysed, using the firm’s total cash and cash equivalents, rather than 
considering just the small portion of the FCF available at managers’ disposal. Therefore, 
in this study, the cash holdings are computed using the cash and cash equivalents, as a 
proportion of the firm’s total assets. This helps to indicate the size of the firm’s cash 
holding levels in relation to the firm’s size. These data are available from Bloomberg 
database. This variable is presented in my research model as CASH. 
Nevertheless, as an expansion to this contribution, firms are categorized into high and 
low cash holding firms, so the research model is analysed again to reveal the impact of 
the remaining corporate governance mechanisms in the model on the participation of EM 
when firms hold high vs low levels of cash. The reason behind this analysis of dividing 
firms into high and low cash holding firms is built on the concepts of the agency and the 
entrenchment theories since high cash holding firms are expected to experience higher 
earnings’ manipulations by their managers. Hence, the corporate governance mechanisms 
presented in this research are expected to be less effective in controlling managerial 
opportunism in firms holding high cash levels, due to the higher opportunity for managers 
to use the firm’s cash holdings. This analysis is also conducted in the UK and the US 
contexts. Low cash holding firms are represented by LCASH, while high cash holding 
firms are represented by HCASH. The samples are split using the median, as in previous 
studies such as Hussainey and Walker (2009) and Alali (2011).  
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4.5.4. Control Variables 
4.5.4.1. Financial Leverage 
According to Bedard et al. (2004) and Peasnell et al. (2005), firms using high leverage 
tend to have income increasing accruals in order to reduce the debt restrictions placed 
upon them. To further explain this, firms which are about to default in paying off their 
debts are more likely to manage the firm’s earnings in order to avoid any contractual 
violations (Mather and Ramsay, 2006; Teshima and Shuto, 2008; Rusmin et al., 2014). 
Conversely, Chung et al. (2002) and Park and Shin (2004) found that firms holding higher 
levels of leverage are less capable of manipulating the firm’s earnings as a result of the 
high control placed upon them by the lenders for the purpose of securing their debts.  
The financial leverage is measured by Klein (2002), Peasnell et al. (2005), Wang (2006), 
Gul et al. (2007), Teshima and Shuto (2008), Rodriguez-Perez and van Hemmen (2010), 
Chen et al. (2011), Rusmin et al. (2014), Alzoubi (2016), Cheng et al. (2016), An et al. 
(2016), and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017) as the total debt divided by total 
assets. Mitra et al. (2007) measured leverage as the long-term debt divided by the total 
assets, while, Bedard et al. (2004) measured leverage as the long-term debt divided by 
the lagged total assets. Meanwhile, Sun et al. (2010), Liu et al. (2014) and Hassanein et 
al. (2018) measured leverage as the total debt to total equity. Additionally, Cohen and 
Zarowin (2008) measured leverage as the long-term debt divided by the market value of 
equity, and Liu et al. (2014) measured leverage as total liabilities divided by the equity 
book value. In this research, the financial leverage is measured as the total debt to total 
assets, as it’s the most commonly used measure. It’s expected to have a significant 
association with EM. The data is obtained from Bloomberg database and the variable is 
presented in my research model as LEV. 
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4.5.4.2. Firm Size 
According to Birjandi et al. (2015), the firm size influences the ability to make decisions 
regarding the firm’s performance, and hence, it must be controlled in order to avoid any 
impact this variable may have on the results. According to Alzoubi (2016), managers’ 
behaviours differ in small and large firms. Dechow and Dichev (2002) found steady 
earnings management levels in larger firms, while Gul et al. (2009) found lower earnings 
management levels associated with larger firms. The reason behind this is that larger 
firms tend to leave fewer chances for managers to manipulate earnings, as a result of the 
high monitoring performed upon them by security analysts (Teshima and Shuto, 2008).  
Conversely, large firms may still be motivated to manipulate the firm’s earnings but for 
other purposes such as meeting the expected earnings’ targets (Chen et al., 2007). Relying 
on the agency theory, large firms tend to have higher information asymmetry, which 
encourages managers to manipulate the firm’s earnings in order to reach their personal 
benefits (Chung et al., 2005; Ben Othman and Zhegal, 2006). The firm size is measured 
by Bedard et al. (2004), Teshima and Shuto (2008), Cornett et al. (2008), Chen et al. 
(2011), Kouaib and Jarboui (2014), Birjandi et al. (2015), Alzoubi (2016), Cheng et al. 
(2016), and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017) as the log of total assets; while Sun 
et al. (2010) used the total assets as a whole. Liu et al. (2014), Rusmin et al. (2014) and 
Hassanein et al. (2018) however, measured the firm’s size as the log of the market value 
of equity. In this study, the firm’s size is expected to have a significant association with 
EM. The firm’s size is measured as the log of total assets, as it’s the most commonly used 
measure, and is presented in my research model as SIZE.  
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4.5.4.3. Profitability 
Bedard et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2007), Alzoubi (2016) and Anagnostopoulou and 
Tsekrekos (2017) found a negative association between the firm’s profitability and 
earnings management. They found that firms generating lower profits, face pressures 
from their shareholders to increase those profits, which pushes them towards 
manipulating the firms’ earnings, resulting in higher EM levels. However, Kothari et al. 
2005, Machuga and Teitel 2007, González and García-Meca (2014) found a positive 
association between the two. They explained that managers become motivated to manage 
the firm’s earnings upward in order to make their firms more attractive to investors. 
The return on assets (ROA) is used as a proxy for the firm’s profitability. González and 
García-Meca (2014) measured the ROA as the EBIT over the lagged total assets. While, 
Alzoubi (2016) measured ROA using the firm’s net income divided by the lagged total 
assets, while Wang (2006) and Mitra et al. (2007) measured ROA as the net income over 
the average total assets. Hassanein et al. (2018) measured ROA using the firm’s return 
on equity ratio. The firm’s ROA is measured by Bedard et al. (2004), Gul (2006), Hoitash 
et al. (2007), Cohen and Zarowin (2008), Sun et al. (2010), Nekhili et al. (2016), Cheng 
et al. (2016), Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017) as the net income divided by the 
total assets.  
Hence, in this study, the firm’s profitability is represented by the firm’s ROA, measured 
as the firm’s net income divided by its total asset, as it’s the most commonly used 
measure. It is expected to have an association with EM, as explained earlier by Bedard et 
al. (2004), and Chen et al. (2007), Alzoubi (2016) and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos 
(2017). The data is collected from Bloomberg database and is presented in my research 
model as ROA. 
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4.5.4.4. Firm Growth Opportunities 
According to Wang (2006), Mitra et al. (2007), Sharma and Kuang (2014), González and 
García-Meca (2014), and Alzoubi (2016) found that firms with high growth tend to have 
high earnings management. They explained that firms with high growth, tend to be 
reluctant to report losses and hence they tend to have higher accruals compared to firms 
with lower growth. On the contrary, An et al. (2016) and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos 
(2017) found a negative association between the two variables. An explanation behind 
this is that when a firm’s growth is imperfect as they have an underinvestment problem, 
firms face higher financial distress, which pushes managers towards managing the firm’s 
earnings. The firm’s growth opportunity is computed by Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006), Gul et al. (2007), Mitra et al. (2007), Sharma and Kuang (2014), Rusmin et al. 
(2014), Alzoubi (2016) and Cheng et al. (2016) as the market to book ratio of equity, 
while it is computed by Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017) as the lagged MTB.  
Hussainey et al. (2003), Schleicher et al. (2007), Cohen and Zarowin (2008) and 
Hussainey and Walker (2009) however, measured the growth rate of total assets. In 
addition, Bedard and Biggs (1991), Wang (2006), Liu et al. (2014), González and García-
Meca (2014), and Hassanein et al. (2018) measured the firm’s growth using the sales 
growth rate, while Chen et al. (2011) used the average growth in sales over the last three 
years. In this research, the firm’s growth is measured as the market to book ratio of equity, 
since it combines the cash flows from assets with the firm’s future investment 
opportunities (Adam and Goyal, 2008). It is also the most commonly used measure, as 
mentioned earlier, and is expected to have a significant association with EM. The data is 
collected from Bloomberg database and is presented in my research model as MTB. 
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4.5.4.5. Cash Flows 
Peasnell et al. (2005), Chung et al. (2005) and Alzoubi (2016) found that the existence of 
higher cash flows from operations result in higher levels of earnings management, while 
on the contrary, Chen et al. (2007) and Gul et al. (2009) found a negative association 
between the two. Cash flows are computed by Bedard et al. (2004) as the cash flow from 
operations (CFO) as it appears on the cash flow statement, while represented by Mitra et 
al. (2007) as the free cash flow (FCF) available at managers’ disposal, computed by the 
CFO after the deduction of capital expenditures and dividends. Additionally, cash flows 
are measured by Liu et al. (2014) and Alzoubi (2016) as the CFO as a proportion of total 
assets, while Klein (2002) and Hoitash et al. (2007) used the CFO divided by the lagged 
total assets. Finally, Rusmin et al. (2014) measured cash flows as the difference between 
the current year’s CFO and the past year’s CFO, to the total assets of the past year. In this 
study, however, the cash flow is computed as the CFO in relation to total assets, to 
indicate how much CFO is generated using the firm’s total assets, as in Liu et al. (2014) 
and Alzoubi (2016). It is expected to have a significant association with EM. The data is 
obtained from Bloomberg database and is presented in my research model as CFO. 
 
4.5.4.6. Firm Loss 
According to Wang (2006), Mitra et al, (2007), Chen et al. (2011), González and García-
Meca (2014), Alzoubi (2016), and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017) there’s a 
significant positive relationship between the firm’s loss and EM. Alzoubi (2016), 
González and García-Meca (2014) justified this positive relation by explaining that poor 
financial performance of firms is likely to increase the agency costs and push managers 
towards manipulating the firm’s earnings. Additionally, Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos 
(2017) justified that managers tend to engage in EM practices to avoid reporting a loss or 
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lower earnings compared to previous year’s levels, or to cover missing earnings targets 
set by financial analysts, or to avoid being delisted. Cohen and Zarowin (2008), however, 
found a significant negative relationship between the firm’s loss and EM. Their 
justification behind this is that loss firms have fewer opportunities and less access to 
funds, which makes earnings more difficult to manipulate. Meanwhile, Sharma and 
Kuang (2014) found no association between the two variables.  
Gul (2006), Schleicher et al. (2007), Alzoubi (2016) and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos 
(2017) used a dummy variable equivalent to 1 if the firm incurred losses in the previous 
year, and 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, Chen et al. (2011), Sharma and Kuang (2014) and 
González and García-Meca (2014) used a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm 
reports losses in two consecutive years, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, Mitra et al, (2007) 
and Alali (2011) used a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm incurred a loss in 
any of the previous three years, and 0 otherwise. However, Bedard and Biggs (1991), 
Wang (2006), Cohen and Zarowin (2008) and Liu et al. (2014) used a dummy variable 
indicating negative earnings for the year.  
Schleicher et al. (2007) explained that the existence of a loss in surviving firms has an 
important indication, as the current income does not signal a good long-term firm 
performance. Hence, as a way of monitoring future earnings, investors need to investigate 
why those losses arise and when to eliminate them in the future. Therefore, for this 
research, the firm’s loss is analysed using a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
firm’s net income is negative for the current year and 0 otherwise, as explained by 
Schleicher et al. (2007), and is expected to have a significant positive association with 
EM. The data is obtained from Bloomberg database and is indicated in my research model 
as LOSS.  
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Table 4.2 summarizes all the variables used in my research study- the moderating 
variable, the independent variables, the control variables, and even all the components 
used in measuring the dependent variable- earnings management. This table presents their 
measurements and descriptions, along with their data sources, in addition to their 
expected signs from conducting this study.  
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Table 4.2: Research Variables 
Variables Labels Measurements/ Description Expect
ed Sign 
Data 
Source 
Dependent Variable: Earnings Management (EM) - Absolute value of discretionary 
accruals measured using the modified Jones (1991) model and the Kothari et al. (2005) 
performance-matched DA model 
Net Income NIit is the net income of firm i in year t.  Bloomberg 
Cash Flow 
from 
Operations 
CFOit is the net cash flows from 
operations of firm i in year t. 
 Bloomberg 
Lagged Total 
Assets 
TAit-1  is the total assets for firm i in year t-
1. 
 Bloomberg 
Change in 
Revenues 
Δ REVit   is the change in revenues of firm i 
between years t and t-1. 
 Bloomberg 
Change in 
Receivables 
Δ RECit   is the change in receivables of firm i 
between years t and t-1. 
 Bloomberg 
Property Plant 
and Equipment 
PPEit   is the level of gross property, plant, 
and equipment of firm i in year t. 
 Bloomberg 
Lagged Return 
on Assets 
ROAit-1  is the lagged return on assets of firm 
i in year t-1, computed as the net 
income of firm i in year t divided by 
the total assets of firm i in year t-1. 
  
 Bloomberg 
Moderating Variable 
CEO 
Compensation 
COMP 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑇. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝ensation Un-
known 
Bloomberg 
Independent Variables 
Audit Quality AUDQ Log of Audit Fees  Un-
known 
Datastream 
ECSLDP064 
Managerial 
Ownership 
MANOWN Not Available N/A  
Institutional 
Ownership 
INSTOWN T. percentage of shares of at least 
5% , held by investment banks, 
institutions, pension funds and 
endowment funds 
 
Un-
known 
Datastream 
(NOSHIC+ 
NOSHPF) 
Concentrated 
Ownership 
CONOWN T. percentage of strategic 
shareholdings of at least 5% - 
INSTOWN 
Un-
known 
Datastream 
(NOSHST-
INSTOWN) 
Cash Holdings CASH 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
(+) Bloomberg 
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Control Variables   
Firm Leverage LEV 𝑇. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Un-
known 
Bloomberg 
Firm Size SIZE Log. of Total Assets Un-
known 
Bloomberg 
Firm 
Profitability 
ROA 𝑁𝐼
𝑇. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Un-
known 
Bloomberg 
Firm Growth MTB Market-to-Book Ratio Un-
known 
Bloomberg 
Cash Flows CFO 𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝑇. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Un-
known 
Bloomberg 
Firm’s Loss LOSS Dummy Variable taking a value of 
1 if the firm’s net income is 
negative and 0 otherwise. 
 
(+) Bloomberg 
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4.6. Summary 
This chapter compares the two markets of the UK and the US and explains the sample 
size, along with the sources of data used for the purpose of this research. It also sets the 
research model to be used for my analysis of the impact of the moderating role of CEO 
compensation on the associations between four factors and earnings management 
practices, in the UK and the US contexts. It also identifies the different variables used in 
my research model, whether dependent, independent, moderating, or control variables, 
and how these variables are measured in the study. The analyses of this research are 
further discussed and presented in the following three chapters, in an attempt of satisfying 
the research objectives set in the introduction chapter. Chapter five presents the impact 
of the EM constraints, as well as the impact of cash holdings on EM. Chapter six presents 
the impact of the moderating role of CEO compensation on EM. Chapter seven presents 
the impact of the moderation effect, as well as the effectiveness of the remaining 
corporate governance mechanisms, in high (HCASH) and low cash holding firms 
(LCASH). 
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Chapter 5: Earnings Management Constraints in the UK and US  
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the EM constraints. This chapter compares the 
findings of the UK and the US-listed firms. It presents the summary statistics, followed 
by the impact of CEO compensation on EM, the impact of three governance mechanisms 
on EM- audit quality, institutional ownership, and concentrated ownership, and finally 
the impact of cash holdings on EM within the two contexts.  
 
5.2. Summary Statistics of UK Firms 
First, the analysis is performed on UK firms listed on the FTSE 350 index, throughout 
the period of twelve years from 2005-2016. This section presents the descriptive statistics 
of all the variables used in this study of UK listed firms. Second, it presents the regression 
diagnostics. Third, it analyses the findings of the Hausman fixed effects model applied to 
the UK sample. 
 
5.2.1.  Descriptive Statistics of UK Firms 
Table 5.1 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables 
used in the study. The table presents an average DAC, which is a proxy for EM, of approx. 
3.1%, with a min of 0 and a max of 42%. The average DAC presented by Sun et al. (2010) 
is found to be 6.4%, which is almost the double of the DAC presented in my findings, 
with a higher max reaching 53.4% of UK listed firms. Their analysis, however, was based 
on a different index, the FTSE All-share, and for the period between April 2006 and 
March 2007. In addition, they used the performance- matched model for measuring the 
DAC, rather than the Modified Jones model, used in this study. Table 5.1 indicates an 
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average CEO compensation of around 3M, with a minimum of 3,342 and a maximum of 
around 32M.  
As of the independent variables, the audit fees presenting the audit quality has an average 
of around 4M, with a min of 0 and a max of around 57M. The average audit quality is 
found to be 85.4% as obtained by Peasnell et al. (2005) on their study of the UK listed 
firms, as they used the Big 5 auditors as an audit quality indicator, rather than the audit 
fees. Additionally, the average audit quality is found to be 3.7% as indicated by Sun et 
al. (2010) on their study of the UK listed firms, as they used a different measure- the 
number of audit committee meetings, and a different index, between 2006 and 2007. 
The table indicates the average level of the institutional ownership type of corporate 
structure of UK listed firms to be approx. 9%, with a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 
54%. This average is much lower than the average of the institutional ownership of 21.6% 
during the period from 1993-1996 as found by Peasnell et al. (2005) on UK listed firms. 
Their analysis, however, was based on a different sample size, as they analysed the largest 
1000 listed firms each year, based on their market capitalization. The concentrated 
ownership tends to have an average of approx. 8.5% and to range between a minimum of 
0% and a maximum of 74%, with a standard deviation of 17.3%. In relation to UK based 
studies, the Block ownership was measured by a dummy variable and found to have a 
higher average of 53.3%, which is about six times as much, based on the study of Peasnell 
et al. (2005). Cash-holdings tend to have an average of approx. 9 %, with a minimum and 
maximum of approx. 0.1% and 56%, respectively.  
As of the control variables, the leverage tends to have an average of 20.4%, with a min 
of 0% and a max of 80.1%. This finding is close to the findings of Hassanein et al. (2018), 
as they found an average firm leverage of 21.5% on UK listed firms; even though their 
study was based on a different index, the FTSE all-shares, consisting of 2932 firm-year 
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observations, which is more than five times the number of this research’s observations. 
Their measure, however, was different as they used the debt to equity ratio, rather than 
the debt to assets ratio. These findings, however, are different from the leverage obtained 
by Peasnell et al. (2005) which reached 52.3% back in the period between 1993 and 1996 
of UK listed firms. These findings are also different from the average leverage obtained 
by Sun et al. (2010) of UK listed firms, which reached a 92.3% between 2007 and 2008, 
as indicated by the FTSE All-share index. In addition to the difference in their sample 
size and period, they used the debt to equity ratio, rather than the debt to assets ratio. 
The table also shows an average firm size of 9.5, with a min of 8.16 and a max of 11.55. 
This size is slightly lower than the average size of 12.4 obtained by Hassanein et al. (2018) 
on UK listed firms, between 2005- 2014, from the FTSE All-Share index. This difference, 
however, can be justified by the difference in the measurement, as they used the log of 
the market value of equity, rather than the log of total assets. The findings presented by 
Sun et al. (2010) of the UK listed firms display even lower firm size compared to these 
findings. This difference, however, can be justified by the different sample size and 
period, as they used the FTSE All-share index, between 2006 and 2007, in addition to the 
different measurement, as they used the total assets as a whole, rather than the log of the 
total assets. However, this research’s finding is closer to the average firm size of 9.9 and 
10.9 for the two groups of high and low disclosure firms, respectively, as indicated by 
Hussainey et al. (2003) on their study of UK firms, between 1996 and 1999.  
The average cash flows of UK listed firms tends to be around 11.4%, with a min of -6.9% 
and a max of 42%. This average is very close to the average CFO of 11.6% found by 
Peasnell et al. (2005) on UK listed firms, between 1993 and 1996. The table also shows 
an average of around 9.5% for loss-making firms, with a min of 0 and a max of 1, since 
it’s a dummy variable. The firms’ profitability presented by ROA is shown to be around 
7.5%, with a minimum and maximum of approx. -57% and 67%, respectively. The 
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findings of Sun et al. (2010) present an average ROA of 7.1% which is comparable to 
this finding, on their study of UK listed firms, between 2006 and 2007. However, the 
ROA is found to have a slightly lower average of 5.6%, with a lower max of only 36.6% 
in the study of Hassanein et al. (2018) on UK listed firms indexed in the FTSE all-shares, 
between 2005- 2014, which indicates lower profitability. In addition to the fact of them 
using a different index, with a different number of observations, they used the return on 
equity for measuring the firm’s ROA. 
Last, the firms’ growth presented by MTB has an average of 3.9%, with a min of 7% and 
a max of 56%. This growth is lower than the average growth of approx. 9% obtained by 
Hassanein et al. (2018), which is more than the double. This difference can be justified 
by the use of a different index, FTSE all-shares, and a sales growth ratio, rather than the 
MTB. The average growth rate in these findings is also lower than the growth rate of 
15.7% in the study obtained by Hussainey et al. (2003), who used the growth rate of total 
assets instead, on UK firms between 1996 and 1999. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of UK Firms 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
DAC .031 .042 0 .420 
COMP 3.3 M 3.4 M 3,342 32.1 M 
AUDQ 4.2 M 9.2 M 0 57 M 
INSTOWN .090 .093 0 .54 
CONOWN .085 .173 0 .74 
CASH .091 .088 .001 .559 
LEV 20.42 15.11 0 80.08 
SIZE 9.53 .707 8.16 11.55 
CFO .114 .077 -.069 .420 
LOSS .095 .293 0 1 
ROA 7.45 9.11 -56.98 67.11 
MTB 3.93 4.60 .070 56.20 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
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5.2.2.  Regression Diagnostics of UK Firms 
First, figure 5.1 represents the histogram, which indicates the normality of the error terms, 
it shows that the errors are well distributed around the mean. Second, the Scatterplot in 
figure 5.2 represents the linearity of the data. Third, when using the modified Wald test 
in fixed effect regression models for checking for heteroscedasticity, a significance level 
of 0.000 indicates that the data is heteroscedastic, as presented below. Hence, running a 
robust regression is found to be necessary to solve for this issue. Fourth, using the 
Wooldridge test for testing autocorrelation, a significance level of 0.51 indicates no serial 
correlation, as presented below. Last, there’s no multicollinearity problem, as indicated 
by the correlation matrix in table 5.2, since the correlation between the variables is lower 
than 0.8 (Bryman and Cramer, 1997).   
 
Figure 5.1: Histogram 
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Figure 5.2: Scatterplot Matrix 
 
Modified Wald Test 
 
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
 
 
Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix of UK Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) COMP 1           
(2) AUDQ 0.052* 1          
(3) INSTOWN -0.26* -0.24* 1         
(4) CONOWN -0.15* -0.10* -0.19* 1        
(5) CASH -0.02 -0.10* 0.02 0.07 1       
(6) LEV 0.02 0.21* -0.05 -0.09* -0.26* 1      
(7) SIZE 0.56* 0.84* -0.38* -0.02 -0.26* 0.26* 1     
(8) CFO 0.04 -0.19* 0.02 0.08 0.36* -0.23* -0.28* 1    
(9) LOSS -0.11* -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.001 -0.20* 1   
(10) ROA 0.08 -0.13* -0.03 -0.05 0.17* -0.22* -0.19* 0.59* -0.53* 1  
(11) MTB 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 0.19* 0.19* -0.18* 0.40* -0.15* 0.37* 1 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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5.2.3.  Regression Results of UK Firms 
The following tables provide the regression analysis for the impact of five factors on EM 
of UK firms listed on the FTSE 350 index. In this analysis, earnings management, 
represented by the absolute value of discretionary accruals, is measured using the 
Modified Jones Model (1991). As indicated in table 5.3, the model is highly significant, 
since it has a significance level of 0.000. The coefficient of determination represented by 
the R-sq, in table 5.3, indicates that 18.8% of the variation in the level of discretionary 
accruals is explained by the research variables used in this study. The intraclass 
correlation represented by the “rho” in table 5.3, indicates that 75.9% of the variance is 
due to the differences across panels.  
Table 5.4 displays the robust regression results, for 490 observations. The table indicates 
that CEO compensation, along with the concentrated ownership, and loss are significant. 
Hence, these variables tend to have a great impact on EM, as revealed in the following 
discussion. These variables are analysed again with the existence of the moderation effect 
of CEO compensation in the following chapter to analyse any changes the moderation 
effect may have on these main variables. 
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Table 5.3: Regression Results of UK Firms 
DAC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
COMP 0.022 0.010 2.27 0.024 0.003 0.041 
AUDQ -0.028 0.015 -1.84 0.067 -0.058 0.002 
INSTOWN -0.021 0.026 -0.81 0.418 -0.073 0.030 
CONOWN 0.167 0.049 3.41 0.001 0.071 0.263 
CASH 0.042 0.038 1.11 0.270 -0.033 0.118 
LEV 0.001 0.0004 1.54 0.124 -0.0002 0.001 
SIZE -0.041 0.025 -1.69 0.091 -0.090 0.007 
CFO 0.018 0.049 0.37 0.711 -0.078 0.115 
LOSS  0.020 0.008 2.62 0.009 0.005 0.035 
ROA -0.001 0.0003 -4.03 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
MTB -0.001 0.0010 -1.19 0.234 -0.002 0.001 
_CONS 0.442 0.219 2.02 0.044 0.011 0.873 
F(11, 362) 7.64      
Prob>F 0.0000      
R-sq 0.1884      
Rho 0.7586 No of Obs.: 490 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss.  
 
Table 5.4: Robust Regression Results of UK Firms 
DAC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
COMP 0.022 0.009 2.44 0.016 0.004 0.040 
AUDQ -0.028 0.034 -0.82 0.412 -0.096 0.039 
INSTOWN -0.021 0.023 -0.92 0.361 -0.067 0.025 
CONOWN 0.167 0.049 3.40 0.001 0.070 0.264 
CASH 0.042 0.032 1.34 0.183 -0.020 0.105 
LEV 0.001 0.0004 1.34 0.184 -0.0003 0.001 
SIZE -0.041 0.034 -1.23 0.220 -0.108 0.025 
CFO 0.018 0.071 0.26 0.798 -0.122 0.158 
LOSS  0.020 0.012 1.68 0.096 -0.004 0.044 
ROA -0.001 0.001 -1.03 0.306 -0.004 0.001 
MTB -0.001 0.001 -1.54 0.125 -0.002 0.0003 
_CONS 0.442 0.256 1.73 0.086 -0.064 0.948 
F(11, 116) 2.99      
Prob>F 0.0016      
R-sq 0.1884      
Rho 0.7586 No of Obs.: 490 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
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5.2.3.1. Impact of CEO Compensation on Earnings Management in the UK 
Table 5.4 indicates the impact of five independent variables on EM. First, as shown in 
table 5.4, CEO compensation is found to have a significant relationship with EM, as it 
has a significance level of 0.016, which accepts my first hypothesis suggesting a 
relationship between the two. This indicates that managers become more tempted to 
manipulate the firm’s earnings when they receive a higher level of compensation. This 
positive relationship is found between the level of CEO compensation and the level of 
EM, as indicated by the positive coefficient of 0.022. This positive relation can be due to 
the existence of the equity-based component of compensation which results in increasing 
EM since this type of compensation is tied to the firms’ earnings and hence managers 
tend to manipulate these earnings to earn higher compensation. This positive relation is 
consistent with the concept of the agency theory, since higher DA create conflicts of 
interests between managers and shareholders, and are participated to lead managers to 
their personal interests as suggested by the entrenchment theory. This finding is 
inconsistent with the stewardship theory, however, as high DA associated with high CEO 
compensation does not indicate that managers’ interests are aligned with those of the 
shareholders’. Therefore, financial incentives must be coupled with adequate monitoring 
to constrain managers’ discretions and enhance the financial reporting process, as 
suggested by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Laux and Laux (2009).   
On one hand, this finding is consistent with the findings of Beneish and Vargus (2002), 
Cheng and Warfield (2005), Burns and Kedia (2006), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) 
and Cornett et al. (2008) who found a significant positive relationship between the equity-
based type of CEO compensation and EM, even though their studies were not based on 
the UK context. They found that the level of discretionary accruals is higher at firms in 
which managers’ compensation is tied to the stock value, especially through stock 
options, so EM moves in line with managers’ incentives. They found that managers tend 
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to increase their wealth by inflating stock prices in periods surrounding stock sales or 
option exercises. Hence, the equity-based compensation involves more risk as it has a 
negative impact on managers because they tend to manage the firms’ earnings in order to 
earn higher compensation accordingly.  
On the other hand, this finding is inconsistent with the findings of Hassen (2014) who 
found a negative relationship between the total compensation and EM from a sample of 
eighty French firms listed on the SBF 120, from 2007-2010. This result aligns the 
interests of managers with those of the shareholders’, which reduces the agency problem. 
This negative relation indicates that CEO compensation can act as a motive for managers 
to act in the firm’s best interest rather than their own, in the French context, which makes 
them less opportunistic and reduces EM practices, not to mention, managers’ desire to 
maintain their leadership powers.  
 
5.2.3.2. Impact of Governance Mechanisms on Earnings Management in the UK 
First, table 5.4 indicates a significance level of 0.412 for the audit quality, which indicates 
an insignificant relationship with EM. This result rejects my second hypothesis of a 
significant relationship between the audit quality and EM. This finding indicates that in 
the UK, the existence of audit quality is not such an effective mechanism for reducing 
EM practices. This can be due to the low average of audit fees of 4.2M, compared to the 
max amount spent of 57 M within the same sample, as indicated in table 5.1, which forms 
around 7.4% of the max amount spent on auditing services. This can also be due to the 
UK firms’ dual leadership pattern of which they divide the role of the CEO and the 
chairman of the board, which is perceived to have higher internal control, leading to lower 
need for external auditing, as suggested by Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009). 
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This finding is consistent with the finding of Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) who found an 
insignificant relationship between the audit quality represented by the “Big 4” and EM, 
in Tunisian commercial firms, between 2007 and 2011. Their explanation behind this is 
that auditors who belong to one of the “Big 4” auditing firms cannot necessarily force 
stop managerial opportunism; along the fact that small percentage of these firms are 
audited by at least one of the “Big 4”, which supports my justification as well.  
This finding is also consistent with the findings of Chen et al. (2011), in their study of 
Chinese firms, between 2001 and 2006. They explained that this insignificant relation 
may be due to the large percentage of their sample firms that are state-owned (SOEs), 
which tend to have weaker incentives to manage accounting performance due to the 
different ownership structures and agency relations. Hassen (2014) also found an 
insignificant relationship between the audit quality and EM, in the existence of a 
significant impact of CEO compensation as well, in their sample of French firms between 
2007 and 2010, but didn’t provide a justification of why this might be the reason.  
This finding is inconsistent with the findings of Zhou and Elder (2004), Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), and Chi et al. (2011) who found a significant negative relation between 
audit quality and EM. Their explanation behind this is that the existence of higher audit 
quality helps in reducing the information asymmetry and the agency problem arising 
between managers and shareholders, reducing managers’ discretions over the firms’ 
resources and therefore, enhancing the transparency of the financial reporting process. 
Chen et al. (2011) also found a negative relationship between the audit quality and EM 
for non-state owned enterprises (NSOEs), for Chinese firms from 2001-2006. 
Second, a significance level of 0.361 for institutional ownership is shown in table 5.4, 
which indicates an insignificant relationship with EM. This result rejects my third 
hypothesis of a significant impact of the institutional ownership on EM. This finding is 
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consistent with the finding of González and García-Meca (2014) who found an 
insignificant relationship between the institutional ownership type of corporate structure 
and the level of earnings management on their study of the main Latin American stock 
markets from 2006-2009. This may be due to the existence of higher ownership 
concentration, which they found to have a great impact in reducing EM, which indicates 
that the main shareholders are more powerful than institutions in affecting EM levels. 
This is consistent with my findings as the concentrated ownership is also significant, as 
indicated in table 5.4, and tends to reach up to a max of 74%, which is 20% higher than 
the max held by institutions, as indicated in table 5.1. In relation to previous UK studies, 
Peasnell et al. (2005) also found a consistent finding of an insignificant relation between 
the institutional ownership and EM, even though they present double the percentage of 
ownership held by institutions, on their study of UK listed firms between 1993 and 1996. 
Additionally, consistent with these findings is the finding of Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) 
who also found an insignificant relationship between the institutional ownership and the 
level of EM practices, on their analysis of Jordanian industrial firms, between 2001- 2005. 
They justified that this insignificant relation may be due to their lack of expertise or their 
strategic alliance with the management. These findings, however, are inconsistent with 
the findings of Wang (2006), Gul et al. (2007), Hoitash et al. (2007), Cornett et al. (2008), 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Alzoubi (2016) as they found a significant negative impact 
of the institutional ownership on EM. Their findings, however, are different from this 
research’s findings, as they analyse different contexts. Their explanation behind this 
negative relation is that institutions have great resources, which enable them to access the 
relevant available information at the lowest cost and hence exert the necessary monitoring 
on managers to restrain their opportunistic behaviours and limit EM practices. My finding 
is also inconsistent with the findings of Charitou et al. (2007) and Hadani et al. (2011) 
who found a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and EM. 
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They explained that a higher level of participation by institutions pushes managers 
towards manipulating the firms’ earnings, in an attempt to meet the firms’ short-term 
objectives. Hence, according to them, the existence of high institutional ownership does 
not help in constraining EM due to the high pressures placed on managers.  
Third, as shown in table 5.4 the concentrated ownership is found to be significant as 
represented by the 0.001 significance level, which accepts my fourth hypothesis. A 
positive association between the concentrated ownership and EM is indicated by the 
positive coefficient of 0.167. This can be due to the high ownership concentration as it 
can reach a max of 74% in the UK listed firms, as indicated in table 5.1. On one hand, 
this finding is consistent with the findings of Zhong et al. (2007) and Halioui and Jerbi 
(2012) who found that the existence of high levels of block-holders makes them more 
focused on achieving their own interests rather than the minority shareholders’ interests, 
resulting in agency problems. This pushes managers towards managing the firms’ 
earnings in an attempt of leading block-holders to their private benefits, leading to more 
conflicts of interests as suggested by the agency theory.  
On the other hand, this finding is inconsistent with the findings of Peasnell et al. (2005) 
who found an insignificant relation between ownership concentration and EM in the UK 
context; while Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) also found an insignificant relation, on their 
analysis of Jordanian industrial firms. These findings are also inconsistent with the 
findings of Yeo et al. (2002), De Miguel et al. (2004), Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) and 
Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014) who found a significant negative relationship between 
the concentrated ownership type of corporate structure and EM. Their justification for 
this negative relation is that large shareholders become highly motivated to monitor the 
firms’ strategies and performances in an attempt at protecting their large investments. 
Therefore, they tend to restrain the manager’s motives for taking over the minority 
shareholders’ rights and wealth and opportunistically using the firms’ resources, as a way 
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of reducing the agency problem. González and García-Meca (2014) also found a 
significant negative relationship, on their study of the main Latin American stock markets 
between 2006 and 2009, indicating that block-holders have a great power in restraining 
managerial opportunism.  
 
5.2.3.3. Impact of Cash holdings on Earnings Management in the UK 
As indicated in table 5.4, cash-holding has an insignificant association with EM, as 
indicated by the 0.183 significance level. This finding rejects the fifth hypothesis of a 
significant positive relationship between the cash-holdings and EM. This insignificant 
relationship can be due to the low average of cash holdings of approx. 9%, as indicated 
in table 5.1. This insignificant relation is inconsistent with the entrenchment theory since 
the presence of excess cash does not make it vulnerable for use by managers towards 
achieving their personal benefits, which does not lead to conflicts of interests between 
these managers and their shareholders, as suggested by the agency theory. This finding 
represents one of my main contributions to this research, as it is the first study to analyse 
the impact of the cash holding variable on EM, conducted in the UK context between 
these years of analysis, using this measurement of cash and cash equivalents, to the best 
of my knowledge. 
This finding is inconsistent with the findings of Chung et al. (2005), Bukit and Iskandar 
(2009), Rusmin et al. (2014), Nekhili et al. (2016) and Farahani et al. (2016), who found 
a positive relationship between FCFs and EM. They explained that there is a high risk 
associated with the presence of free cash flows within firms, as managers use these free 
cash flows on their own private benefits. As a result, managers use their discretionary 
powers to hide this misuse of funds, resulting in higher EM levels.  
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To summarize the above discussion, EM levels tend to increase in UK firms with higher 
levels of CEO compensation, higher ownership concentration, or in case of incurring 
losses. Hence, as an advice for UK firms, if they intend to restrain the participation of 
EM practices, they may want to consider the distribution of lower levels of CEO 
compensation, and allow for the intervention of lower percentage of non-institutional 
block-holders. Additionally, UK investors are advised to avoid investing in firms 
distributing high CEO compensation or having high ownership concentration as they will 
have higher levels of EM. They are also advised to avoid investing in loss-making firms. 
Finally, Table 5.5 presents the findings’ summary of the analysis conducted on the CEO 
compensation, governance mechanisms and cash holdings in relation to EM practices, on 
UK listed firms. From the above analysis, it is found that the first and fourth hypotheses 
are accepted, as the CEO compensation and concentrated ownership are found to have a 
significant impact on EM in the UK.  
Table 5.5: Findings’ Summary of UK Firms 
Hypotheses Expected 
Signs 
Results 
 
H1: There is a relation between the total 
CEO compensation and EM. 
 
Unknown Confirmed 
(+) 
H2: There is a relationship between the 
audit quality and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H3: There is a relationship between 
institutional ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected  
H4: There is a relationship between the 
concentrated ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Confirmed 
(+) 
H5: There is a positive relationship 
between cash holdings and EM. 
 
(+) Rejected 
(Insig) 
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5.3. Summary Statistics of US Firms 
This study is based on US firms listed on the S&P 500 index, throughout the same period, 
from 2005-2016. This section first, analyses the descriptive statistics of the research 
variables. Second, it presents the regression diagnostics. Third, it analyses the findings of 
the Hausman fixed effects regression model applied to US sample. 
 
5.3.1.  Descriptive Statistics of US Firms 
Table 5.6 indicates the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables 
used in the study of US-listed firms. The table indicates an average absolute value of 
discretionary accruals of US firms to be approx. 3.5%, with a minimum of 0 and a max 
of 60.9%. This average DAC is very close to the average DAC of the UK firms, however, 
US firms tend to have higher max DAC reaching 60.9%, compared to a max of 42% of 
the UK firms. This indicates wider boundaries for the participation of earnings 
management in the US, compared to that of the UK. In relation to other US studies, Alali 
(2011) found a higher average DAC of approx. 9%, which is more than the double, on 
their study of US firms between 2000 and 2006. This difference in the level of 
discretionary accruals, however, can be justified by the different sample size used, as they 
analysed firms using audit and non-audit service fees on the S&P, during a different time 
period. Lower average DAC, as indicated by this study between 2005 and 2016, can 
indicate that more control measures are applied recently. 
The average CEO compensation is presented in table 5.6 to be around 13.9 M, with a min 
of approx. 34 thousands and a max of 378 M. The findings of the CEO compensation in 
US firms are much higher, compared to this study of UK firms, which displays an average 
CEO compensation of only 3.3 M, with their max reaching only 32.1 M. This huge 
difference in CEO compensation can be explained by the greater power of the CEOs in 
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US firms, as they hold two roles- the role of the CEO and the chairman of the board, as 
explained by Aguilera et al. (2006). In relation to previous studies of US firms, Cornett 
et al (2008) classify the CEO compensation into two parts, salaries and bonuses which 
have an average of 2.7M, and annual option grants which have an average of 5.4M, which 
are still lower than the average presented in table 5.6. Their analysis, however, is based 
on the S&P 100 index, rather than the 500 index, during the period from 1994-2003.  
Table 5.6 presents average audit fees, as a proxy for audit quality, of 12.9 M, with a min 
of 328 thousand, and a max of 3.51 B. This average of audit fees is much higher than that 
found of the UK of only 4.2 M, with the max audit fees of US firms spent are more than 
six times those of the UK. This huge difference, however, can be justified by the US 
firms’ need for higher monitoring and control efforts by more professional and 
experienced auditors, due to the higher business risk associated with providing CEOs 
greater power and higher incentives, as suggested by Mitra et al. (2007). Compared to 
other studies conducted on US firms, Mitra et al (2007) presented average audit fees of 
1.6M, which is much lower than the average audit fees indicated in table 5.6 of 12.9M. 
Their analysis, however, was based on a different sample, as they analysed the non-
regulated, non-financial, and non-service firms listed on the NYSE, in 2000. Gul et al 
(2007) found even lower audit fees equivalent to 0.59M on their analysis of US firms, 
between 2000 and 2001. The higher audit fees presented in this study, compared to 
previous studies, can indicate higher reliance on audit fees as a corporate governance 
mechanism, leading firms to increase their spending on audit services to earn a better 
audit quality. Alali (2011) used the log of audit fees, as a proxy for audit quality, rather 
than the monetary value on their analysis of US firms, between 2000- 2006. 
US firms are found to have an average institutional ownership of approx. 10%, with a 
min of 0 and a max of 78%. This average is comparable to the UK average of 9%, 
presented in table 5.1. However, Mitra et al (2007) found a higher average of institutional 
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ownership reaching 39% with their max reaching 95%, on their analysis of US firms in 
2000. This can be justified by the difference in measurements, as they consider 
institutional investors who individually own less than 5% of the firm’s shares. They 
classify block-holders, however, into institutional and non-institutional, and hence they 
present a 20% average of the institutional block-holders, who own at least 5% of the 
firm’s share, as computed in this study. This average is still double the amount presented 
in this analysis, but almost half what they classify as the institutional ownership.  
Gul et al (2007) also found higher average of institutional ownership of approx. 42%, on 
their analysis of US firms, between 2000- 2001. Hoitash et al (2007) also found a higher 
institutional ownership on average of 43.5%, on their analysis of US firms, from 2000-
2003. In addition, Wang (2006) also found a higher average of approx. 58% for family-
owned firms, between 1994 and 2002. These previous studies of US firms indicate even 
higher reliance from the US firms on the institutional ownership in the past, compared to 
today’s, as presented in this study.  
Table 5.6 presents an average level of the concentrated ownership of 2.8%, with a min of 
0 and a max of 81%. This average is lower than the UK average of 8.5%, presented in 
table 5.1, however, it has a higher max compared to 74% in the UK. Mitra et al (2007) 
found an even higher average of the concentrated ownership of 20%, of what they classify 
as non-institutional block ownership, on their analysis of US firms in 2000. In terms of 
the cash holdings, the table presents an average of 9.3%, with a min of 0 and a max of 
70.8%. This average is comparable to the UK average of 9.1% indicated in table 5.1. 
However, the max cash holdings held by US-listed firms are much higher, compared to 
only 55.9% in UK listed firms.  
As for the leverage, table 5.6 presents an average financial leverage of approx. 25%, with 
a min of 0 and a max of 110.6%. US firms tend to rely on a higher average and max 
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boundary of leverage, compared to UK firms of approx. 20% and 80%, respectively, as 
indicated in table 5.1. Nevertheless, US firms can be fully financed by debt, as indicated 
by the max percentage, which is not the case in the UK. In relation to previous studies of 
US firms, Hoitash et al (2007) found a close average of 18.6% on their analysis of US 
firms, between 2000 and 2003. Similarly, Mitra et al (2007) found an average leverage 
of 23%, which is comparable with this finding, even though they had a slightly different 
measurement, as they considered only the long-term debt over the total assets, rather than 
the total debt. While Gul et al (2007) used the same measurement as in this study, they 
found a higher average leverage of 49% on their analysis of US firms, back in the period 
between 2000 and 2001. In addition, Wang (2006) found a higher average leverage of 
50.4%, which is almost the double, on their analysis of the US firms listed on the S&P 
500 index, between 1994 and 2002. 
The average firm size is indicated to be approx. 10, as presented in table 5.6, with a min 
of 8.8 and a max of 11.9, which is comparable to that of the UK. In relation to the US, 
Wang (2006) found a comparable average of approx. 8 in their study of firms listed on 
the S&P 500 index, from 1994- 2002. The average cash flows of US-listed firms is found 
to be 12.2%, with cash outflow of 42% and a max of cash inflow of approx. 48%, which 
is comparable with UK firms. The cash outflows related to the firms’ operations, 
however, are much higher than those of the UK of only 6.9% as presented in table 5.1, 
compared to 42% in the US.  
In relation to the US, Klein (2002) found a comparable average cash flow from operations 
of 11.7% on their analysis of US firms listed on the S&P 500 index, between 1991 and 
1993. Mitra et al (2007) analysed the free cash flow available at the manager’s disposal 
and found an average of only 2.4%. They computed the free cash flow as the operating 
cash flow after the deduction of capital expenditures and dividends, for the year 2000. 
Additionally, Gul et al (2007) found an average CFO of 3%, between 2000 and 2001, 
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which is much lower than the most recent average found in this study, indicating higher 
income from operations recently. Similarly, from 2000-2003, Hoitash et al (2007) found 
an average CFO of -1.4% when analysing US firms, indicating a cash outflow from 
operations, which is worse off than this study’s finding.  
Table 5.6 indicates an average loss of 6.6%, compared to an average of 9.5% in the UK, 
shown in table 5.1., which indicates that the US firms report fewer losses than the UK 
firms. This can be justified by their resistance to reporting those losses, leading to higher 
earnings’ manipulations. In relation to prior studies conducted on US firms, Wang (2006) 
is found to have a comparable average of 10.5% in family-owned firms, on their analysis 
of US firms listed on the S&P 500, from 1994-2002. However, the average loss indicated 
by Gul et al (2007) is found to be 40%, between 2000- 2001, which is much higher than 
the average loss indicated in this recent study.  
Hoitash et al (2007) also found a high loss, reaching around 45%, within the same period, 
between 2000- 2003, even though they used a dummy variable indicating a loss in the 
previous two years. Conversely, Alali (2011) present a lower average loss of approx. 14% 
on their analysis of the US firms, between 2000 and 2006. This average is lower than the 
previous analyses but still higher than the loss indicated in table 5.6. Their measurement 
is different, however, as they used a dummy variable indicating a loss in any of the 
previous three years.  
The firms’ profitability, represented by the ROA, shows to have an average of 7.4%, with 
a min of approx. -58% and a max of 58.5%, which is comparable with that of the UK, 
even though US firms tend to have a slightly lower max boundary of profitability. 
According to previous studies on US firms, Wang (2006) found a comparable average 
ROA of 7.5% in family-owned firms, on their analysis of US firms, from 1994-2002. 
Mitra et al (2007) found a slightly lower profitability of 5.4% of US firms in 2000. 
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However, Hoitash et al (2007) found an average profitability of -21.4%, indicating a loss, 
during the period from 2000-2003. The higher average presented in this study, along with 
the lower percentage loss, indicate better firm performance within the US, recently, as 
apparent in this study. 
The firm’s growth, represented by the MTB, shows to have an average of approx. 4.2%, 
with a min of approx. -1,107 % and a max of approx. 1,373 %. This average growth is 
comparable to that of the UK of 3.9%, in table 5.1. However, US firms holding higher 
levels of leverage can indicate higher growth than what they really have, since higher 
leverage can indicate a higher MTB ratio of equity as indicated by Adam and Goyal 
(2008). In relation to previous US studies, Hoitash et al (2007) found a comparable 
average firm growth of 3.2%, between 2000- 2003.  
Within the same period of analysis, Gul et al (2007) also found an average of approx. 3% 
in US firms, between 2000- 2001. This average firm growth is also comparable with the 
analysis conducted by Mitra et al (2007) who found an average of 3.8%, in 2000. Wang 
(2006), however, present a higher average growth of 18.2% in family-owned firms, 
between 1994 and 2002. They measured growth, however, using the sales growth rate, 
rather than the MTB. 
Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics of US Firms 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
DAC .035 .042 0 .609 
COMP 13.9 M 14.5 M 33,831 378 M 
AUDQ 12.9 M 132 M 328,000 3.51 B 
INSTOWN .101 .092 0 .78 
CONOWN .028 .085 0 .81 
CASH .093 .088 0 .708 
LEV 25.18 15.95 0 110.60 
SIZE 10.13 .523 8.78 11.90 
CFO .122 .066 -.420 .479 
LOSS .066 .248 0 1 
ROA 7.40 7.68 -58.14 58.49 
MTB 4.21 43.94 -1,106.89 1,372.89 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
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holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
 
5.3.2.  Regression Diagnostics of US Firms 
First, there is a normal distribution of residuals, as indicated by the histogram in figure 
5.3, as well as by the Shapiro-Wilk test for checking normality presented below, as it 
shows a significance level of 0. Second, the data is linear as indicated by the scatterplot 
matrix presented in figure 5.4. Third, the data is heteroscedastic as indicated by the 
significance level of 0.000 in the Modified Wald test used in the fixed effect regression 
models for checking heteroscedasticity, as presented below. Therefore, running a robust 
regression is found to be necessary to solve for this issue. Fourth, there is no serial 
correlation as indicated by the significance level of 0.37 in the Wooldridge test for testing 
autocorrelation, as presented below. Last, there’s no multicollinearity problem as 
indicated by the correlation matrix in table 5.7. 
Figure 5.3: Histogram 
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Shapiro Wilk Test of Normality 
 
Figure 5.4: Scatterplot Matrix 
 
Modified Wald Test 
 
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
 
Table 5.1: Correlation Matrix of US Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) COMP 1           
(2) AUDQ 0.49* 1          
(3) INSTOWN -0.17* -0.23* 1         
(4) CONOWN -0.02 -0.06* -0.15* 1        
(5) CASH -0.07* -0.11* 0.10* 0.06* 1       
(6) LEV 0.09* 0.08* 0.02 0.03 -0.30* 1      
(7) SIZE 0.50* 0.74* -0.33* -0.02 -0.32* 0.14* 1     
(8) CFO -0.09* -0.19* -0.03 -0.001 0.25* -0.25* -0.22* 1    
(9) LOSS -0.01 -0.01 0.12* 0.002 0.01 0.08* -0.01 -0.23* 1   
(10) ROA -0.04* -0.09* -0.08* 0.02 0.22* -0.23* -0.17* 0.64* -0.58* 1  
(11) MTB 0.004 0.02 -0.001 -0.001 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 1 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively.   
       resid     2746    0.78228    344.283    15.028    0.00000
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (349)  =   2.2e+05
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
           Prob > F =      0.3781
    F(  1,     323) =      0.779
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
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5.3.3.  Regression Results of US Firms 
The following tables provide the regression analysis for the impact of five factors on EM 
based on the study of US firms listed on the S&P 500 index. Earnings management is 
represented by the absolute value of discretionary accruals and estimated using the 
Modified Jones Model (1991). The model is highly significant, as indicated by the 
significance level of 0.000, in table 5.8. The R-squared indicates that 9.3% of the variation 
in discretionary accruals levels are due to the research variables used in the study, as 
indicated in table 5.8, which is lower compared to that of the UK listed firms of 18.8% 
presented in table 5.3. The “rho” indicates that 29.9% of the variance is due to the 
differences across panels, as presented in table 5.8, which is much lower than that of the 
UK of 75.9%. The lower R-squared, along with the lower rho, compared to the UK 
sample, can indicate that the model better fits the UK data, than the US data.  
The robust regression results represent 2,733 observations, as indicated in table 5.8. In 
summary, table 5.9 indicates that each of the audit quality and the concentrated ownership 
have a significant impact on the level of EM participated in US firms, in addition to the 
firm’s size, loss, and growth. This result is quite different from the findings of the UK 
sample, as will be further discussed shortly. These findings are further analysed for the 
impact of the moderation effect of the CEO compensation in the following chapter. 
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Table 5.8: Regression Results of US Firms 
DAC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
COMP -0.001 0.004 -0.29 0.772 -0.009 0.007 
AUDQ 0.010 0.006 1.69 0.090 -0.002 0.021 
INSTOWN -0.001 0.011 -0.11 0.913 -0.022 0.020 
CONOWN -0.044 0.020 -2.26 0.024 -0.083 -0.006 
CASH -0.016 0.017 -0.93 0.350 -0.048 0.017 
LEV -0.00002 0.0001 -0.22 0.830 -0.0002 0.0002 
SIZE -0.024 0.007 -3.47 0.001 -0.037 -0.010 
CFO 0.019 0.021 0.90 0.366 -0.022 0.061 
LOSS  0.041 0.004 9.74 0.000 0.033 0.050 
ROA -0.001 0.0002 -3.06 0.002 -0.001 -0.0002 
MTB 0.00003 0.00001 1.89 0.059 0.000001 0.0001 
_CONS 0.219 0.062 3.51 0.000 0.097 0.342 
F(11, 2373) 22.08      
Prob>F 0.0000      
R-sq 0.0928      
Rho 0.2994 No of Obs.: 2,733 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
 
Table 5.9: Robust Regression Results of US Firms 
DAC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
COMP -0.001 0.004 -0.29 0.772 -0.009 0.007 
AUDQ 0.010 0.005 1.75 0.080 -0.001 0.020 
INSTOWN -0.001 0.012 -0.09 0.925 -0.026 0.023 
CONOWN -0.044 0.023 -1.95 0.052 -0.089 0.0003 
CASH -0.016 0.030 -0.52 0.604 -0.075 0.044 
LEV -0.00002 0.0002 -0.14 0.887 -0.0003 0.0003 
SIZE -0.024 0.009 -2.48 0.014 -0.042 -0.005 
CFO 0.019 0.069 0.28 0.781 -0.116 0.154 
LOSS  0.041 0.009 4.36 0.000 0.023 0.060 
ROA -0.001 0.001 -0.59 0.553 -0.002 0.001 
MTB 0.00003 0.00001 2.69 0.007 0.00001 0.0001 
_CONS 0.219 0.081 2.70 0.007 0.059 0.379 
F(11, 348) 7.48      
Prob>F 0.0000      
R-sq 0.0928      
Rho 0.2994 No of Obs.: 2,733 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
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5.3.3.1. Impact of CEO Compensation on Earnings Management in the US 
Table 5.9 indicates an insignificant impact of the CEO compensation on the level of EM, 
as it has a significance level of 0.772, which rejects my first hypothesis. This insignificant 
relation can be due to the nature of the CEOs’ power. To further justify this, in US firms, 
CEOs are also the chairmen of the boards, as previously explained by Higgs (2003), 
which gives them greater power associated with holding the two roles. This concentration 
of power may prevent effective monitoring, leading to higher earnings management, 
which makes the compensation an insufficient tool in restraining managerial 
opportunism, even though it is observed to have a negative association, as indicated by 
the negative coefficient of -0.001. Hence, its moderating role is further analysed in the 
following chapter.   
This finding is inconsistent with the findings of the UK firms, as they have higher 
earnings management associated with higher compensation, even though the US firms 
tend to distribute much higher CEO compensation, compared to the UK firms, as they 
have an average compensation of 13.9M, compared to only 3.3M in the UK, which is 
more than three times as much.  Nevertheless, the max spending of the compensation 
reaches a high of 378M in the US, compared to only 32.1M in the UK, which is more 
than ten times as much. This indicates that the great power of CEOs in the US leads to a 
massive difference of distribution of CEO compensation between the two countries, 
within the same time period. This insignificant relation is inconsistent with the 
entrenchment theory and the agency theory, and inconsistent with the stewardship theory, 
as previously explained. This finding is inconsistent with the findings of Cornett et al 
(2008) who found a positive relationship between the options compensation and EM, 
rather than the salaries component of compensation, on their analysis of US firms listed 
on the S&P 100 index, between 1994 and 2003.  
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5.3.3.2. Impact of Governance Mechanisms on Earnings Management in the US 
First, the audit quality, presented by the audit fees, are found to have a weakly significant 
relationship with EM, as indicated by the significance level of 0.080 in table 5.9, at a 90% 
confidence interval. This finding accepts my second hypothesis of a significant 
relationship between the two. A positive relationship is observed by the positive 
coefficient of 0.01 in table 5.9.  This finding is inconsistent with this research’s finding 
of the UK listed firms, as they are observed to have an insignificant relationship between 
the two. This indicates that the high spending of audit fees does not prevent earnings 
management practices of US firms, but rather involves risk as it is used as a signal for 
higher credibility to external investors, as suggested by Rajgopal et al. (2015).  
Even though the average audit fees of 12.9M spent for auditing services within the US, 
is much higher than the average audit fees of 4.2M spent in the UK, it is found not to be 
sufficient to have an effective role of monitoring in the US. According to Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009), firms which follow dual leadership pattern, such as in the UK, tend 
to be viewed by auditors to have strong internal control, leading to the reduction of the 
audit effort needed and the audit fees spent, consequently. This positive relationship 
apparent from the US sample, however, can indicate that the high audit fees are not all 
directed towards obtaining higher quality audits and more audit efforts, but rather spent 
in return for the auditors’ high reputations and brand names, as suggested by Rajgopal et 
al. (2015). Hence, this finding is consistent with the signalling theory and the agency 
theory, since more conflicts of interests arise with the rise of DAs. 
Compared to an earlier study conducted on the US, this finding is inconsistent with the 
finding of Gul et al. (2007), as they found a significant negative relation between audit 
service fees and EM, between 2000 and 2001, even though the average audit fees spent 
were much lower than the amount spent today. This can indicate that managers’ 
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discretionary powers are much higher today, raising the need for more auditing services 
to restrict them, than before, in addition to the need for other alternatives for controlling 
managerial opportunism, other than the use of audit services.  
Second, the institutional ownership is found to have an insignificant impact on EM 
practices, as indicated by the significance level of 0.925, indicated in table 5.9. This 
finding rejects my third hypothesis. This insignificant relation can be justified by the low 
average of institutional ownership incorporated of approx. 10% in US firms. This finding 
is also apparent in my analysis of the UK firms, as they have a comparable average of 
approx. 9%, and still display an insignificant impact on EM practices. Nevertheless, the 
two samples display higher boundaries of concentrated ownership, compared to the 
institutional ownership max level held, which makes the concentrated ownership more 
powerful and significant in relation to EM practices. This finding is supported by the 
findings of González and García-Meca (2014), on their study of the main Latin American 
stock markets, from 2006-2009, as previously explained. This insignificant relation is 
also consistent with the findings of Peasnell et al. (2005) and Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010). 
In relation to other studies conducted on US firms, however, Gul et al (2007), Hoitash et 
al (2007), and Wang (2006) present inconsistent findings. They found a significant 
negative relation between the institutional ownership type of corporate structure and EM. 
Their findings can be justified by the higher average of institutional ownership on their 
analyses of US firms, in the early 2000s. They present a higher percentage of 
shareholdings held by institutions of 42%, 43.5%, and 58% for family-owned firms, 
respectively, compared to this finding’s average of only 10% of institutional 
shareholdings, which is four times and five times as much. 
Third, table 5.9 presents a significance level of 0.052, which indicates a significant 
relationship between the concentrated ownership and EM, which accepts my fourth 
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hypothesis. A negative relation is observed by the negative coefficient of -0.044, 
indicated in table 5.9. This indicates that a higher percentage of ownership concentration 
restrains EM practices of CEOs in US firms. This negative association can be justified by 
the presence of high CEO power, as block-holders become more concerned about losing 
their large investments as a result of the greater risk associated with CEOs. This finding 
is inconsistent with my findings of the UK firms, as they experience a significant positive 
relationship instead. This finding of US firms is consistent with the findings of Yeo et al. 
(2002), De Miguel et al. (2004), Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) and Gonzalez and Garcia-
Meca (2014) who found a significant negative association as well. Their justification for 
this negative relation is that the main shareholders tend to monitor their firms in an 
attempt at protecting their large investments, in order to control managerial opportunism 
and reduce the agency problem.   
However, this finding of the US context, is inconsistent with the finding of Zhong et al. 
(2007) and Halioui and Jerbi (2012) who found a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and EM, and Peasnell et al. (2005) and Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) who found 
an insignificant relationship, as previously explained. Even though the finding of Zhong 
et al. (2007) is also based on US firms, they found contradicting results as ownership 
concentration is observed to be an insignificant monitoring mechanism, as it leads to 
higher EM practices of firms following the GAAP, between 1994 and 2003. This 
difference between the findings, however, can be justified by the higher reliance of firms 
on the presence of large investors in their corporate structures during this period, as they 
found higher average of concentrated ownership, compared to this research, as well as a 
higher boundary of ownership concentration reaching 99.9%. 
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5.3.3.3. Impact of Cash Holdings on Earnings Management in the US 
Table 5.9 indicates an insignificant relation between the firm’s cash-holdings and EM 
practices of US firms, as indicated by the 0.604 significance level. This finding rejects 
my fifth hypothesis. This finding is consistent with this research’s finding of an 
insignificant relationship in the UK context, as the US has a comparable average to that 
of the UK. These findings are inconsistent with the findings of Chung et al. (2005), Bukit 
and Iskandar (2009), Rusmin et al. (2014), Farahani et al. (2016) and Nekhili et al (2016), 
as they found a positive relation between the FCF levels and EM. This positive relation 
is explained on the basis that excess FCFs left in the hands of managers, becomes more 
attractive for managers to spend on their personal benefits. In addition, this finding is 
inconsistent with the agency theory and the entrenchment theory, since managers’ desires 
to use cash for fulfilling their personal benefits do not exist, as apparent by this 
insignificant relation.  
This insignificant relation found in the analysis of US-listed firms can be justified by the 
existence of high power in the hands of managers. To further explain, as managers hold 
a great deal of power after having two roles, they become suspects of high earnings’ 
manipulations, hence, firms try to apply as much monitoring and control measures, as 
apparent by the high spending of audit fees, to limit managerial opportunism. This can 
actually be the reason behind managers’ care not to manipulate the firm’s earnings using 
the firm’s cash, as it’s the first to be discovered. Hence, US firms are found to have no 
association between the level of cash-holdings and EM. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first comparative study to analyse the impact of the cash holding variable on 
EM, in both of the US and the UK contexts between 2005 and 2016, which is why it is 
considered one of my main contributions to this research. To further expand this analysis, 
the moderating role of CEO compensation is also added to this relationship, as will be 
further discussed in the following chapters.  
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In summary, due to the existence of higher CEO compensation and cash-holdings 
available in US firms, there came the need for the higher spending of audit fees, leading 
to the higher boundary of discretionary accruals reaching 60.9%, which is much higher 
compared to that of the UK sample. From the analysis, it’s observed that US-listed firms 
tend to exercise higher earnings management in the existence of higher spending on audit 
fees, or in the case of incurring losses or high growth. However, their earnings 
manipulations are restrained in the presence of ownership concentration, or in the case of 
large firms. Hence, if US firms intend to restrict managerial opportunism and limit the 
participation of EM practices, they are highly advised to increase the shareholdings held 
by large non-institutional block-holders. Nevertheless, US investors are advised to invest 
in firms where the concentrated ownership is high. 
Based on the above analysis, table 5.10 presents the findings’ summary of the analysis 
conducted on the impact of CEO compensation, governance mechanisms, as well as the 
cash holdings on the participation of EM, in US-listed firms. It is found that the second 
and fourth hypotheses are accepted as the audit quality, as well as the concentrated 
ownership, are found to have significant impact on EM practices. While the higher audit 
fees spending is found to increase EM, the presence of a higher percentage of ownership 
concentration is found to restrain EM practices within the US context.  
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Table 5.10: Findings’ Summary of US Firms 
Hypotheses Expected 
Signs 
Results 
 
H1: There is a relation between the total 
CEO compensation and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H2: There is a relationship between the 
audit quality and EM. 
 
Unknown Confirmed 
(+) 
H3: There is a relationship between 
institutional ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected  
H4: There is a relationship between the 
concentrated ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Confirmed (-) 
H5: There is a positive relationship 
between cash holdings and EM. 
 
(+) Rejected 
(Insig) 
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Table 5.11 presents the findings of the analyses conducted on both contexts of the UK 
and the US, to clarify the differences between the two. From these results, it is observed 
that EM constraints act differently in relation to EM in both markets. Even though the 
ownership concentration is found to be significant in both contexts, they still have 
differing relations with EM, since it is found to have a positive relationship with EM in 
the UK, but a negative relationship in the US. Therefore, a test of difference is necessary 
to analyse the difference between the two markets, to reveal if EM constraints are more 
effective in restraining EM practices in one country than the other. 
 
Table 5.11: Comparison between UK and US Firms  
Dependent Variable: DAC measured using the Modified Jones Model 
Variables UK Firms US Firms 
Coef. Coef. 
COMP 0.022* -0.001 
AUDQ -0.028 0.010** 
INSTOWN -0.021 -0.001 
CONOWN 0.167* -0.044** 
CASH 0.042 -0.016 
LEV 0.001 -0.00002 
SIZE -0.041 -0.024* 
CFO 0.018 0.019 
LOSS 0.020* 0.041* 
ROA -0.001 -0.0006 
MTB -0.001 0.00003* 
No of Obs. 490 2,733 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
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5.4. Comparison Between the UK and the US Contexts 
To compare the findings of both contexts of the UK and the US in order to reveal the 
difference in the impact of the EM constraints in influencing EM practices within the two 
markets, a test of difference is implemented. First, a t-test is used to compare the mean 
levels of DAC for UK and US firms. As indicated in table 5.12, there is a significant 
difference between the two means at 0.07 significance level. UK firms are observed to 
have lower EM levels than those of US firms (3.1% of UK firms compared to 3.5% of 
US firms), a significant difference of -0.0035, as indicated in table 5.12. Since the level 
of DAC can be affected by other company-specific variables, such as the firm’s size, 
leverage, and profitability, as indicated by Wright et al. (2006), then the research model 
is run again for a combined sample of both of UK and US firms in order to control for 
this possibility and as further analysis in this matter. Hence, a dummy variable is created 
to indicate the country type “C”, as in Wright et al. (2006). Therefore, the country type 
variable takes a value of “1” for US firms, and “0” for UK firms. The model is run again 
using this interaction effect of “C” with each of the independent variables. Therefore, the 
interaction with the country type “C” represents the marginal impact of the EM 
constraints on EM between the two countries (Gujarati, 2011), after controlling for the 
firm’s leverage, size, profitability, loss, cash flows and growth. Testing the sum of the 
new interaction effects generated using “C” indicates the difference in the use of 
mechanisms between the two markets (Gujarati, 2011). The sum of the coefficients of B6 
through B11 is -0.487, which indicate a lower impact of EM constraints in influencing 
EM practices in US firms (0.174 for the US compared to 0.661 for the UK)2. This reveals 
                                                          
2 As the country type variable “C” takes a value of “1” to represent US firms, by substituting in the 
model, the impact of EM constraints in US firms appears to be the sum of the coefficients of the 
independent variables, as well as, the interaction effects created using “C” (β0+β1+…+β11= 
0.174). However, when the variable “C” takes a value of “0” to represent UK firms, by substituting in the 
model, the impact of EM constraints in UK firms appears to be the sum of the coefficients of the 
independent variables only (β0+β1+…+β5= 0.661). Therefore, the difference (β6+β7+…+β11= -
0.487) represents the marginal impact of the EM constraints between UK and US firms. 
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that the EM constraints are more effective in reducing EM practices in UK firms, 
compared to those of the US. This difference is found to be significant as indicated by 
the significance level of 0.00, presented in table 5.13. Hence, it can be concluded that the 
average level of EM is lower in the UK due to the higher effectiveness of the EM 
constraints there. This finding rejects the tenth hypothesis suggesting that EM constraints 
applied in US firms are more effective in restraining EM practices than those applied in 
UK firms. As further analysis, the impact of each EM constraint is analysed 
independently, in order to find the marginal impact of each independent constraint 
between the two countries. Table 5.14, illustrates the marginal impact of each variable 
between UK and US firms, along with its significance level. From table 5.14, it appears 
that CEO compensation along with ownership concentration have higher impacts on EM 
of UK firms, compared to US firms, as they both have significant marginal impacts when 
analysed independently.  
 
Table 5.12: Test of Difference in Mean Levels of DAC of the UK and the US 
Observations  Mean 
UK Firms 490 0.03097 
US Firms 2,733 0.03456 
Test of Difference (Pr = 0.07) -0.0035  
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Table 5.13: Regression Results of Combined Sample of UK and US Firms 
Model: EM= β0+ β1 COMP+ β2 AUDQ + β3 INSTOWN + β4 CONOWN+ β5 CASH 
+ β6 C+ β7 (C x COMP) + β8 (C x AUDQ) + β9 (C x INSTOWN) + β10 (C x 
CONOWN) + β11 (C x CASH) + β12 LEV +β13 SIZE + β14 ROA+ β15 MTB+ β16 
CFO + β17 LOSS+ ε 
Variables Parameter Coeff. Std. Err t P> t 
INTERCEPT β0 0.472 0.177 2.66 0.008 
COMP β1 0.016 0.010 1.53 0.127 
AUDQ β2 -0.03 0.025 -1.18 0.239 
INSTOWN β3 -0.013 0.019 -0.69 0.492 
CONOWN β4 0.174 0.057 3.05 0.002* 
CASH β5 0.042 0.038 1.08 0.278 
C β6 -0.247 0.170 -1.45 0.147 
C x COMP β7 -0.017 0.011 -1.49 0.137 
C x AUDQ β8 0.04 0.026 1.54 0.124 
C x INSTOWN β9 0.012 0.022 0.55 0.585 
C x CONOWN β10 -0.218 0.061 -3.59 0.000* 
C x CASH β11 -0.057 0.048 -1.18 0.236 
LEV β12 0.00001 0.0001 0.09 0.930 
SIZE β13 -0.025 0.009 -2.67 0.008* 
CFO β14 0.021 0.056 0.38 0.707 
LOSS β15 0.036 0.007 4.89 0.000* 
ROA β16 -0.0008 0.0007 -1.05 0.295 
MTB β17 0.00003 .00001 2.66 0.008* 
Prob>F= 0.0000 
F-value= 3.58 
R-squared= 0.3808 
Adjusted R2= 0.2721 
Test of β0+β1+β2+β3+β4+β5=0 (F-value = 3.69, Prob > F =0.0025*) 
Test of β0+β1+β2+β3+…+β9+β10+β11=0 (F-value = 11.78, Prob > F =0.000*) 
Test of H10: β6+β7+β8+β9+β10+β11=0 (F-value= 17.11, Prob > F =0.0000*) 
 
Variable Definitions: 
“C” indicates the Country Type= “1” for US and “0” for UK 
Controlling for the firm’s leverage, size, CFO, loss, ROA, and MTB, the 
coefficients can be interpreted as follows: 
β0+β1+β2+β3+β4+β5= represent the impact of EM constraints in UK firms. 
Β0+β1+β2+…+β10+β11= represent the impact of EM constraints in US firms. 
Β6+β7+β8+β9+β10+β11: represent the marginal impact of the EM constraints 
on EM between UK and US firms to test for [H10] EM constraints are more 
effective in the US, compared to the UK, in reducing EM practices.  
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5.14: Marginal Impact of Each Variable Independently 
Variables Parameter Coeff. F-value P> t 
COMP β6+β7 -0.264 2.41 0.0900** 
AUDQ β6+β8 -0.207 1.19 0.3052 
INSTOWN β6+β9 -0.235 1.11 0.3307 
CONOWN β6+β10 -0.465 6.75 0.0012* 
CASH β6+β11 -0.304 1.87 0.1546 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
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5.5. Additional Analysis 
Table 5.15 presents an additional analysis for the impact of the determinants of EM as 
well as cash holdings on EM. In this analysis, EM is measured using the performance-
matched discretionary accruals, using the lagged ROA. Once again, data is analysed 
based on UK firms listed on the FTSE 350 index and US firms listed on the S&P 500 
index, between the period of twelve years, from 2005- 2016. The robust regression results 
are also used to resolve for the heteroscedasticity problem. 
 
Regression Results 
The findings of UK listed firms, using the performance-matched DA, is found to be 
mostly consistent with the above analysis, except for the results related to the impact of 
the two control variables on EM. When matching the firms’ performance using the lagged 
ROA, the firm’s loss is found to be no longer significant, as indicated in table 5.15, while 
growth represented by the MTB, which appears to have a negative association with EM. 
Normally, firms tend to manage the profitability portion under their discretions, in order 
to hide their losses. However, when matching the firms’ performance, no association is 
found between the firms’ loss and earnings’ manipulations any longer, as presented in 
table 5.15, which is due to the low loss percentage of 9.5% apparent in UK listed firms. 
In relation to the findings of US-listed firms, the findings are mostly consistent with the 
previous findings presented in table 5.9, under the modified Jones model, except for the 
association between the firm’s size and EM, as it no longer exists. When controlling for 
firms’ profitability levels, the impact of the firms’ size tends to disappear, which may 
indicate that the firm’s size may be an indicator of profitability.  
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Table 5.15: Additional Analysis  
Dependent Variable: Performance-Matched DAC, using lagged ROA 
Variables UK Firms US Firms 
Coef. Coef. 
COMP 0.018* 0.0002 
AUDQ -0.024 0.009** 
INSTOWN -0.022 0.001 
CONOWN 0.113* -0.046* 
CASH 0.011 -0.011 
LEV 0.001 0.0002 
SIZE -0.034 -0.013 
CFO 0.040 0.036 
LOSS 0.014 0.041* 
ROA -0.001 -0.0005 
MTB -0.001* 0.00003* 
No. of Obs. 490 2,733 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
(Refer to Appendix A and B for complete regression tables, as provided by STATA 11) 
 
5.6. Summary 
In summary of the above analysis, as indicated in table 5.11, it is observed that CEO 
compensation increases the participation of EM practices in the UK context, while 
remains insignificant in the US. Hence, managers’ interests are not aligned with those of 
their shareholders when CEO compensation increases, but rather a wider gap between the 
two parties is created due to the higher earnings’ manipulations exercised by managers 
of UK firms. Audit quality is found to be an ineffective tool in restraining EM practices 
in both contexts, as it is found to be insignificant in the UK and to have a positive 
association in the US. Concentrated ownership is found to be an effective mechanism in 
controlling managerial opportunism and restraining EM practices in the US, even though 
it is observed to increase earnings’ manipulations in the UK. This can be due to the higher 
monitoring and control exerted on US firms, associated with the higher responsibilities 
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given to their CEOs or the higher and stricter rules and regulations imposed upon them 
by the US GAAP. Nevertheless, institutional ownership or cash holdings are found to 
have insignificant impacts on EM participated in the two contexts. From this analysis, it 
appears that the above-mentioned factors act differently in the UK vs the US due to the 
different regulations imposed upon them, as the UK firms are regulated by the IFRS, 
while the US firms are governed by the US GAAP. Finally, to further expand the study 
of what best restrains EM practices within the UK and the US contexts, the impact of the 
moderating role of CEO compensation is analysed in the following chapter, to indicate if 
CEO compensation can act differently when joined with another governance mechanism.  
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Chapter 6: Earnings Management Constraints in the UK and US: The 
Moderating Role of CEO Compensation 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the analysis performed on the impact of the 
moderating role of CEO compensation on the associations between four determinants of 
EM and earnings management. These four factors are the audit quality, the institutional 
ownership, the concentrated ownership, and cash holdings. This chapter also presents the 
impact of the independent and control variables on EM after introducing the moderator 
to the model. It also presents a comparison between the two analyses of the UK and the 
US-listed firms.  
 
6.2. Regression Diagnostics of UK Firms 
The scatterplot presented in figure 6.1 represents the linearity of the data. The data 
appears to be heteroscedastic as revealed by the significance level of 0.000 indicated by 
the Modified Wald test in fixed effect regression models, presented below. Hence, 
running a robust regression is found to be necessary to solve for this issue. Finally, no 
serial correlation is observed by Wooldridge test for testing autocorrelation, as indicated 
by the significance level of 0.75, presented below. 
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Figure 6.1: Scatterplot Matrix 
 
 
Moderation Analysis- Testing for Heteroscedasticity  
 
 
Moderation Analysis- Testing for Autocorrelation 
 
 
 
6.3. Moderated Regression Results of UK Firms 
The following tables indicate the moderated regression results of the impact of the 
moderating role of CEO compensation on the associations between four factors and EM, 
as previously explained. In this analysis, earnings management is represented by the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals and is measured using the Modified Jones Model 
(1991). Table 6.1 indicates that the model is highly significant since it has a significance 
level of 0. The coefficient of determination represented by the R-sq, in table 6.1, indicates 
that 19.4% of the variation in the level of discretionary accruals is explained by the 
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research variables used in this study, which is slightly higher than the R-squared of 18.8% 
of the UK regression results presented in the previous chapter. The intraclass correlation 
represented by the “rho” in table 6.1, indicates that 74.7% of the variance is due to the 
differences across panels. Table 6.2 represents the robust regression results for 490 
observations, as previously explained in chapter 5. The table reveals all variables to be 
insignificant except for the firm’s loss as will be further clarified in the following 
discussion.  
 
Table 6.1: Moderation Analysis- UK Regression Results 
DAC Coef. Std. 
Err. 
t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
COMP 0.056 0.087 0.65 0.516 -0.114 0.227 
AUDQ -0.004 0.089 -0.05 0.962 -0.179 0.171 
INSTOWN -0.060 0.552 -0.11 0.913 -1.146 1.025 
CONOWN 0.160 0.375 0.43 0.670 -0.577 0.897 
CASH 0.935 0.580 1.61 0.108 -0.205 2.075 
COMP x AUDQ -0.004 0.014 -0.27 0.786 -0.030 0.023 
COMP x INSTOWN 0.006 0.088 0.07 0.944 -0.167 0.180 
COMP x CONOWN 0.001 0.058 0.01 0.991 -0.114 0.115 
COMP x CASH -0.142 0.092 -1.54 0.124 -0.322 0.039 
LEV 0.001 0.0003 1.41 0.159 -0.0002 0.001 
SIZE -0.037 0.025 -1.49 0.136 -0.086 0.012 
CFO 0.019 0.049 0.39 0.698 -0.078 0.116 
LOSS  0.020 0.008 2.60 0.010 0.005 0.035 
ROA -0.001 0.0003 -4.03 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
MTB -0.001 0.001 -1.13 0.261 -0.002 0.001 
_CONS 0.183 0.597 0.31 0.759 -0.990 1.357 
F(15, 358) 5.74      
Prob>F 0.0000      
R-sq 0.1940      
Rho 0.7473 No. of Obs.: 490 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; LEV is the firm’s leverage; 
SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; 
CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS represents the firm’s loss. 
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Table 6.2: Moderation Analysis- Robust Regression Results 
DAC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
COMP .056 0.080 0.70 0.486 -0.103 0.216 
AUDQ -.004 0.087 -0.05 0.961 -0.177 0.168 
INSTOWN -0.060 0.505 -0.12 0.905 -1.06 0.941 
CONOWN 0.160 0.333 0.48 0.632 -0.499 0.819 
CASH 0.935 0.689 1.36 0.178 -0.430 2.30 
COMP x AUDQ -0.004 0.012 -0.30 0.764 -0.028 0.020 
COMP x INSTOWN 0.006 0.081 0.08 0.939 -0.155 0.167 
COMP x CONOWN 0.001 0.051 0.01 0.989 -0.099 0.101 
COMP x CASH -0.142 0.110 -1.29 0.201 -0.359 0.076 
LEV 0.001 0.0004 1.20 0.231 -0.0003 0.001 
SIZE -0.037 0.034 -1.10 0.273 -0.104 0.030 
CFO 0.019 0.070 0.27 0.786 -0.120 0.158 
LOSS  0.020 0.012 1.68 0.096 -0.004 0.044 
ROA -0.001 0.001 -1.03 0.307 -0.004 0.001 
MTB -0.001 0.001 -1.42 0.159 -0.002 0.0003 
_CONS 0.183 0.472 0.39 0.698 -0.752 1.12 
F(15, 116) 2.81      
Prob>F 0.0009      
R-sq 0.1940      
Rho 0.7473 No. of Obs.: 490 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; LEV is the firm’s leverage; 
SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; 
CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS represents the firm’s loss. 
 
6.3.1. Earnings Management Constraints in the UK 
Table 6.2 presents the results associated with the intervention of the moderating role of 
CEO compensation to the model. So for UK firms using CEO compensation as an 
additional incentive and control mechanism, observe an insignificant impact of CEO 
compensation on EM. This indicates that CEO compensation does not act as an incentive 
for managers to restrain managerial opportunism in order to reduce EM practices, yet it 
does not encourage the participation of EM as revealed by the positive association 
observed in the previous chapter. This finding of insignificant relation rejects my first 
hypothesis suggesting a significant association between CEO compensation and EM.  
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This finding is inconsistent with the findings of Beneish and Vargus (2002), Cheng and 
Warfield (2005), Burns and Kedia (2006), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Cornett 
et al. (2008) who found a significant positive relationship between the equity-based type 
of CEO compensation and EM, as explained in the previous chapter. It is also inconsistent 
with the findings of Hassen (2014) who found a negative relationship between the total 
compensation and EM. This insignificant relationship is also inconsistent with the 
entrenchment and agency theories since managers do not manipulate the firms’ earnings 
to earn higher levels of compensation, which reduces the conflicts of interests.  
In regards to the audit quality, presented by the audit fees, as well as the institutional 
ownership, they are also found to have insignificant association with EM practices in the 
UK, as observed in table 6.2, even though the two factors are observed to have a negative 
association in relation to EM. These findings reject my second and third hypotheses 
suggesting a relationship between each of the two and EM practices. These findings are 
consistent with the findings presented in the previous chapter of UK-listed firms. In 
addition, the concentrated ownership is found to be insignificant as it’s found to be an 
ineffective control mechanism in restraining EM practices in the UK, as revealed in table 
6.2, yet it does not tempt managers to increase their earnings’ manipulations as observed 
in the previous chapter. This finding also rejects my fourth hypothesis suggesting a 
relationship between the ownership concentration and EM. This finding is inconsistent 
with the agency theory supported by the positive association, observed in chapter 5. 
This finding of an insignificant association between the ownership concentration and EM 
is consistent with the findings of Peasnell et al. (2005) who found an insignificant relation 
between the two in the UK context, and Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) who also found an 
insignificant relation, on their analysis of Jordanian industrial firms. However, it is 
inconsistent with the findings of Zhong et al. (2007) and Halioui and Jerbi (2012) who 
found a positive association between the two. It is also inconsistent with the findings of 
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Yeo et al. (2002), De Miguel et al. (2004), Kouaib and Jarboui (2014) and Gonzalez and 
Garcia-Meca (2014) who found a significant negative relationship between the 
concentrated ownership type of corporate structure and EM, as explained in the previous 
chapter. Last, but not least, the cash holdings are also revealed to remain insignificant as 
indicated in table 6.2, as previously observed in the previous chapter. This finding is 
inconsistent with the entrenchment and agency theories, as previously explained in 
chapter 5. This finding rejects my fifth hypothesis suggesting a relationship between cash 
holdings and EM.  
 
6.3.2. The Moderating Role of CEO Compensation in the UK 
To illustrate my contribution to this research, table 6.2 indicates an insignificant 
relationship of the joined effect of CEO compensation with each of the four factors, in 
relation to EM. The table reveals that none of the formed joint effects reduces the 
participation of EM. This can be due to the insignificant impact of each of the four factors 
mentioned above, even though the joint effect of CEO compensation with each of the 
audit quality, or cash holdings, is observed to have negative coefficients. This indicates 
that CEO compensation- as a moderator, doesn’t play a significant role in restraining EM 
practices. Analysing the strengths of these insignificant joint effects are no longer valid, 
which reject my sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth hypotheses. This concludes that using 
CEO compensation in the existence of either audit fees spending, institutional ownership 
type of corporate structure, ownership concentration, or cash holdings doesn’t help UK-
listed firms in reducing managerial opportunism to increase the transparency of the 
reported earnings. Hence, using the moderation effect of CEO compensation doesn’t add 
value to UK firms and is not such a helpful contribution to the UK market.  
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6.3.3. The Impact of the Control Variables in the UK 
In regards to the control variables, as indicated in table 6.2, the financial leverage is found 
to be insignificant as indicated by 0.231 significance level, which rejects prior findings 
of a significant association between the financial leverage and EM. This finding indicates 
that the firm’s leverage ratio is not tied to the level of EM, which could be due to the 
weak reliance on leverage as a source of fund, since the average firm’s leverage is just 
20.4% as indicated in table 5.1, presented in chapter 5. This finding is inconsistent with 
the findings of Bedard et al. (2004), Peasnell et al. (2005), Mather and Ramsay (2006), 
Teshima and Shuto (2008), and Rusmin et al. (2014) who found a significant positive 
relationship between the firm’s leverage and EM. 
They found higher accruals involved with firms holding higher levels of debts, as a way 
of saving them from facing the contractual violations if they are about to default from 
paying off their debts. This positive relation can be justified by the findings of Peasnell 
et al. (2005) who found a higher average leverage of 52.3% between 1993 and 1996, of 
UK-listed firms. This high reliance on debt can result in more contractual obligations, 
and consequently, lead to higher earnings manipulations in order to avoid any violations 
upon their default. 
These findings oppose the findings of Chung et al. (2002) and Park and Shin (2004) who 
found a significant negative relationship between the level of financial leverage and the 
level of EM. They explained that the existence of higher levels of debts held by firms, 
attract even higher control upon those firms, placed by their lenders as a way of securing 
their debts. As a result, this control helps to restrain managers’ opportunistic behaviours 
and make it difficult for them to manipulate the firms’ earnings accordingly, because of 
the high monitoring placed upon firms acquiring higher debt levels. 
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Table 6.2 indicates a significance level of 0.273 for the firm’s size, which indicates an 
insignificant association between the firm’s size and the level of EM. This finding is 
inconsistent with the findings of Gul et al. (2009) and Teshima and Shuto (2008), who 
found a negative association between the two, indicating that larger firms are more 
controlled and monitored by security analysists, which results in leaving fewer chances 
for managers to manipulate the firm’s earnings and use the firm’s resources 
opportunistically. 
This insignificant relationship is also inconsistent with the findings of Chung et al. (2005), 
Ben Othman and Zhegal (2006) and Chen et al. (2007), who found a positive relationship 
between the firm’s size and the level of EM. Chen et al. (2007) and Ben Othman and 
Zhegal (2006), present lower average firm size of 7.9 and 7.98, respectively, compared 
to this research’s findings of the UK listed firms. Their explanation behind this positive 
relation is that larger firms become more tempted to manipulate the firms’ earnings in 
order to meet earnings’ targets and signal better firms’ performance. In addition, the 
existence of higher information asymmetry in larger firms, according to the agency 
theory, motivates managers to manipulate the firms’ earnings to reach their personal 
benefits. 
The firm’s cash flows from operation are found to be insignificant in relation to EM, as 
indicated by the significance level of 0.786 in table 6.2, which rejects prior studies of a 
significant relationship between the two. This indicates that cash flows from operation 
don’t affect the level of EM as it’s not the main source of funds which managers rely on 
in achieving their private benefits. This finding is inconsistent with the findings of 
Peasnell et al. (2005) and Chung et al. (2005) who found a significant positive 
relationship between the firms’ cash flows and EM. The reason behind this is that the 
existence of a higher level of cash flows from operations in the hands of managers, 
becomes tempting for them to use on their personal benefits, and hence results in higher 
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earnings’ manipulations. Peasnell et al. (2005) also based their analysis on UK firms, 
using the same measurement. They presented an average CFO of 11.6% which is 
comparable with the average CFO presented in table 5.1 of 11.4%. However, their 
analysis was based on a different period, from 1993-1996, and on a different sample size- 
the largest 1000 listed firms based on market capitalization, which justifies the difference 
in the findings. 
As indicated in table 6.2, the firm’s loss is found to have a weak significant relationship 
with EM, as indicated by the 0.096 significance level, which supports prior findings. A 
positive relationship between the firm’s loss and the level of EM is found, as indicated 
by the positive coefficient of approx. 0.02, so the more firms incur losses, the more they 
would manipulate the firm’s earnings in order to hide these losses. This weak relationship, 
however, can be justified by the low percentage of loss-making firms in my sample, as 
loss firms only make up 9.5% of the whole sample. This finding is consistent with the 
findings of Wang (2006), Mitra et al, (2007), Chen et al. (2011), González and García-
Meca (2014), Alzoubi (2016), and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017) who found 
that firms become motivated to engage in EM practices when they need to cover up for 
their losses. The reason managers hide these losses, is to signal higher firm value as 
indicated by the signalling theory and to attract more investors. This finding supports the 
concept of the agency theory resulting from the information asymmetry and the conflicts 
of interests between managers and their shareholders. However, this finding is 
inconsistent with the findings of Cohen and Zarowin (2008) who found a negative 
association between the two variables and Sharma and Kuang (2014) who found no 
association. 
The firm’s profitability presented by ROA in table 6.2, is found to have an insignificant 
impact on EM, as indicated by the 0.307 significance level. This insignificant relation 
indicates that only loss-making firms manipulate the firms’ earnings, while profit-making 
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firms, whether making high or low profits, don’t participate in earnings’ manipulations 
in UK listed firms. This finding is inconsistent with the findings of Bedard et al. (2004), 
Chen et al. (2007), Alzoubi (2016) and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017) who 
found a significant negative relationship between the firm’s profitability and EM. They 
explained that lower profitability results in more pressures on managers, leading to higher 
levels of earnings’ manipulations participated to satisfy shareholders’ demands. This 
finding is also inconsistent with the findings of Machuga and Teitel (2007) and González 
and García-Meca (2014) who found a positive association between the two, as managers 
become tempted to manipulate the firm’s earnings to signal higher profitability to make 
their firms appear more attractive to investors, as indicated by the signalling theory. 
According to table 6.2 the firms’ growth, represented by the MTB, is found to have an 
insignificant relationship with EM, as indicated by the significance level of 0.159. This 
indicates that when UK firms have an underinvestment problem and low growth 
opportunities, managers don’t manipulate the firm’s earnings to hide the financial distress 
they face from their investors. This finding is inconsistent with the signalling theory since 
managers do not signal higher firm growth than achieved in order to attract more 
investors. This insignificant relationship can be explained by the lower average growth 
of 3.9, indicated in table 5.1 in chapter 5. This average growth is much lower compared 
to other studies on UK firms, such as the average growth of approx. 9% obtained by 
Hassanein et al. (2018), or the average growth rate of 15.7% in the study obtained by 
Hussainey et al. (2003) on UK firms, between 1996 and 1999. 
This finding is inconsistent with the findings of An et al. (2016) and Anagnostopoulou 
and Tsekrekos (2017) who found a negative association indicating that firms tend to 
manage their earnings when their growth progress is imperfect. However, these findings 
are inconsistent with the findings of Wang (2006), Mitra et al. (2007), Sharma and Kuang 
(2014), González and García-Meca (2014), and Alzoubi (2016) who found a significant 
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positive relationship between the firm’s growth and EM. Their justification behind this 
positive relation is that high growth firms are more resistant to report losses and hence, 
they tend to have higher accruals compared to firms with lower growth, in order to signal 
better growth performance. 
To summarize the above discussion, incorporating the moderating role of CEO 
compensation in UK-listed firms is found not to add value, as it doesn’t restrain 
managerial opportunism to reduce EM practices as suggested. Hence, using CEO 
compensation as an incentive mechanism is not recommended for UK firms. Even though 
the moderation effect is found to be ineffective, it wipes out the positive association 
resulting from each of the CEO compensation and the ownership concentration on EM, 
observed in the previous chapter. This may indicate that even though the moderating role 
of CEO compensation was not very successful in reducing earnings’ manipulations, it, at 
least, prevents the rise of EM practices. Finally, UK investors are advised to avoid 
investing in loss-making firms to avoid being presented with misstated financial 
statements. Table 6.3 summarizes the research findings of the impact of the moderation 
effect of CEO compensation.   
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Table 6.3: Findings’ Summary of UK Firms 
Hypotheses Expected 
Signs 
Results 
 
H1: There is a relation between the total 
CEO compensation and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H2: There is a relationship between the 
audit quality and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected  
H3: There is a relationship between 
institutional ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected  
H4: There is a relationship between the 
concentrated ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected  
H5: There is a positive relationship 
between cash holdings and EM. 
 
(+) Rejected  
H6: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and audit quality on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-)  Rejected 
(Insig) 
H7: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and institutional ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H8: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and concentrated ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H9: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and cash holdings on EM is 
substitutive. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
There is a relation between LEV and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between SIZE and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between ROA and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between MTB and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between CFO and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between LOSS and EM (+) Confirmed 
(+) 
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6.4. Regression Diagnostics of US Firms 
The data is observed to be linear as indicated by the scatterplot matrix presented in figure 
6.2. The data is observed to be heteroscedastic as indicated by the significance level of 
0.000 in the Modified Wald test used for checking heteroscedasticity, as presented below. 
Therefore, running a robust regression is found to be necessary to resolve the issue. There 
is no serial correlation indicated due to the significance level of 0.37 in the Wooldridge 
test for testing autocorrelation, presented below. 
Figure 6.2: Scatterplot Matrix 
 
Moderation Analysis- Testing for Heteroscedasticity 
 
 
Moderation Analysis- Testing for Autocorrelation 
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6.5. Moderation Regression Results of US Firms 
The following tables provide the moderated regression analysis for the impact of the 
moderating role of CEO compensation on the association between the above mentioned 
four factors and EM. EM is represented by the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
and is estimated using the Modified Jones Model (1991). The model is highly significant, 
as indicated by the significance level of 0.000 in table 6.4. The R-squared indicates that 
9.7% of the variation in discretionary accruals levels are due to the research variables 
used in the study, presented in table 6.4, which is lower compared to that of the UK listed 
firms of 19.4% presented in table 6.1.  
The “rho” indicates that 29.5% of the variance is due to the differences across panels, as 
presented in table 6.4, which is much lower than that of the UK of 74.7%. The robust 
regression results represent 2,733 observations, as indicated in table 6.5. In summary, 
table 6.5 indicates that cash holdings, as well as the joint effect of CEO compensation 
with cash holding levels, in addition to the firm’s size, loss and growth tend to have 
significant impacts on the level of EM participated in the US. This result is quite different 
than the findings of the UK sample, as will be further discussed shortly.  
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Table 6.4: Moderation Analysis- US Regression Results 
DAC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
COMP 0.010 0.056 0.19 0.853 -0.099 0.121 
AUDQ 0.014 0.061 0.23 0.818 -0.106 0.134 
INSTOWN -0.120 0.221 -0.54 0.589 -0.554 0.314 
CONOWN -0.291 0.210 -1.39 0.166 -0.701 0.120 
CASH 0.712 0.244 2.91 0.004 0.233 1.19 
COMP x AUDQ -0.001 0.008 -0.07 0.943 -0.017 0.015 
COMP x INSTOWN 0.017 0.032 0.53 0.596 -0.045 0.079 
COMP x CONOWN 0.035 0.030 1.18 0.238 -0.023 0.094 
COMP x CASH -0.105 0.035 -2.98 0.003 -0.174 -0.036 
LEV -0.00001 0.0001 -0.07 0.947 -0.0002 0.0002 
SIZE -0.023 0.007 -3.25 0.001 -0.037 -0.009 
CFO 0.020 0.021 0.95 0.345 -0.021 0.061 
LOSS  0.042 0.004 9.97 0.000 0.034 0.051 
ROA -0.001 0.0002 -2.95 0.003 -0.0009 -0.0002 
MTB 0.00003 0.00002 1.76 0.078 -0.000003 0.0001 
_CONS 0.130 0.401 0.32 0.745 -0.656 0.916 
F(15, 2369) 16.86      
Prob>F 0.0000      
R-sq 0.0965      
Rho 0.2949 No. of Obs.: 2,733 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; LEV is the firm’s leverage; 
SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; 
CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS represents the firm’s loss. 
 
Table 6.5: Moderation Analysis- Robust Regression Results 
DAC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
COMP 0.010 0.060 0.17 0.862 -0.108 0.129 
AUDQ 0.014 0.065 0.22 0.829 -0.114 0.142 
INSTOWN -0.120 0.319 -0.37 0.708 -0.748 0.508 
CONOWN -0.291 0.210 -1.39 0.167 -0.703 0.122 
CASH 0.712 0.363 1.96 0.051 -0.003 1.43 
COMP x AUDQ -0.001 0.009 -0.07 0.946 -0.017 0.016 
COMP x INSTOWN 0.017 0.046 0.37 0.715 -0.074 0.108 
COMP x CONOWN 0.035 0.029 1.23 0.221 -0.021 0.092 
COMP x CASH -0.105 0.051 -2.03 0.043 -0.206 -0.003 
LEV -0.00001 0.0002 -0.04 0.965 -0.0003 0.0003 
SIZE -0.023 0.010 -2.32 0.021 -0.043 -0.003 
CFO 0.020 0.068 0.29 0.770 -0.114 0.154 
LOSS  0.042 0.010 4.41 0.000 0.023 0.061 
ROA -0.001 0.001 -0.58 0.565 -0.002 0.001 
MTB 0.00003 0.00001 2.72 0.007 0.00001 0.0001 
_CONS 0.130 0.429 0.30 0.762 -0.714 0.974 
F(15, 348) 5.68      
Prob>F 0.0000      
R-sq 0.0965      
Rho 0.2949 No. of Obs.: 2,733 
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Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; LEV is the firm’s leverage; 
SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; 
CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS represents the firm’s loss. 
 
6.5.1. Earnings Management Constraints in the US 
Introducing the moderating role of CEO compensation to the model generates the 
findings presented in table 6.5. Neither CEO compensation, audit quality, institutional 
ownership, nor concentrated ownership is found to have a significant relationship with 
EM of US-listed firms, as indicated in table 6.5. These findings reject the first, second, 
third, and fourth hypotheses. These findings are consistent with this research’s findings 
of UK-listed firms, as they too observe no association between any of these four factors 
and EM, as previously discussed in section 6.5.1. Cash holdings, however, are revealed 
to have a significant association with EM, as indicated by the 0.051 significance level, in 
table 6.5. A positive relationship is indicated by the positive coefficient of 0.71, presented 
in table 6.5. This finding accepts the fifth hypothesis of a significant positive relationship 
between cash holdings and EM. This indicates that the presence of cash makes it 
vulnerable for misuse by managers.  
This positive relationship can be due to the effect of high discretionary accruals 
participated by managers to cover their abuse of the firms’ cash. Keeping high cash 
reserves, tempts managers to spend this excess cash opportunistically. It becomes 
vulnerable for managers’ abuse towards achieving their personal desires, which creates 
conflicts of interests and widens the gap between these managers and their shareholders. 
Hence, this finding is consistent with entrenchment and agency theories. This positive 
relation is inconsistent, however, with the stewardship theory. This finding represents one 
of my main contributions to this research, as previously explained.  
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This finding is consistent with the findings of Chung et al. (2005), Bukit and Iskandar 
(2009), Rusmin et al. (2014) and Farahani et al. (2016), who found a positive relationship 
between FCFs and EM. Their explanation behind this positive association is that there is 
high risk associated with the presence of free cash flows, as managers become tempted 
to use these free cash flows on their own private benefits. As a result, managers use their 
discretionary powers to hide this misuse of funds, resulting in higher EM levels.  
Nekhili et al (2016) also found a positive relation as they had an average free cash flows 
of 12.2%, which is comparable with this research’s finding of the cash holdings- 
represented by the cash and cash equivalents- of 9.3%, presented in table 5.6- chapter 5. 
Their study is conducted on French firms, based on the SBF 120 index, from 2001-2010. 
They found that protecting this FCFs from managerial opportunism depends on the 
ownership structure and the corporate governance mechanisms incorporated, which leads 
to the observation of my ninth hypothesis incorporating the moderating role of CEO 
compensation as a corporate governance mechanism, as expressed by Cornett et al. 
(2008). 
 
6.5.2. The Moderating Role of CEO Compensation in the US 
As a contribution to this research, the moderating role of CEO compensation is analysed 
in the US context. The analysis indicates that the joint effect of CEO compensation with 
either the audit quality, institutional ownership, or concentrated ownership has no 
association with EM, as presented in table 6.5, even though the joint effect of CEO 
compensation along the presence of audit quality is observed to have a negative 
coefficient. These findings reject the sixth, seventh, and eighth hypotheses, since 
analysing the strengths for these insignificant joint effects becomes no longer valid. These 
results can be due to the insignificant impact of each of these variables in relation to EM. 
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This indicates that the presence of CEO compensation doesn’t act as an incentive for 
managers to support audit fees spending to restrain managerial opportunism and reduce 
EM practices. These findings are consistent with this study’s findings of UK-listed firms 
discussed earlier in section 6.3.2, as CEO compensation is found not to be effective in 
motivating managers to reduce EM practices when moderating any of these relations.  
A value-adding contribution is that the moderating role of CEO compensation is found to 
have a significant impact on the association between cash-holdings and EM, as revealed 
by the 0.043 significance level in table 6.5. A negative relation of the joint effect and EM 
is observed by the negative coefficient of -0.105, indicated in table 6.5. Even though the 
existence of the cash-holdings by itself in US-listed firms is found to increase the 
participation of EM, the positive relation changes in the intervention of CEO 
compensation. To further clarify, the distribution of CEO compensation in the presence 
of cash within US-listed firms acts as an incentive for managers to actually work for the 
firms’ best interests, avoid using the firms’ excess cash, leading to lower EM practices. 
This finding is inconsistent with this study’s findings of UK-listed firms, as previously 
discussed in section 6.3.2 since an insignificant relation between the joint effect and EM 
is found in the UK context. This study confirms that CEO compensation can act as a 
moderator to add value in offsetting the positive relation between cash-holdings and EM 
levels, leading to lower participation of EM.  
To further analyse the strength of this impact, the joint effect is found to be substitutive, 
as indicated by the negative coefficient of -0.105, which is lower than the sum of the two 
independent coefficients of 0.010 for CEO compensation and approximately 0.712 for 
Cash-holding. This finding accepts the ninth hypothesis suggesting a substitutive effect 
of the joint effect on EM. This finding is inconsistent with those of the UK discussed 
earlier. In conclusion, this contribution can be a significant benefit to the US market, as 
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firms holding high cash reserves can protect their excess cash by distributing CEO 
compensation in line, to prevent managerial opportunism and restrain EM practices. 
 
6.5.3. The Impact of the Control Variables in the US 
The financial leverage is found to have an insignificant association with EM, as indicated 
by the significance level of 0.965, in table 6.5. This indicates that the level of leverage 
obtained by US firms doesn’t impact their EM levels. This insignificant relation can be 
due to the low average of leverage relied on by US firms of 25%, indicated in table 5.6, 
chapter 5. This finding is consistent with this research’s findings of UK listed firms, 
which relies on an even lower average of leverage of 20%, presented in table 5.1, chapter 
5. This finding of US firms is also consistent with the finding of Gul et al (2007) as they 
found an insignificant association on their analysis of US firms, between 2000 and 2001. 
Conversely, Hoitash et al (2007) and Wang (2006) found a significant negative 
relationship, on their studies conducted on US firms, as higher levels of debt attract higher 
monitoring by the creditors to secure their debt, leading to limited participation of EM. 
The firm’s size is found to have a significant relationship with EM, as indicated in table 
6.5 by the 0.021 significance level. A negative relationship is observed by the negative 
coefficient of -0.02, in table 6.5. This finding indicates that high monitoring and control 
measures are applied by the US on larger firms in an attempt of restraining earnings 
management practices by managers. This finding is inconsistent with this study’s findings 
of UK listed firms, as indicated in table 6.7. This finding of US-listed firms is consistent 
with the findings of Wang (2006), who had a comparable average size on their study of 
firms listed on the S&P 500 index, between 1994 and 2002. In addition, these findings 
are consistent with prior research studies such as that of Gul et al. (2009) and Teshima 
and Shuto (2008). 
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The firm’s CFO is found to have an insignificant association with EM as indicated by the 
significance level of 0.770 in table 6.5. This finding indicates that US-listed firms don’t 
rely in their personal benefits on the level of cash flows generated from the firms’ main 
operations, even though they are observed to rely on cash-holdings of firms, as explained 
earlier. This insignificant relation of the firms’ CFO on EM may be explained by the 
existence of the firms’ cash holdings in the model. To further clarify, managers are found 
to manipulate the firms’ earnings in the existence of higher cash holding levels, which 
indicates that managers rely on the amount of cash and cash equivalents in their private 
benefits, rather than just the cash flow from operations. Cash holdings are wider as they 
combine all sources of the firm’s cash, whether from the operation, investments, or 
financing. This finding indicates that EM does not necessarily occur in the cash generated 
from the firm’s operations as a source of fund, but rather from either the investments or 
financing sources of funds. 
This finding is supported by the findings of Jensen (1993) who found evidence that capital 
investments, during the 1980s, is what leads to the destruction of billions of dollars in 
companies such as General Motors, Ford, Chevron, DuPont, and British Petroleum. In 
addition, Cash holdings reach a max of 70.8%, as indicated in table 5.6 in chapter 5, 
which is much higher than the max of 47.9% of the firm’s cash flow from operations. 
Hence, when the two are available, other branches of the cash holdings seem to be highly 
used by managers towards achieving their personal benefits, rather than using the CFO. 
This can be due to the high monitoring and control placed on this CFO. This finding is 
comparable with that of the UK-listed firms, as they too are found not to rely on their 
CFO, as indicated in table 6.7. 
This finding of US-listed firms is inconsistent with the findings of Gul et al (2007) and 
Hoitash et al (2007) who found a negative association between the two, on their study of 
US firms, in the early 2000s. This negative association, however, can be due to the lower 
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average of CFO of 3%, as presented by Gul et al. (2007), which is four times lower than 
the average presented in table 5.6, in the previous chapter, of 12.2%, or due to the negative 
CFO, presenting a loss from operations, as indicated by Hoitash et al (2007). This can 
indicate that, in the US, earnings management occur only when the cash generated from 
operations is low or in the case of incurring losses, to cover up for the low firm 
performance. These findings are inconsistent with that of Peasnell et al. (2005), Chung et 
al. (2005) and Alzoubi (2016) who found a positive association between the two 
variables, in different contexts. 
The firm’s loss is found to have a significant relationship with EM practices of US-listed 
firms, as indicated by the significance level of 0.00, in table 6.5. A positive association is 
observed by the positive coefficient of 0.04 in table 6.5. This indicates that loss-making 
firms in the US tend to manage their firms’ earnings, in order to cover up for those losses. 
This finding is consistent with the findings of UK-listed firms, as indicated in table 6.7. 
These findings are also consistent with the findings of Wang (2006), Gul et al (2007) and 
Hoitash et al (2007) on their analysis of US firms during the early 2000s. In addition, this 
finding supports the concept of the agency theory, as firms hide information from their 
shareholders, which widens the gap between the two, leading to higher conflicts of 
interests. This is also consistent with the signalling theory, as they hide firms’ losses in 
an attempt to signal higher firm value to attract more investors. 
The level of profitability is found to have an insignificant association with EM practices 
of US-listed firms, as indicated by the 0.565 significance level, presented in table 6.5. 
This indicates that as long as firms make profits, whether high or low, they don’t manage 
the firms’ earnings, but only in the case of making losses. This finding is consistent with 
this study of the UK-listed firms. This insignificant relation in the US is also observed by 
Wang (2006) on their study of US firms listed on the S&P 500 index, between 1994 and 
2002, as they too found a comparable average ROA of 7.5%, in family-owned firms. 
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The firm’s growth, represented by the firm’s MTB, is found to be significant as indicated 
by the significance level of 0.007, presented in table 6.5. A positive association between 
the firm’s growth level and EM practices is indicated by the positive coefficient of 
0.00003, presented in table 6.5. This indicates that high growth firms in the US resist 
reporting losses, as previously discussed, leading them to higher earnings management 
levels. Nevertheless, high growth firms can be tempted to manage the firms’ earnings to 
signal even higher firm value and, hence, to deserve higher equity-based compensation 
accordingly. This finding is consistent with the finding of Wang (2006) on their sample 
of US firms listed on the S&P 500 index, between 1994 and 2002. Mitra et al. (2007) also 
present consistent results to this finding, as they present a comparable average to this 
study, on their analysis of US firms in 2000. 
This finding is also consistent with the findings of Sharma and Kuang (2014), González 
and García-Meca (2014), and Alzoubi (2016). In addition, these findings are consistent 
with the agency theory and the entrenchment theory, as managers manipulate the firms’ 
earnings to mislead shareholders and reach their personal targets. Conversely, this finding 
of US-listed firms is inconsistent with the findings of Gul et al (2007) and Hoitash et al 
(2007) who found an insignificant and negative association, respectively, in their analysis 
of US firms in the early 2000s. This finding of US-listed firms is also inconsistent with 
this study’s finding of the UK-listed firms, as they are observed to have an insignificant 
association between the two, as explained earlier. 
In summary, US-listed firms tend to exercise higher earnings management in the presence 
of cash holdings, or in the case of incurring losses or experiencing high growth. However, 
their earnings manipulations are restrained either when distributing CEO compensation 
in the presence of large amounts of cash, or in large firms, or in low growth firms. Hence, 
if US firms intend to restrict managerial opportunism and limit the participation of EM 
practices, they are highly advised to either lower the levels of their cash holdings or to 
   
190 
 
distribute higher levels of compensation when higher cash levels are present to restrict 
managers from using the firms’ cash available on their personal desires.  
Nevertheless, US investors are advised to invest in firms where the use of CEO 
compensation as an incentive and control mechanism is used in the presence of excess 
cash, or in firms holding lower cash levels, or in large firms, or in low growth firms. Table 
6.6 includes this study’s findings of the impact of the moderating role of CEO 
compensation, based on the analysis of US firms listed on the S&P 500 index. In addition, 
table 6.7 presents a comparison between the UK and the US findings.  
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Table 6.6: Findings’ Summary of US Firms 
Hypotheses Expected 
Signs 
Results 
 
H1: There is a relation between the total 
CEO compensation and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected  
H2: There is a relationship between the 
audit quality and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected  
H3: There is a relationship between 
institutional ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected  
H4: There is a relationship between the 
concentrated ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected  
H5: There is a positive relationship 
between cash holdings and EM. 
 
(+) Confirmed 
H6: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and audit quality on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H7: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and institutional ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H8: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and concentrated ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H9: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and cash holdings on EM is 
substitutive. 
 
(-) Confirmed 
(Substitutive) 
There is a relation between LEV and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between SIZE and EM Unknown Confirmed (-) 
There is a relation between ROA and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between MTB and EM Unknown Confirmed 
(+) 
There is a relation between CFO and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between LOSS and EM (+) Confirmed 
(+) 
 
   
192 
 
 Table 6.7: Comparison between UK and US Firms  
Dependent Variable: DAC measured using the Modified Jones Model 
Variables UK Firms US Firms 
Coef. Coef. 
COMP 0.056 0.010 
AUDQ -0.004 0.014 
INSTOWN -0.060 -0.120 
CONOWN 0.160 -0.291 
CASH 0.935 0.712** 
COMP x AUDQ -0.004 -0.001 
COMP x INSTOWN 0.006 0.017 
COMP x CONOWN 0.001 0.035 
COMP x CASH -0.142 -0.105* 
LEV 0.001 -7.26e-06 
SIZE -0.037 -0.023* 
CFO 0.019 0.020 
LOSS 0.020** 0.042* 
ROA -0.001 -0.001 
MTB -0.001 0.00003* 
No of Obs. 490 2,733 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
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6.6. Comparison between the UK and the US Contexts 
In an attempt of comparing the findings of the both contexts of the UK and the US to 
reveal the difference of the influences of the EM constraints, including the moderating 
role of CEO compensation, in affecting EM practices within the two markets, a test of 
difference is implemented. Since UK firms are observed to have lower EM levels than 
those of US firms, as indicated by the t-test in table 5.12, chapter 5, the marginal impact 
of the constraints, including the moderation effect of CEO compensation, is worth 
analysing. Hence, a dummy variable indicating the country type “C” is used again, as 
previously explained in section 5.4 (Wright et al., 2006). Table 6.8 reveals a difference 
between the overall impacts of EM constraints within the US in comparison to the UK. 
The sum of B10 through B19 is -0.9053, which is proved to be significant as indicated by 
the significance level of 0.00, presented in table 6.8, indicates that EM constraints are 
more effective in restraining EM practices of UK firms compared to those of the US. 
Hence, it can be concluded that UK firms have lower EM levels, due to the higher 
effectiveness of the EM constraints employed, compared to the US. This finding rejects 
the tenth hypothesis suggesting that EM constraints, including the moderation effect, 
applied in US firms, are more effective in restraining EM practices than in the UK. As 
further analysis, the marginal impact of each variable is analysed independently to further 
indicate their individual strengths, as revealed in table 6.9. Table 6.9 reveals that none of 
the variables has significant impact between the two countries. Hence, even though each 
individual mechanism is not more effective in country than the other, the overall impact 
of the constraints put together is revealed to be more effective in reducing EM practices 
in the UK compared to the US, as indicated in table 6.8.  
                                                          
3 β0+β1+β2+…+β18+β19=0.39 which represents the impact of EM constraints in US firms. 
β0+β1+…+β8+β9=1.30 which represents the impact of EM constraints in UK firms. Hence, the 
difference between them (β10+β11+…+β18+β19= -0.905) which represents the marginal impact 
of the EM constraints on EM between UK and US firms. 
   
194 
 
Table 6.8: Regression Results of Combined Sample of UK and US Firms 
Model: EM= β0+ β1 COMP+ β2 AUDQ + β3 INSTOWN + β4 CONOWN+ β5 CASH + 
β6 (COMP x AUDQ) + β7 (COMP x INSTOWN) + β8 (COMP x CONOWN) + β9 (COMP 
x CASH)+ β10 C+ β11 (C x COMP) + β12 (C x AUDQ) + β13 (C x INSTOWN) + β14 (C 
x CONOWN) + β15 (C x CASH) + β16 (C x COMP x AUDQ) + β17 (C x COMP x 
INSTOWN) + β18 (C x COMP x CONOWN) + β19 (C x COMP x CASH)+ β20 LEV +β21 
SIZE + β22 ROA+ β23 MTB+ β24 CFO + β25 LOSS+ ε 
Variables Parameter Coeff. Std. Err t P> t 
INTERCEPT β0 0.378 0.471 0.80 0.422 
COMP β1 0.028 0.069 0.41 0.684 
AUDQ β2 -0.029 0.072 -0.41 0.683 
INSTOWN β3 -0.141 0.458 -0.31 0.758 
CONOWN β4 0.156 0.318 0.49 0.624 
CASH β5 1.040 0.745 1.40 0.163 
COMP x AUDQ β6 0.00003 0.010 0.00 0.997 
COMP x INSTOWN β7 0.020 0.074 0.27 0.785 
COMP x CONOWN β8 0.002 0.047 0.05 0.959 
COMP x CASH β9 -0.159 0.118 -1.34 0.181 
C β10 -0.246 0.642 -0.38 0.702 
C x COMP β11 -0.017 0.090 -0.19 0.849 
C x AUDQ β12 0.044 0.095 0.46 0.646 
C x INSTOWN β13 0.022 0.563 0.04 0.969 
C x CONOWN β14 -0.447 0.375 -1.19 0.233 
C x CASH β15 -0.347 0.820 -0.42 0.672 
C x COMP x AUDQ β16 -0.001 0.013 -0.05 0.959 
C x COMP x INSTOWN β17 -0.003 0.087 -0.04 0.970 
C x COMP x CONOWN β18 0.033 0.055 0.61 0.544 
C x COMP x CASH β19 0.057 0.128 0.44 0.658 
LEV β20 0.00002 0.0001 0.15 0.879 
SIZE β21 -0.024 0.010 -2.52 0.012* 
CFO β22 0.022 0.056 0.39 0.693 
LOSS β23 0.037 0.008 4.95 0.000* 
ROA β24 -0.0008 0.001 -1.03 0.302 
MTB β25 0.00003 0.00001 2.65 0.008* 
Prob>F= 0.0000 
F-value= 3.48 
R-squared= 0.3835 
Adjusted R2= 0.2732 
Test of β0+β1+…+β8+β9=0 (F-value = 2.62, Prob > F =0.0052*) 
Test of β0+β1+ …+β9+β18+β19=0 (F-value = 7.30, Prob > F =0.000*) 
Test of H10: β10+β11+…+β18+β19=0 (F-value= 11.19, Prob > F =0.0000*) 
Variable Definitions: 
“C” indicates the Country Type= “1” for US and “0” for UK 
Controlling for the firm’s leverage, size, CFO, loss, ROA, and MTB, the coefficients 
can be interpreted as follows: 
β0+β1+…+β8+β9= represent the impact of EM constraints in UK firms. 
β0+β1+β2+…+β18+β19= represent the impact of EM constraints in US firms. 
β10+β11+…+β18+β19: represent the marginal impact of the EM constraints on EM 
between UK and US firms to test for [H10] EM constraints are more effective in 
the US, compared to the UK, in reducing EM practices. 
 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.9: Marginal Impact of Each Variable Independently 
Variables Parameter Coeff. F-value P> t 
COMP β10+β11 -0.263 1.95 0.143 
AUDQ β10+β12 -0.202 0.23 0.793 
INSTOWN β10+β13 -0.224 0.07 0.929 
CONOWN β10+β14 -0.693 0.88 0.415 
CASH β10+β15 -0.593 0.20 0.820 
COMP x AUDQ β10+β16 -0.247 0.57 0.567 
COMP x INSTOWN β10+β17 -0.249 0.07 0.929 
COMP x CONOWN β10+β18 -0.213  0.30 0.738 
COMP x CASH β10+β19 -0.189 0.21 0.813 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; LEV is the firm’s leverage; 
SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; 
CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS represents the firm’s loss. 
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6.7. Additional Analysis 
Table 6.10 presents the additional analysis required for validating the findings of this 
research study. In this analysis, EM is measured using the performance-matched 
discretionary accruals, using the lagged ROA. The analysis is performed on the UK firms 
listed on the FTSE 350 index and US firms listed on the S&P 500 index, for the duration 
of twelve years, from 2005- 2016. The robust regression results are presented and 
summarized in table 6.10. 
 
Regression Results 
In relation to the UK findings, the results are mostly consistent with the previous findings 
discussed earlier in this chapter, except for the firm’s loss, which is found to be no longer 
insignificant in relation to EM practices, consistent with the additional analysis conducted 
in chapter 5. Rather, the firm’s growth, presented by the firm’s MTB, is found to have a 
negative association with EM, as low growth firms become tempted to manipulate the 
firms’ earnings, in order to hide their underinvestment problems from the investors.  
In relation to the US findings, the findings are mostly consistent with the previous 
findings discussed earlier in this chapter, with only one difference in the firm’s size, as 
it’s observed to be no longer significant, as presented in table 6.10, consistent with the 
additional analysis conducted in chapter 5.  
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Table 6.10: Additional Analysis for Moderation 
Dependent Variable: Performance-Matched DAC, using lagged ROA 
Variables UK Firms US Firms 
Coef. Coef. 
COMP 0.002 0.037 
AUDQ -0.049 0.045 
INSTOWN -0.260 -0.256 
CONOWN 0.205 -0.290 
CASH 0.743 0.673** 
COMP x AUDQ 0.004 -0.005 
COMP x INSTOWN 0.038 0.037 
COMP x CONOWN -0.015 0.035 
COMP x CASH -0.116 -0.098** 
LEV 0.0004 0.00002 
SIZE -0.031 -0.014 
CFO 0.041 0.037 
LOSS 0.014 0.042* 
ROA -0.001 -0.001 
MTB -0.001* 0.00003* 
No. of Obs. 490 2,733 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
(Refer to Appendix C and D for complete regression tables, as provided by STATA 11) 
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6.8. Summary 
In summary, as indicated in table 6.7, none of the monitoring and control mechanisms is 
found to impact the level of EM in UK-listed firms. Even the proposed moderation effect 
of CEO compensation is found to be an ineffective strategy in restraining managerial 
opportunism and reducing EM practices in the UK market. In the US, however, cash 
holdings are found increase EM practices, while the moderation effect of CEO 
compensation is revealed to add value in the presence of these cash holdings, as it limits 
the participation of EM. Hence, it can be concluded that CEO compensation cannot 
moderate either one of the associations between the corporate governance structures, 
whether institutional or concentrated, and EM, or the audit quality and EM. Overall, CEO 
compensation can act as a moderator only in the presence of high cash holdings, in the 
US market, as it acts as an incentive for managers to reduce their EM practices.  
Based on the analysis conducted in this chapter, since cash holdings are found to increase 
the participation of EM in the US, as supported by the entrenchment and the agency 
theories, and since the moderation effect of CEO compensation is found to be an effective 
strategy in constraining EM- as indicated above, then analysing the moderating effect of 
CEO compensation in the presence of low vs. high cash holdings must be analysed. 
Hence, the following chapter will further expand this analysis by analysing the 
moderating role of CEO compensation on the remaining determinants of EM, in low vs. 
high cash holding firms, to determine what best constrains EM within the two contexts 
of the UK and the US markets. This analysis is important in order to reveal the 
effectiveness of the remaining corporate governance mechanisms, as well as the 
effectiveness of the moderation effect of CEO compensation, in the presence of low levels 
of cash (LCASH), in comparison to high levels of cash (HCASH). 
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Chapter 7: Earnings Management Constraints in the UK and US: The 
Moderating Role of CEO compensation in Low vs. High Cash Holding 
Firms  
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the analysis conducted on low cash holding 
(LCASH) firms, compared to high cash-holding (HCASH) firms. It analyses the impact 
of the remaining three corporate governance mechanisms on EM, as well as the 
moderating role of CEO compensation, in firms with low and high cash holding levels. 
This is conducted to reveal their impact in restraining EM practices, as they are expected 
to act differently and to be more effective in reducing EM, in the presence of lower cash 
levels, compared to higher cash levels, within firms. This analysis is based on the agency 
theory and the entrenchment theory, as higher cash levels are expected to be more 
attractive for managers to use towards achieving their personal benefits. In addition, the 
moderating role of CEO compensation is also analysed, to find the impact of the joint 
effects on both types of firms holding different levels of cash. This analysis is built on 
the finding of a positive association between cash holdings and EM in the US market, 
and the presence of a moderation effect of CEO compensation, as revealed in the previous 
chapter. This analysis is still conducted in both contexts of the UK and the US, to compare 
how the three governance mechanisms act in the presence of low compared to high cash 
holdings, these three factors are the audit quality, the institutional ownership, and the 
concentrated ownership. 
  
   
200 
 
7.2. Research Hypotheses 
The research hypotheses analysed in this chapter are formed to achieve the third objective 
of analysing the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms in low vs high cash holding 
firms, as previously explained. These hypotheses are very much similar to the original 
hypotheses developed earlier, in section 3.6, but with the exclusion of the hypotheses 
testing for cash holdings, since this sample is now split into low vs high cash levels using 
the median. Hence, the two hypotheses including the cash holding variable are excluded, 
leaving only eight hypotheses to be analysed in this chapter, for both contexts of the UK 
and the US, to compare the findings of LCASH vs HCASH firms. Hence, the LCASH 
firms of the UK are compared to the LCASH firms of the US, then the HCASH firms of 
the UK are compared to HCASH firms of the US. From the above discussion, the 
following hypotheses can be generated:  
H1: There is a relation between the total CEO compensation and EM. 
H2: There is a relationship between the audit quality and EM. 
H3: There is a relationship between institutional ownership and EM. 
H4: There is a relationship between the concentrated ownership and EM. 
H5: The joint effect of CEO compensation and audit quality on EM is complementary. 
H6: The joint effect of CEO compensation and institutional ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
H7: The joint effect of CEO compensation and concentrated ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
H8: EM constraints are more effective in the US, compared to the UK, in reducing EM 
practices. 
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7.3. Descriptive Statistics of UK LCASH Firms 
For firms holding low cash levels, they are observed to have an average cash holding of 
approx. 3.4%, as indicated in table 7.1, with a min of 0.1% and a max of approx. 6%. 
Low cash holding firms are observed to have an average absolute value of DAC of 2%, 
with a min of 0 and a max of 10.8%. This average DAC is slightly lower than that of the 
whole sample of 3.1%, presented in table 5.1 in chapter 5, even the max boundary of 
DAC of low cash holding firms is much lower than that of the whole sample of 42%, 
indicated in table 5.1. This indicates that the level of DAC is reduced when firms hold 
low cash levels, which reveals that low cash-holdings can be used as a strategy for 
restraining EM practices among UK-listed firms. 
In regards to the CEO compensation, low cash holding firms are observed to spend an 
average of 2.9 M towards the compensation of their CEOs, with a min of approx. 3 
thousand and a max reaching 12.3 M, presented in table 7.1. The average CEO 
compensation spent by firms holding low cash levels is lower than that of the whole 
sample of 3.3 M, indicated in table 5.1, even the max boundary is lower than that of the 
whole sample of 32.1 M. This indicates that low cash holding firms distribute lower CEO 
compensation, compared with the whole sample.  
Low cash holding firms are found to spend an average of 2.7 M of audit service fees 
towards acquiring audit services, with a min of 0 and a max of 34 M, as presented in table 
7.1. This average is much lower than that of the whole sample of 4.2 M, indicated in table 
5.1 in chapter 5, with even lower boundary of the max spending observed by the whole 
sample of 57 M. This can indicate that low cash holding firms acquire fewer audit efforts 
due to the lower risk associated with the lower cash they hold on hand, as suggested by 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009). 
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The average institutional ownership present in low cash holding firms as presented in 
table 7.1 is approx. 9%, with a min of 0 and max shareholdings of 39% held by 
institutional investors. The average institutional ownership is equivalent to that of the 
whole sample of 9%, as indicated in table 5.1, even though a higher boundary of 54% is 
observed in the findings of the whole sample. The concentrated ownership is observed to 
have an average of approx. 7%, with a min of 0 and a max of 61% held by non-
institutional block-holders. This average of concentrated shareholdings is comparable 
with that of the whole sample of 8.5%, even though a higher boundary is observed in the 
whole sample of 74%. 
In regards to the control variables, the financial leverage is found to have an average of 
23.8%, with a min of 0, and a max of 57.5%, in firms holding low cash levels. This 
average leverage is found to be slightly higher than that of the whole sample of only 
20.4%. This can indicate a slightly higher reliance of low cash holding firms on debts to 
finance their investments, due to the lower liquidity they face as a result of the lower 
levels of cash they hold. Low cash holding firms tend to have an average size of 9.6, with 
a min of 8.43 and a max of 11, which is comparable with that of the whole sample, 
indicating that the amount of cash held by firms does not rely on the firms’ sizes, but 
rather on their preference of doing so. Hence, whether large or small firms, they may 
choose to hold low cash levels to reduce the risk associated with the managerial 
opportunism involved with higher cash levels.  
Low cash holding firms are observed to hold an average CFO of 9.6%, with a min of cash 
outflow of 5.4% and a max of cash inflow of 26.6%, as presented in table 7.1. This 
average is lower than that of the whole sample of 11.4%, as indicated in table 5.1. This 
indicates that firms which prefer holding low cash levels, tend to hold lower cash from 
operations as well. Loss-making firms are observed to form around 10% of low cash 
holding firms, as indicated in table 7.1, which is slightly higher than that of the whole 
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sample of 9.5%, indicated in table 5.1. This can indicate that higher losses are associated 
with holding lower levels of cash, which explains their higher reliance on debt financing. 
In regards to the firm profitability, represented by the firms’ ROA, low cash holding firms 
are found to have an average profitability of 5.8%, with a min of -12.5% and a max of 
25.7%, as presented in table 7.1. This average is slightly lower than that of the whole 
sample of 7.5%. The financial position of low cash holding firms is observed to involve 
higher risk, due to the lower profitability and the higher losses incurred. Finally, the firm’s 
growth, represented by MTB, is observed to have an average of 3.3%, with a min of 
0.07% and a max of 56% in firms with low cash holding levels, as indicated in table 7.1. 
This average growth is comparable with that of the whole sample of 3.9%, in table 5.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics of UK LCASH Firms 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
CASH 0.034 0.016 0.001 0.063 
DAC 0.020 0.019 0 0.108 
COMP 2.9 M 2.3 M 3,342.36 12.3 M 
AUDQ 2.7 M 4.5 M 0 34 M 
INSTOWN 0.091 0.083 0 0.39 
CONOWN 0.070 0.145 0 0.61 
LEV 23.76 13.93 0 57.47 
SIZE 9.58 0.592 8.43 11 
CFO 0.096 0.055 -0.054 0.266 
LOSS 0.10 0.30 0 1 
ROA 5.83 5.46 -12.52 25.68 
MTB 3.25 4.97 0.07 56.2 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss.   
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7.4. Regression Results of UK LCASH Firms 
This analysis conducted on low cash holding firms, listed on the FTSE 350 index, reveals 
some differences in the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms on EM practices. 
First, the CEO compensation is now found to have a significant association with EM, as 
indicated in table 7.2, which accepts the first hypothesis suggesting a relationship 
between the two, in the presence of low cash levels within firms. A negative relationship 
is observed by the negative coefficient of -0.179. This indicates that when firms hold low 
cash levels, managers no longer take advantage of their compensation towards increasing 
EM practices, but rather it acts an incentive for them to reduce earnings’ manipulations. 
To further clarify, they are no longer interested in manipulating the firms’ earnings to 
increase their equity-based portion of compensation. This finding is inconsistent with the 
entrenchment theory since managers are less entrenched to participate their opportunistic 
behaviours, in the presence of low cash holding levels within their firms. It is also 
inconsistent with the agency theory, since lower cash holdings leave lower opportunity 
for managerial opportunism, leading to lower participation of EM and lower agency 
problems.  
Second, the audit quality is found to have a significant association with EM practices, as 
indicated in table 7.2, which accepts the second hypothesis of a significant relation 
between the two. A negative relationship is indicated by the negative coefficient of -0.21. 
This indicates that the audit quality is an effective EM controlling mechanism in regards 
to UK firms holding low levels of cash. This can be an indication that the audit fees’ 
spending is sufficient to impose their monitoring and control on EM of such firms, as 
they already acquire a low cash holding strategy. Third, institutional ownership is found 
to remain insignificant in relation to EM. This finding rejects the third hypothesis. This 
indicates that even if firms hold low cash levels, the existence of institutional investors 
does not seem to exert enough control to restrain EM practices, in UK listed firms.  
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Fourth, the concentrated ownership is found to have a significant positive relationship 
with EM, as indicated in table 7.2. This finding accepts the fourth hypothesis of a 
significant relationship. This indicates that large non-institutional investors remain 
powerful, even in the presence of low cash holding levels within firms, as they push 
managers towards manipulating the firms’ earnings, to lead them to their private benefits. 
In relation to the moderation effects generated in this research, the CEO compensation is 
found to moderate the relation between the audit quality and EM in firms holding low 
cash levels, as indicated in table 7.2. The joint effect of the CEO compensation with the 
audit quality is observed to have a positive association with EM, in low cash holding 
firms in the UK. This can indicate that the two factors joined together are not such 
effective mechanisms in restraining EM practices in UK firms holding low levels of cash. 
This is hard to justify though since each of the two factors independently is found restrain 
EM, but when combined together their effect reverses.  
This positive relationship can be due to the nature of one component embedded within 
the CEO compensation, such as the equity-based type of compensation, which tends to 
lead to higher earnings management in order to display higher firm value for firms 
holding low cash levels so that they can deserve even higher compensation. To further 
clarify, firms holding low levels of cash are less capable of investing to present higher 
firm value and to increase managers’ compensation accordingly, which pushes managers 
towards manipulating the firms’ earnings in order to reach their desires of higher 
compensation. In addition, the audit quality- represented by the audit fees may not be 
sufficient to control managerial opportunism resulting from the equity-based type of 
compensation which may be stronger in its impact. Therefore, their joint effect 
encourages the participation of EM. This finding rejects the fifth hypothesis as the joint 
effect was expected to restrain earnings’ manipulations rather than encouraging it.  
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On the contrary, the CEO compensation is found not to moderate the relation between 
the institutional ownership and EM, in the presence of low cash holding levels in UK 
firms. This indicates that when firms keep lower levels of cash, the CEO compensation 
does not act as an incentive for managers to work for the firm’s best interest, to reduce 
their opportunistic behaviours and earnings’ manipulations consequently in the presence 
of institutional investors. This could be due to the institutions’ high impact on managers 
which offset the benefit of compensation. This finding rejects the sixth hypothesis 
suggesting a moderation effect since analysing the strength becomes no longer valid. 
The joint impact of the CEO compensation with the ownership concentration is found to 
have a significant impact on the participation of EM, as indicated in table 7.2. A negative 
association is observed due to the negative coefficient of -0.090. This indicates that even 
though the presence of non-institutional block-holders is found to increase EM, as they 
push managers towards manipulating the firms’ earnings for their private gains when 
managers are well awarded, they become more satisfied and incentivised not to engage 
in such EM practices. This reveals the incentive power of compensation in restraining 
managerial opportunism, as well as block-holders’, in low cash holding firms within the 
UK. The strength of this joint effect, however, is found to be substitutive since the 
coefficient of the joint effect is lower than the sum of the two variables’ coefficients, 
which rejects the seventh hypothesis suggesting a complementary effect.  
In relation to the control variables, each of the firm’s leverage, the firm’s CFO, and the 
firm’s loss and ROA are found to have an insignificant association with EM, when low 
cash levels exist, within UK listed firms, as indicated in table 7.2. The firms’ size, 
however, is found to have a negative association with EM in low cash holding firms in 
the UK. This can indicate that when firms hold low cash levels in the firms, high 
monitoring and control is exerted on large firms, leading to lower EM practices in such 
firms. The firm’s growth- represented by MTB, is observed to have a negative association 
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with EM, as indicated in table 7.2, due to the firms’ desire to manipulate their earnings 
only in case of low growth to cover-up for their low performance. Hence, the higher the 
growth which firms achieve, the lower the need for them to manipulate the firms’ earnings 
to signal higher performance for external investors.  
In conclusion, when the same corporate governance mechanisms are incorporated in low 
cash holding UK firms, they are revealed to be more effective, than when analysing the 
whole sample, as explained earlier. Hence, they better contribute to limiting managerial 
opportunism and EM practices accordingly, in the presence of low cash holdings. This 
may be due to the presence of lower opportunities for managerial opportunism, involved 
with the presence of low cash levels within UK firms, which makes it easier to control 
using the same corporate governance mechanisms.  
Hence, if UK firms hold lower cash in their firms and need to restrict managers from 
manipulating the firms’ earnings, they are advised to increase the distribution of CEO 
compensation, the spending of audit fees to acquire higher audit efforts, and the 
distribution of higher CEO compensation in the presence of high ownership 
concentration. They are also advised to intervene in growth opportunities and to avoid 
the presence of high ownership concentration. As for the UK investors, they are advised 
to invest in such firms following these instructions, and in large firms, as they become 
highly monitored, when low cash holding levels are present, to encourage the issuance of 
more reliable financial reports. Table 7.3 summarizes the findings of UK LCASH firms. 
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Table 7.2: Low vs. High Cash Holding UK Firms Analysis 
Dependent Variable: DAC measured using the Modified Jones Model 
Variables UK LCASH Firms UK HCASH Firms 
Coef. Coef. 
COMP -0.179* -0.187 
AUDQ -0.205* -0.153 
INSTOWN 0.315 -0.778 
CONOWN 0.571* 0.246 
COMP x AUDQ 0.033* 0.032 
COMP x INSTOWN -0.057 0.125 
COMP x CONOWN -0.090* -0.023 
LEV -0.0001 0.001 
SIZE -0.038* -0.07 
CFO -0.028 0.162 
LOSS 0.006 0.001 
ROA -0.0004 -0.003* 
MTB -0.001* 0.00004 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; LEV is the firm’s leverage; 
SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; 
CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS represents the firm’s loss. 
(Refer to Appendix E and F for complete regression tables, as provided by STATA 11) 
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Table 7.3: Findings’ Summary of UK LCASH Firms 
Hypotheses Expected 
Signs 
Results 
 
H1: There is a relation between the total 
CEO compensation and EM. 
 
Unknown Confirmed (-) 
H2: There is a relationship between the 
audit quality and EM. 
 
Unknown Confirmed (-) 
H3: There is a relationship between 
institutional ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H4: There is a relationship between the 
concentrated ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Confirmed 
(+) 
H5: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and audit quality on EM is complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected (+) 
H6: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and institutional ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H7: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and concentrated ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Substitutive) 
There is a relation between LEV and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between SIZE and EM Unknown Confirmed (-) 
There is a relation between ROA and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between MTB and EM Unknown Confirmed (-) 
There is a relation between CFO and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between LOSS and EM (+) Rejected  
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7.5. Descriptive Statistics of UK HCASH Firms 
For UK firms holding high cash levels, they are observed to have an average cash holding 
of approx. 14%, as indicated in table 7.4, with a min of 6% and a max of approx. 41%. 
High cash holding firms are observed to have an average absolute value of DAC of 3.8%, 
with a min of 0 and a max of 32.6%. This average DAC is almost double the DA of 
LCASH firms of 2%, presented in table 7.1, even the max boundary of DAC appears to 
be almost three times as much that of LCASH of approx.11%, indicated in table 7.1. This 
indicates that the level of DAC is higher in the presence of higher cash levels, which 
reveals that low cash-holdings can be used as a strategy for restraining EM practices 
among UK-listed firms. 
In relation to the CEO compensation, HCASH firms are observed to spend an average of 
3.2 M, with a min of approx. 600 thousand and a max of 17M towards compensating their 
CEOs, as indicated in table 7.4. This average is slightly higher than that spent by LCASH 
firms of only 2.9M, indicated in table 7.1, with even higher max spending of 
compensation than that of LCASH firms of 12.3M. This indicates that UK firms holding 
higher cash levels tend to prefer the distribution of higher levels of compensation in an 
attempt to satisfying their CEOs. 
HCASH firms are observed to spend an average of 2.8M towards the acquisition of audit 
efforts, with a min of approx. 48 thousand, and a max of approx. 37M, as indicated in 
table 7.4. The average spending of audit fees of HCASH firms is comparable to that of 
LCASH forms of 2.7M, with slightly higher max boundary, as indicated in table 7.1. This 
indicates that HCASH firms are not much concerned about acquiring higher audit efforts 
to protect their cash levels. This, however, may be due to their reliance on other 
governance mechanisms acquired by their firms, as will be further revealed. 
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HCASH firms are observed to have an average of institutional shareholdings of 1%, with 
a min of 0, and a max of 46%, as indicated in table 7.4. This average is lower than that 
held by institutional investors in LCASH firms, as presented in table 7.1, even though a 
higher boundary is observed in HCASH firms than in LCASH firms. HCASH UK firms 
are observed to have an average ownership concentration of 7.2%, with a min of 0 and a 
max of 69%, as presented in table 7.4. This average is comparable to that of LCASH 
firms of 7%, presented in table 7.1, even though a higher boundary is observed for 
HCASH firms.  
In regards to the control variables, the financial leverage of HCASH firms is observed to 
have an average of 19.2%, with a min of 0 and a max of 80%, as indicated in table 7.4. 
This average leverage is lower than that of LCASH firms of 23.8%, presented in table 
7.1. This, however, can be justified by the LCASH firms’ need for cash to finance their 
investments, since they keep lower cash levels, which doesn’t allow for higher flexibility 
to enter into new investments, hence, LCASH firms tend to have a higher reliance on debt 
than HCASH firms. HCASH firms are observed to have an average size of 9.3%, with a 
min of 8.25 and a max of 11, indicated in table 7.4, which is comparable with LCASH 
firms. This indicates that the amount of cash held by firms does not rely on the firms’ 
sizes, but rather on their preferences. Therefore, holding high or low levels of cash can 
be a choice for large as well as for small firms, as a strategy for constraining managerial 
opportunism.  
Table 7.4 indicates that HCASH firms have an average CFO of 13.4%, with a max of 
42%. This average is higher than that of LCASH firms of 9.6%, presented in table 7.1. 
This indicates that HCASH firms tend to have higher cash levels generated from their 
operations, as a result of the greater flexibility they have from holding higher cash levels 
which allow for the intervention in more investment opportunities and the generation of 
more CFO as a result. HCASH firms are observed to have an average loss of 8%, as 
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indicated in table 7.4, which is slightly lower than that of the LCASH firms of 10%, 
presented in table 7.1.  
In relation to the firms’ profitability, HCASH firms are observed to have an average of 
approx. 9%, with a max reaching 36%, as indicated in table 7.4. This average is higher 
than that of LCASH firms of 5.8%, presented in table 7.1, which indicates that higher 
cash levels within UK firms, allow firms to intervene in more investment opportunities 
to generate even higher profits. Last, but not least, HCASH firms are observed to have an 
average growth of 5%, with a min of 0.3% and a max of 26%, as indicated in table 7.4. 
This average growth is slightly higher than that of LCASH firms of 3.3%, presented in 
table 7.1, which indicates that the presence of cash may be well put into use in the UK 
market as it drives HCASH firms to higher growth, CFO, and consequently, higher 
profitability and lower loss ratio, than LCASH firms.  
  
Table 7.4: Descriptive Statistics of UK HCASH Firms 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
CASH 0.143  0.78 0.063 0.411 
DAC 0.038 0.044 0 0.326 
COMP 3.2M 2.78M 627,933 17M 
AUDQ 2.8M 5.2M 48,242 36.9M 
INSTOWN 0.01 0.1 0 0.46 
CONOWN 0.072 0.162 0 0.69 
LEV 19.18 17.19 0 80.08 
SIZE 9.34 0.578 8.25 11 
CFO 0.134 0.097 -0.057 0.42 
LOSS 0.081 0.274 0 1 
ROA 8.98 9.7 -56.98 36.24 
MTB 5 4.45 0.32 26.14 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
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7.6. Regression Results of UK HCASH Firms 
This analysis conducted on high cash holding firms, listed on the FTSE 350 index, reveals 
some differences in how the corporate governance mechanisms impact EM practices in 
the presence of higher levels of cash. First, the CEO compensation is revealed to have an 
insignificant association with EM, as indicated in table 7.2, even though a negative 
coefficient is observed. This finding rejects the first hypothesis suggesting a relationship 
between the two. This finding is inconsistent with the findings of LCASH firms of the 
UK, presented in table 7.2. This indicates that CEO compensation acts as an incentive for 
managers to restrain their EM practices, only in the presence of lower cash levels within 
UK-listed firms, even though HCASH firms are observed to distribute even higher CEO 
compensation compared to LCASH firms.  
Second, in relation to the audit quality, it is revealed to have an insignificant relationship 
with EM practices conducted in HCASH firms, as indicated in table 7.2, even though a 
negative coefficient is observed. This finding rejects the second hypothesis suggesting a 
relationship between the two. This insignificant relationship can be due to the need for 
higher spending of audit fees to acquire higher audit efforts to better restrain managerial 
opportunism, in the presence of higher cash levels. This finding is inconsistent with the 
findings of LCASH firms, presented in table 7.2, as the audit fees’ spending is found to 
restrain managerial opportunism when lower cash levels exist within the UK-listed firms.  
Third, the presence of institutional investors is observed to have no association with EM 
practices conducted in HCASH firms, as indicated in table 7.2. This finding rejects the 
third hypothesis suggesting a relationship between the two. This finding is consistent with 
the findings of LCASH firms, presented in table 7.2, which indicates that the presence of 
institutional investors does not act as an effective control mechanism in restraining the 
EM practices in the UK market, whether holding high or low cash levels.  
   
214 
 
Fourth, ownership concentration is observed to have no association with EM practices of 
HCASH firms, as indicated in table 7.2. This finding rejects the fourth hypothesis 
suggesting a relationship between the two. This finding is inconsistent with the findings 
of LCASH firms, presented in table 7.2, as a positive relationship is observed in the 
presence of lower cash levels, even though the two types of firms are observed to have 
comparable averages of concentrated shareholdings.  
In regards to the moderating effects of CEO compensation, they are all observed to be 
insignificant in relation to EM, which indicates the absence of moderation, presented in 
table 7.2. This reveals that the presence of CEO compensation as a moderator is not such 
an effective strategy in restraining EM practices of HCASH firms in the UK when 
moderating the associations between either one of the audit quality, the institutional 
ownership or the concentrated ownership, and EM. These findings reject the fifth, sixth, 
and seventh hypotheses suggesting moderation, since analysing the strengths for these 
joint effects are no longer valid. These findings are partially consistent with the UK 
findings, presented in table 7.2, as the presence of CEO compensation is observed not to 
moderate the association between the institutional ownership and EM. 
In regards to the control variables, none of the control variables is found to have an 
association with EM in HCASH firms within the UK, except for the firm’s profitability. 
It is found to have a negative association with EM in HCASH firms, as indicated in table 
7.2. This can indicate that the higher the profitability levels apparent in UK firms holding 
higher levels of cash, the lower the need for managers to manipulate the firms’ earnings. 
This finding is inconsistent with the findings of LCASH firms, due to the lower 
profitability they generate, as previously discussed in the previous section, which 
encourages the higher manipulations to cover for the lower profitability figures.  
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In conclusion, in the presence of lower cash levels within UK firms, higher CEO 
compensation, as well higher spending of audit fees, and lower presence of concentrated 
shareholdings tend to be effective mechanisms in restraining EM practices, while none 
of these mechanisms adds value in the presence of higher cash levels. Moreover, the 
moderation effect tends to be valid in LCASH firms, compared to HCASH firms, since 
the distribution of CEO compensation in the presence of concentrated shareholdings tend 
to contribute to restraining EM practices of LCASH firms. Hence, in the presence of high 
cash holdings of UK firms, it is difficult to determine what’s best to restrain EM practices 
of their managers, other than generating profits, to provide a guide for investors of where 
to best invest their funds to be presented with more transparent financial reports. 
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 Table 7.5: Findings’ Summary of UK HCASH Firms 
Hypotheses Expected 
Signs 
Results 
 
H1: There is a relation between the total 
CEO compensation and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H2: There is a relationship between the 
audit quality and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H3: There is a relationship between 
institutional ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H4: There is a relationship between the 
concentrated ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H5: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and audit quality on EM is complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H6: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and institutional ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H7: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and concentrated ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
There is a relation between LEV and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between SIZE and EM Unknown Rejected 
There is a relation between ROA and EM Unknown Confirmed (-) 
There is a relation between MTB and EM Unknown Rejected 
There is a relation between CFO and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between LOSS and EM (+) Rejected  
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7.7. Descriptive Statistics of US LCASH Firms 
In the US, firms holding low cash levels are observed to have an average cash holding of 
3%, as indicated in table 7.6, with a min of 0 and a max of 7%. This finding of low cash 
holding firms is comparable with that of the UK, as previously discussed. In relation to 
the absolute value of DAC, low cash holding firms are observed to have an average of 
2.8%, with a max of 33%, as indicated in table 7.6. This average is lower than that of the 
whole US sample of 3.5%, indicated in table 5.6 in chapter 5 but comparable with the 
average DAC of 2.6% participated by UK firms holding low levels of cash. 
Low cash holding firms are observed to distribute an average CEO compensation of 
13.6M, with a min of approx. 34 thousand, and a max of 156 M. This average is 
comparable to that of the whole sample, which indicates that US firms generally tend to 
prefer high spending of CEO compensation, to compensate for the higher responsibilities 
given to their CEOs. This average CEO compensation of US firms holding low cash 
levels is observed to be much higher than the average CEO compensation of 2.9 M 
provided by low cash holding firms in the UK. This, however, can be justified by the 
greater responsibilities held by CEOs of US firms, in comparison with those of the UK- 
who separate the roles of CEOs and chairmen of the boards.    
In relation to the audit quality presented by the audit fees spent, low cash holding firms 
are observed to spend an average of 12.7 M, with a min of approx. 328 thousand, and a 
max of 3.4 B, towards audit services, as indicated in table 7.6. This average is comparable 
to the average presented by the whole sample of 12.9M, indicated in table 5.6, chapter 5. 
This indicates that US firms holding low levels of cash are keen to acquire high audit 
efforts. This average is also higher than the average audit service fees of 2.7M spent by 
low cash holding firms in the UK, as indicated in table 7.1. This higher spending on audit 
services, however, may be associated with the need for higher monitoring in the US due 
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to the presence of higher responsibilities in the hands of the CEOs along with the higher 
compensation awarded to them.     
In regards to the institutional ownership, low cash holding firms in the US are observed 
to have an average of 9.3%, with a min of 0 and a max reaching 65%, as indicated in table 
7.6. This average is comparable with that of approx. 9% of low cash holding firms within 
the UK, indicated in table 7.1. However, the concentrated ownership is found to have an 
average of 2.4%, with a min of 0, and a max reaching 55%, presented in table 7.6. This 
indicates a higher reliance of low cash holding firms on institutional investors rather than 
non-institutional block-holders in the US. This average is much lower than that of approx. 
7% of UK listed firms holding low cash levels, as indicated in table 7.1. 
In relation to the control variables, firms holding low levels of cash are observed to 
acquire an average leverage of 29.8%, with a min of 0 and a max of approx. 103%. This 
average is higher than that of the whole US sample of 25.2%, which indicates a higher 
reliance on low cash holding firms on debt. This average is also higher than the average 
leverage of 23.7% of UK firms holding low cash levels, which indicates a higher reliance 
on debt financing in the US compared with the UK, which comes with greater monitoring 
and control, imposed by the creditors to secure their debts. The higher reliance on debt 
financing seems to be necessary for entering into new investment opportunities since 
firms have lower chances of investing on their own due to the low levels of cash they 
hold.  
The average size of low cash holding firms is found to be approx. 10, as indicated in table 
7.6, with a min of approx. 9 and a max of approx. 12. This average firm size is comparable 
with that of the whole US sample, as indicated in table 5.6, which indicates that firms of 
all sizes can choose to hold low cash levels as a control strategy to reduce any associated 
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risks. This average firm size is also comparable with that of UK firms holding low cash 
levels.  
Low cash holding firms are observed to hold an average CFO of approx. 11%, with a 
cash outflow of 8.6% and max cash inflow of approx. 34%, presented in table 7.6. This 
average CFO is slightly higher than the average CFO of 9.7% held by UK firms holding 
low cash levels, as indicated in table 7.1. Loss-making firms are observed to form around 
6% of low cash holding firms, as indicated in table 7.6, which is comparable with the 
whole US sample. This average, however, is lower than the average loss-making firms 
with low cash holdings in the UK of 10%, which indicates a slightly better performance 
of low cash holding firms within the US. 
In regards to the firm profitability, presented by the ROA, low cash holding firms are 
observed to have an average profitability of approx. 6 %, with a min of -50.6% and a max 
of 28.5%, as indicated in table 7.6. This average profitability is comparable to the average 
profitability of low cash holding firms within the UK. Finally, the firm’s growth, 
presented by the MTB, is found to have an average of 3.4%, which is comparable with 
the average growth of 3.3% of UK firms holding low cash levels, as indicated in tables 
7.4 and table 7.1, respectively.  
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Table 7.6: Descriptive Statistics of US LCASH Firms 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
CASH .030 .020 0 .070 
DAC .028 .032 5.79e-06 .330 
COMP 13.6 M 12.5 M 33,831 156 M 
AUDQ 12.7 M 131 M 328,000 3.4 B 
INSTOWN 0.093 0.088 0 0.65 
CONOWN 0.024 0.077 0 0.55 
LEV 29.80 13.72 0 103.05 
SIZE 10.25 0.488 9.03 11.9 
CFO 0.108 0.054 -0.086 0.339 
LOSS 0.060 0.237 0 1 
ROA 5.87 5.86 -50.58 28.54 
MTB 3.42 28.2 -638.7 759.6 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
 
7.8. Regression Results of US LCASH Firms 
This analysis of low cash holding firms, listed on the S&P 500 index, reveals some 
differences in the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms on EM practices. First, 
in regards to the CEO compensation, it is revealed to have an insignificant relation to EM, 
as indicated in table 7.7, even though a negative relation is observed. This finding rejects 
the first hypothesis of a significant relationship between CEO compensation and EM 
practices. This finding is inconsistent with the UK findings presented in table 7.2, which 
indicates that CEO compensation performs as an incentive for managers to restrict their 
EM practices in case of low cash levels within UK firms only, even though US firms 
distribute higher CEO compensation compared to that of the UK, as previously discussed.  
Second, in relation to the audit quality, it is revealed to have an insignificant association 
with EM practices of low cash holding firms of the US, as indicated in table 7.7, even 
though a negative coefficient is observed, which rejects the second hypothesis suggesting 
an association between the two. This insignificant relation can be due to the need for 
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higher spending on audit fees in order to acquire higher audit efforts to become effective 
in restraining the participation of EM in low cash holding firms. This finding is 
inconsistent with the UK findings indicated in table 7.2, as the audit quality in UK firms 
is found to restrain EM practices, even though the US firms are observed to spend higher 
audit fees, compared to UK firms, as previously discussed.  
Third, institutional ownership is found to be insignificant in relation to EM, as indicated 
in table 7.7, even though a negative association is observed. This finding rejects the third 
hypothesis suggesting an association between the two. It indicates that institutional 
ownership is not considered an effective corporate governance mechanism in reducing 
EM practices in US LCASH firms. In addition, this finding is consistent with the UK 
findings, indicated in table 7.2, which concludes that the institutional ownership, in such 
developed countries, is not such a powerful mechanism in reducing earnings’ 
manipulations.  
Fourth, the concentrated ownership is also found to be insignificant, as indicated in table 
7.7. This finding rejects the fourth hypothesis suggesting an association as well. This can 
indicate that when cash holdings are at low levels in US firms, the concentrated ownership 
does not act as a monitoring and controlling mechanism, which can be due to the lower 
need for monitoring, since the presence of low cash levels in firms is perceived to be less 
attractive for managers to use on their personal benefits. This finding is inconsistent with 
the UK findings presented in table 7.2, which is observed to increase EM levels. This can 
be a result of the lower average ownership concentration in LCASH US firms, compared 
with UK firms holding low cash levels, as previously explained. 
In regards to the moderating effects suggested in this research model, they all tend to 
indicate the absence of moderation, as presented in table 7.7. Hence, the existence of CEO 
compensation is found not to moderate any of the relations between either the audit 
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quality, the institutional ownership or the concentrated ownership, with EM participated 
in US firms with low cash holdings. This indicates that CEO compensation does not act 
as an incentive for managers to limit their opportunistic behaviours and EM levels when 
low cash holdings are present in US firms. These findings reject the fifth, sixth, and 
seventh hypotheses suggesting the moderation, since assessing their strengths are no 
longer valid. These findings are partially consistent with the UK findings, presented in 
table 7.2 since the presence of CEO compensation is observed not to have a moderating 
effect on the association between the institutional ownership and EM.  
In relation to the control variables, they are partially consistent with the UK findings 
presented in table 7.7, as the firms’ leverage is found not to be associated with EM 
practices of US-listed firms in the presence of low cash levels. The firms’ CFO, however, 
is observed to have a positive association with EM, in LCASH firms in the US. This 
indicates that when US firms hold low levels of cash and cash equivalents, the cash flow 
from the operations portion is what becomes attractive for managers to use towards 
achieving their personal desires. In addition, this finding is inconsistent with the UK 
finding, which is revealed to have no association between the two, presented in table 7.2. 
The firm’s loss is also indicated to have a positive association with EM practices of US 
firms in the presence of LCASH. This finding supports the agency theory, as managers 
tend to manipulate the firms’ earnings in order to hide losses from the shareholders, 
creating information asymmetry and an agency problem between the two parties. This 
finding is inconsistent with the UK findings, presented in table 7.2. The firm’s 
profitability is found to have a negative association with EM in US-listed firms, which 
hold low cash levels, as indicated in table 7.7. This can indicate that US firms holding 
low levels of cash become resistant to report lower profits, hence, they seek to display 
higher profitability through the use of earnings management. This finding is inconsistent 
with the UK findings presented in table 7.2, as they have no association. Last, the firms’ 
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growth is observed to have a weakly significant relationship with EM practices, at a 90% 
confidence interval, presented in table 7.7. A positive association is observed, which 
indicates that higher earnings manipulations are involved with the presence of higher 
growth opportunities, to signal even higher firm performance to external investors, 
consistent with LCASH firms of the UK.  
In conclusion, when US firms hold low cash levels, none of the above-mentioned 
mechanisms seems to be effective in reducing earnings’ manipulations, which could be 
due to their reliance on the strategy of holding low levels of cash in restraining managerial 
opportunism. The moderating role of CEO compensation is also found to be an ineffective 
strategy in motivating managers to present more transparent financial reports. Hence, US 
firms holding low cash levels, are advised to better monitor their CFO to use it for further 
investments, to generate higher profits, if they intend to reduce the EM levels in their 
firms. Additionally, US investors are highly advised to invest in such firms holding low 
CFO or generating higher profits, in case of holding low levels of cash, to have a clear 
picture of the firm’s performance. Table 7.8 summarizes the findings of US firms holding 
low cash levels. 
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Table 7.7: US Low vs. High Cash Holding Firms Analysis  
Dependent Variable: DAC measured using the Modified Jones Model 
Variables US LCASH Firms US HCASH Firms 
Coef. Coef. 
COMP -0.033 0.020 
AUDQ -0.032 0.039 
INSTOWN -0.501 0.498 
CONOWN 0.269 -0.192 
COMP x AUDQ 0.004 -0.003 
COMP x INSTOWN 0.069 -0.069 
COMP x CONOWN -0.045 0.019 
LEV 0.0002 -0.0003 
SIZE 0.004 -0.031* 
CFO 0.169* -0.038 
LOSS 0.015* 0.043* 
ROA -0.003* 0.00002 
MTB 0.00003** 0.00003** 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; LEV is the firm’s leverage; 
SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; 
CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS represents the firm’s loss. 
(Refer to Appendix G and H for complete regression tables, as provided by STATA 11) 
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Table 7.8: Findings’ Summary of US LCASH Firms 
Hypotheses Expected 
Signs 
Results 
 
H1: There is a relation between the total 
CEO compensation and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H2: There is a relationship between the 
audit quality and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H3: There is a relationship between 
institutional ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H4: There is a relationship between the 
concentrated ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H5: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and audit quality on EM is complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H6: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and institutional ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H7: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and concentrated ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
There is a relation between LEV and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between SIZE and EM Unknown Rejected 
There is a relation between ROA and EM Unknown Confirmed (-) 
There is a relation between MTB and EM Unknown Confirmed 
(+) 
There is a relation between CFO and EM Unknown Confirmed 
(+) 
There is a relation between LOSS and EM (+) Confirmed 
(+) 
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7.9. Descriptive Statistics of US HCASH Firms 
Table 7.9 indicates the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables 
used in the study of high cash-holding firms in the US. The table indicates an average 
cash-holding of 15.7%, with a min of 7% and a max reaching 70.8%. These findings are 
much higher compared to the low cash-holding sample of US-listed firms previously 
analysed, which are observed to have an average cash-holdings of only 3% and a max 
reaching 7%. In relation to the absolute value of DAC, high cash holding firms are 
observed to have an average of 3.9%, with a max reaching 44.6%, as indicated in table 
7.9. These findings are higher than the average and max boundary of absolute DAC of 
low cash-holding firms of 2.8% and 33%, respectively, presented in table 7.6, which 
indicates that high cash-holding (HCASH) firms tend to experience higher levels of EM 
compered to low cash-holding (LCASH) firms within the US context.  
HCASH firms are observed to distribute to an average CEO compensation of 14.1 M 
which, with a min of 245 thousand, and a max of 378 M, as indicated in table 7.9. These 
findings are also higher than the level of CEO compensation distributed by LCASH firms, 
which tend to have an average of 13.6M, and a max of 156M, as indicated in table 7.6. 
This indicates that HCASH firms tend to prefer higher distributions of CEO 
compensation, compared to LCASH firms, which can be considered a strategy for 
incentivising their managers and protecting the firms’ resources from managers’ abuse 
towards their personal desires, leading to more transparent financial reports.  
In relation to the audit quality, HCASH firms are observed to spend an average audit 
service fees of 13.2 M, with a min of 491 thousand and a max of 3.5 B, as indicated in 
table 7.9. These findings are also slightly higher than the audit fees spending of LCASH 
firms observed in table 7.6, which indicates their higher need for audit efforts to protect 
the higher level of cash they hold. In regards to the institutional ownership, HCASH firms 
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are observed to have an average of 11%, with a min of 0, and a max of 78%, as indicated 
in table 7.9. These findings are also higher than the findings of LCASH firms observed 
in table 7.6, which could be due to their greater need for the monitoring and control 
measures imposed by the institutional investors.  
Similarly, the intervention of non-institutional block-holders is observed to be higher in 
HCASH firms, compared to LCASH firms, which may also be used to monitor and 
constrain managerial opportunism. HCASH firms tend to have an average of 3.2%, with 
a min of 0, and a max boundary of ownership concentration reaching 81%, as presented 
in table 7.9. In relation to the control variables, HCASH firms are observed to acquire an 
average leverage of 20.4%, with a min of 0 and a max of 110.6%, as indicated in table 
7.9. LCASH firms are observed to acquire higher average leverage of 29.8% as indicated 
in table 7.6, compared to HCASH firms, which is explained by their lower levels of cash 
they hold, which increases their reliance on external borrowings to finance their 
investments.  
The average size of HCASH firms is found to be approx. 10, with a min of 8.8 and a max 
of approx. 12, as indicated in table 7.9, which is comparable with the findings of LCASH 
firms. HCASH firms are observed to have an average CFO of 13.6%, with cash outflow 
of 42% and a max cash inflow of 47.8%, as presented in table 7.9. These findings of the 
firms’ CFO of HCASH firms are found to be higher compared to those of LCASH firms, 
which represents higher liquidity. HCASH firms are observed to experience a slightly 
higher loss of 6.8%, compared to LCASH firms, as indicated in table 7.9.  
HCASH firms are also observed to be more profitable as revealed by the average ROA 
of approx. 9% and the max reaching around 58.5% indicated in table 7.9. This is due to 
the higher liquidity, which enables them to intervene in more investment opportunities, 
without the need for external borrowings and interest payments associated with acquiring 
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these debts, which does not only create flexibility but also helps them generate higher 
profits, compared to LCASH firms. Consequently, HCASH firms tend to experience 
higher growth compared to LCASH firms, as indicated by the higher average of approx. 
5% and the double max growth achieved, presented in table 7.9.  
 
Table 7.9: Descriptive Statistics of US HCASH Firms 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
CASH .157 .083 0.07 .708 
DAC .039 .044 1.04e-17 .446 
COMP 14.1 M 16.2 M 245,322 378 M 
AUDQ 13.2 M 134 M 490,760 3.5 B 
INSTOWN 0.11 0.096 0 0.78 
CONOWN 0.032 0.092 0 0.81 
LEV 20.37 16.45 0 110.6 
SIZE 10.02 0.532 8.78 11.9 
CFO 0.136 0.074 -0.420 0.478 
LOSS 0.068 0.252 0 1 
ROA 8.99 8.87 -58.14 58.49 
MTB 5.02 55.53 -1106.9 1372.9 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss. 
 
7.10. Regression Results of US HCASH Firms 
This analysis reveals how corporate governance mechanisms act in relation to EM 
practices, in high cash holding firms, listed on the S&P 500 index. First, CEO 
compensation is found to have no association with EM, as indicated in table 7.7, which 
rejects the first hypothesis suggesting a relationship between the two. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of LCASH firms in the US, even though HCASH firms tend 
to distribute much higher CEO compensation compared to LCASH firms, as discussed in 
the previous section. This insignificant relation is also consistent with the findings of the 
whole US sample presented in chapters 5 and 6, which reveals that CEO compensation 
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does not act as an incentive for CEOs managing US firms. This finding is also consistent 
with the findings of UK HCASH firms, presented in table 7.2, which reveals that CEO 
compensation is not such an effective strategy in the presence of higher cash levels. 
Second, none of the corporate governance mechanisms mentioned earlier is found to have 
an association with EM, so neither the audit quality, nor the institutional ownership, nor 
the concentrated ownership is found to impact EM levels in the presence of high cash 
holdings of US firms. These findings reject the second, third, and fourth hypotheses 
suggesting a relationship between each of the three factors and EM. These findings are 
consistent with the findings of LCASH firms of the US, even though HCASH firms are 
revealed to spend higher average audit fees and are found to be dominated by a higher 
percentage of institutional and non-institutional block-holders, compared to LCASH 
firms. These findings reveal that these mechanisms are not sufficient to restrain EM 
practices of US firms holding either high or low levels of cash. These findings are also 
consistent with the findings of UK HCASH firms, presented in table 7.2, which reveals 
these mechanisms to be ineffective in reducing EM, in firms holding higher cash levels.  
In relation to the moderation effects, the moderating role of CEO compensation appears 
to be ineffective in reducing managerial opportunism in HCASH firms, as indicated in 
table 7.7, as the three joint effects appear to have insignificant relationships with EM. 
This may be due to the insignificant association between each of these factors in relation 
to EM. These findings reject the fifth, sixth, and seventh hypotheses, since analysing their 
strengths becomes no longer valid. These findings are consistent with the findings of the 
moderation effects of the LCASH firms within the US context, which reveals the CEO 
compensation cannot act as a moderator, neither in LCASH firms nor in HCASH firms, 
towards restraining EM practices and presenting more reliable financial reports in the US 
market. These findings are also consistent with the findings of UK HCASH firms which 
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reveal that the moderation effects are ineffective in restraining EM within firms holding 
higher levels of cash, in either one of the two markets.  
In relation to the control variables, the firm’s leverage is found to have no association 
with EM. This finding is consistent with that of LCASH firms, presented in table 7.7. 
This can be due to the low leverage obtained by both firms, with even lower leverage 
obtained by HCASH firms, compared to LCASH firms, as discussed in the previous 
section. The firm’s size is found to have an association with EM, as indicated in table 7.7. 
A negative relation is indicated by the negative coefficient of -0.031, presented in table 
7.7. This indicates that higher monitoring and control measures are applied to larger 
firms, resulting in lower earnings’ manipulations by their managers, only in the presence 
of HCASH within the US. This finding is inconsistent with the finding of LCASH firms 
since HCASH firms tend to be larger in their sizes compared to LCASH firms.  
The firm’s CFO is found to have no association in relation to EM, in the presence of 
HCASH, as indicated in table 7.7. This finding is inconsistent with the finding of LCASH 
firms as they tend to experience higher DAs associated with higher levels of CFO, due to 
the lower cash levels they hold. The firm’s loss is found to have a positive association 
with EM, in firms holding high cash levels, as revealed by the coefficient of 0.043, 
presented in table 7.7. This finding is consistent with the finding of LCASH firms, which 
indicates that US firms tend to manipulate the firms’ earnings, whether they hold high or 
low levels of cash within their firms, in order to hide their losses from the shareholders 
and to signal higher firm performance. Hence, this finding is consistent with the agency 
theory and the signalling theory, as previously discussed. 
The firm’s profitability, represented by the firm’s ROA, is found to have no association 
in relation to EM when high cash levels exist. This finding is inconsistent with the finding 
of the LCASH firms. This finding indicates that managers tend to manipulate the firm’s 
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earnings, only in the case of incurring losses, in the presence of HCASH levels, since 
they are not much concerned with covering lower profitability figures such as in LCASH 
firms. Finally, the firm’s growth, represented by the firm’s MTB, is found to have a 
positive association with EM, as presented in table 7.7. This finding is typical to that of 
LCASH firms, even though HCASH firms tend to experience higher growth compared to 
LCASH firms, yet US firms still tend to manage the earnings to display even higher 
growth to attract investors, as supported by the signalling theory.  
In summary, the findings of HCASH firms are not much different from those of LCASH 
firms within the US context, as they both observe corporate governance mechanisms to 
be ineffective in restraining EM practices. In addition, the moderation effects are also 
found not to add value in restraining managerial opportunism in HCASH firms, as in 
LCASH firms. Moreover, both types of firms are found to display negative associations 
between each of the firm’s loss, and growth, with EM, while HCASH firms tend to 
experience negative association between the firm’s size and EM. Hence, US investors are 
advised to invest in large firms and low growth firms as they are better monitored, and to 
avoid loss-making firms, in the presence of HCASH. Nevertheless, these findings of US 
HCASH firms are not much different from those of UK HCASH firms, as they both find 
it difficult to restrain EM practices using the proposed factors. Finally, table 7.10 
represents the findings’ summary of HCASH firms within the US.    
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Table 7.10: Findings’ Summary of US HCASH Firms 
Hypotheses Expected 
Signs 
Results 
 
H1: There is a relation between the total 
CEO compensation and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H2: There is a relationship between the 
audit quality and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H3: There is a relationship between 
institutional ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H4: There is a relationship between the 
concentrated ownership and EM. 
 
Unknown Rejected 
H5: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and audit quality on EM is complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H6: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and institutional ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
H7: The joint effect of CEO compensation 
and concentrated ownership on EM is 
complementary. 
 
(-) Rejected 
(Insig) 
There is a relation between LEV and EM Unknown Rejected  
There is a relation between SIZE and EM Unknown Confirmed (-) 
There is a relation between ROA and EM Unknown Rejected 
There is a relation between MTB and EM Unknown Confirmed 
(+) 
There is a relation between CFO and EM Unknown Rejected 
There is a relation between LOSS and EM (+) Confirmed 
(+) 
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7.11. Comparison between LCASH firms of the UK and the US 
To compare the findings of LCASH firms between both contexts of the UK and the US 
to reveal the marginal impact of the EM constraints employed in each, including the 
moderation effect of CEO compensation, a test of difference is implemented. First, a t-
test is implemented, as revealed in table 7.11, which indicates a significant difference 
between the levels of DAC of LCASH firms of the two countries. Hence, the difference 
in the influence of the EM constraints is worth analysing between LCASH firms of both 
countries. Then, a dummy variable is created to indicate the country type “C”, as 
previously explained in the previous two chapters (Wright et al., 2006). Table 7.12 reveals 
the marginal impact of EM constraints between LCASH firms of the US compared to 
those of the UK (Gujarati, 2011). The sum of B8 through B15 is -0.8104 and significant, 
as indicated by the significance level of 0.00, presented in table 7.12. This indicates that 
UK LCASH firms have lower levels of DAC compared to those of the US, due to the 
higher effectiveness of the EM constraints employed. Hence, this finding rejects the 
eighth hypothesis suggesting that EM constraints applied in US LCASH firms are more 
effective in restraining EM practices than those applied in UK LCASH firms. As further 
analysis, the marginal impact of each individual constraint is analysed independently, as 
revealed in table 7.13. Table 7.13 indicates that the audit quality has a greater impact on 
EM of UK LCASH firms, compared to those of the US. This finding is consistent with 
the previous findings discussed in section 7.8. 
 Table 7.11: Test of Difference in Means of DAC of UK and US LCASH Firms 
Observations  Mean 
UK Firms 211 0.020 
US Firms 1373 0.028 
Test of Difference (Pr = 0.0005*) -0.008  
                                                          
4 β0+β1+β2+…+β14+β15= 0.029 which represents the impact of EM constraints in US firms. 
β0+β1+…+β6+β7= 0.839 which represents the impact of EM constraints in UK firms. Hence, 
the difference between them β8+β9+…+β14+β15= -0.810 represents the marginal impact of the 
EM constraints on EM between LCASH firms of the UK and US. 
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Table 7.12: Regression Results of Combined Sample of UK and US LCASH Firms 
Model: EM= β0+ β1 COMP+ β2 AUDQ + β3 INSTOWN + β4 CONOWN+ β5 (COMP x 
AUDQ) + β6 (COMP x INSTOWN) + β7 (COMP x CONOWN)+ β8 C+ β9 (C x COMP) 
+ β10 (C x AUDQ) + β11 (C x INSTOWN) + β12 (C x CONOWN) + β13 (C x COMP x 
AUDQ) + β14 (C x COMP x INSTOWN) + β15 (C x COMP x CONOWN) + β16 LEV 
+β17 SIZE + β18 ROA+ β19 MTB+ β20 CFO + β21 LOSS+ ε 
Variables Parameter Coeff. Std. Err t P> t 
INTERCEPT β0 0.846 0.630 1.34 0.180 
COMP β1 -0.112 .093 -1.21 0.227 
AUDQ β2 -0.159 .102 -1.55 0.121 
INSTOWN β3 -0.226 .499 -0.45 0.651 
CONOWN β4 0.525 .282 1.86 0.063** 
COMP x AUDQ β5 0.023 .015 1.49 0.138 
COMP x INSTOWN β6 0.026 .078 0.33 0.740 
COMP x CONOWN β7 -0.084 .040 -2.08 0.038* 
C β8 -0.597 .835 -0.72 0.475 
C x COMP β9 0.084 .120 0.70 0.483 
C x AUDQ β10 0.133 .130 1.02 0.307 
C x INSTOWN β11 -0.240 .630 -0.38 0.703 
C x CONOWN β12 -0.246 .430 -0.57 0.568 
C x COMP x AUDQ β13 -0.020 .019 -1.04 0.298 
C x COMP x INSTOWN β14 0.038 .096 0.40 0.690 
C x COMP x CONOWN β15 0.038 .062 0.61 0.542 
LEV β16 0.0001 .0002 0.62 0.535 
SIZE β17 0.002 .010 0.18 0.859 
CFO β18 0.143 .049 2.94 0.003* 
LOSS β19 0.009 .007 1.40 0.161 
ROA β20 -0.003 .001 -4.52 0.000* 
MTB β21 0.00004 .00002 1.88 0.060** 
Prob>F= 0.0000  
F-value= 3.84  
R-squared= 0.5102  
Adjusted R2= 0.3772  
Test of β0+β1+…+β6+β7=0 (F-value = 3.05, Prob > F =0.0035*) 
Test of β0+β1+…+β14+β15=0 (F-value = 2.21, Prob > F =0.0048*) 
Test of H10: β8+β9+…+β14+β15=0 (F-value= 2.35, Prob > F =0.0165*) 
 
Variable Definitions: 
“C” indicates the Country Type= “1” for US and “0” for UK 
Controlling for the firm’s leverage, size, CFO, loss, ROA, and MTB, the coefficients 
can be interpreted as follows: 
β0+β1+…+β6+β7= represent the impact of EM constraints in UK firms. 
β0+β1+β2+…+β14+β15= represent the impact of EM constraints in US firms. 
β8+β9+…+β14+β15: represent the marginal impact of the EM constraints on EM 
between LCASH firms of the UK and the US to test for [H8] EM constraints are 
more effective in the US, compared to the UK, in reducing EM practices.  
 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7.13: Marginal Impact of Each Variable Independently in LCASH 
Variables Parameter Coeff. F-value P> t 
COMP β8+β9 -0.513 0.26 0.771 
AUDQ β8+β10 -0.464 4.23 0.015* 
INSTOWN β8+β11 -0.837 0.37 0.692 
CONOWN β8+β12 -0.843 0.31 0.737 
COMP x AUDQ β8+β13 -0.617 2.15 0.117 
COMP x INSTOWN β8+β14 -0.559 0.37 0.690 
COMP x CONOWN β8+β15 -0.559 0.33 0.721 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss.   
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7.12. Comparison between HCASH firms of the UK and the US 
To compare the impacts of the EM constraints employed in HCASH firms of both 
countries of the UK and the US, including the moderation effect of CEO compensation, 
a test of difference is implemented. First, a t-test is implemented, as indicated in table 
7.14, which reveals an insignificant difference between the levels of DACs of HCASH 
firms of both countries, as indicated by the 0.787 significance level. Hence, it seems that 
there is no need for further analysis of the marginal impact of the EM constraints, yet to 
further confirm this, a dummy variable is created to indicate the country type “C”, as 
previously explained (Wright et al., 2006). Table 7.15 reveals that there is no significant 
difference between the impacts of EM constraints in restraining EM practices of HCASH 
firms of both markets. The sum of B8 through B15 is 0.1535, but insignificant, as 
indicated by the significance level of 0.3685, presented in table 7.15. This finding rejects 
the eighth hypothesis suggesting that EM constraints applied in US HCASH firms are 
more effective in restraining EM practices than those applied in UK HCASH firms, since 
the result is insignificant. To further confirm this finding, table 7.16 indicates that there 
is an insignificant marginal impact of each individual constraint when analysed 
independently, between HCASH firms of both countries.  
 
 Table 7.14: Test of Difference in Means of DAC of UK and US HCASH Firms 
Observations  Mean 
UK Firms 185 0.038 
US Firms 1365 0.039 
Test of Difference (Pr = 0.787) -0.001  
  
                                                          
5 β0+β1+β2+…+β14+β15= 0.374 which represents the impact of EM constraints in US firms. 
β0+β1+…+β6+β7= 0.221 which represents the impact of EM constraints in UK firms. Hence, the 
difference between them β8+β9+…+β14+β15= 0.153 which represents the marginal impact of 
the EM constraints on EM between HCASH firms of the UK and US. The marginal impact is 
insignificant, as observed from table 7.15 below. 
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Table 7.15: Regression Results of Combined Sample of UK and US HCASH Firms 
Model: EM= β0+ β1 COMP+ β2 AUDQ + β3 INSTOWN + β4 CONOWN+ β5 (COMP x 
AUDQ) + β6 (COMP x INSTOWN) + β7 (COMP x CONOWN)+ β8 C+ β9 (C x COMP) 
+ β10 (C x AUDQ) + β11 (C x INSTOWN) + β12 (C x CONOWN) + β13 (C x COMP x 
AUDQ) + β14 (C x COMP x INSTOWN) + β15 (C x COMP x CONOWN) + β16 LEV 
+β17 SIZE + β18 ROA+ β19 MTB+ β20 CFO + β21 LOSS+ ε 
Variables Parameter Coeff. Std. Err t P> t 
INTERCEPT β0 0.236 1.33 0.18 0.859 
COMP β1 -0.038 .184 -0.21 0.836 
AUDQ β2 0.041 .221 0.19 0.851 
INSTOWN β3 -0.654 .939 -0.70 0.486 
CONOWN β4 0.594 .552 1.08 0.282 
COMP x AUDQ β5 0.003 .031 0.10 0.918 
COMP x INSTOWN β6 0.107 .153 0.70 0.482 
COMP x CONOWN β7 -0.068 .083 -0.82 0.415 
C β8 -0.125 1.545 -0.08 0.935 
C x COMP β9 0.056 .211 0.26 0.792 
C x AUDQ β10 -0.006 .250 -0.02 0.982 
C x INSTOWN β11 1.124 1.019 1.10 0.270 
C x CONOWN β12 -0.808 .630 -1.28 0.200 
C x COMP x AUDQ β13 -0.006 .035 -0.16 0.869 
C x COMP x INSTOWN β14 -0.172 .163 -1.06 0.290 
C x COMP x CONOWN β15 0.090 .093 0.97 0.332 
LEV β16 -0.0002 .0002 -1.00 0.316 
SIZE β17 -0.033 .014 -2.38 0.017* 
CFO β18 -0.011 .068 -0.16 0.870 
LOSS β19 0.037 .011 3.34 0.001* 
ROA β20 -0.0004 .001 -0.45 0.654 
MTB β21 0.00003 .00002 1.93 0.054* 
Prob>F= 0.0000 
F-value= 2.13 
R-squared= 0.3603 
Adjusted R2= 0.1911 
Test of β0+β1+…+β6+β7=0 (F-value =0.71, Prob > F =0.6676) 
Test of β0+β1+…+β14+β15=0 (F-value =1.09, Prob > F =0.3602) 
Test of H10: β8 + β9 + …+ β15=0 (F-value = 1.09, Prob > F =0.3685) 
 
Variable Definitions: 
“C” indicates the Country Type= “1” for US and “0” for UK 
Controlling for the firm’s leverage, size, CFO, loss, ROA, and MTB, the coefficients 
can be interpreted as follows: 
β0+β1+…+β6+β7= represent the impact of EM constraints in UK firms. 
β0+β1+β2+…+β14+β15= represent the impact of EM constraints in US firms. 
β8+β9+…+β14+β15: represent the marginal impact of the EM constraints on EM 
between HCASH firms of the UK and the US to test for [H8] EM constraints are 
more effective in the US, compared to the UK, in reducing EM practices.  
 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7.16: Marginal Impact of Each Variable Independently in HCASH 
Variables Parameter Coeff. F-value P> t 
COMP β8+β9 -0.069 0.36 0.696 
AUDQ β8+β10 -0.131 0.43 0.650 
INSTOWN β8+β11 0.999 0.61 0.543 
CONOWN β8+β12 -0.933 1.04 0.355 
COMP x AUDQ β8+β13 -0.131 0.08 0.927 
COMP x INSTOWN β8+β14 -0.297 0.56 0.571 
COMP x CONOWN β8+β15 -0.035 0.58 0.560 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; CASH is the firm’s cash 
holdings; LEV is the firm’s leverage; SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s 
profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS 
represents the firm’s loss.   
   
239 
 
7.13. Additional Analysis 
Table 7.17 presents an additional analysis for the impact of the moderating role of CEO 
compensation in LCASH firms of the UK and the US, as well as for HCASH firms of the 
US. In this analysis, EM is measured using the performance-matched discretionary 
accruals, using the lagged ROA, in order to check the validity of the results. The robust 
regression results are also used to resolve for the heteroscedasticity problem. The 
regression results of both of the LCASH firms of the UK and the US markets are found 
to be exactly identical to the analysis performed using the Modified Jones model when 
measuring the DAC, presented above in table 7.2 and 7.7. However, the firm’s size no 
longer has an association with EM, in the presence of HCASH firms in the US, while the 
CEO compensation is revealed to be weakly significant in HCASH firms of the UK. 
Table 7.17: Additional Analysis of Low vs. High Cash Holding Firms  
Dependent Variable: Performance-Matched DAC, using lagged ROA 
Variables UK Firms US Firms 
LCASH HCASH LCASH HCASH 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
COMP -0.179* -0.263** -0.033 0.089 
AUDQ -0.205* -0.219 -0.032 0.118 
INSTOWN 0.315 -1.40 -0.501 0.317 
CONOWN 0.571* -0.710 0.269 -0.223 
COMP x AUDQ 0.033* 0.042 0.004 -0.013 
COMP x INSTOWN -0.057 0.229 0.069 -0.043 
COMP x CONOWN -0.090* 0.105 -0.045 0.023 
LEV -0.0001 0.001 0.0002 -0.0002 
SIZE -0.038* -0.050 0.004 -0.019 
CFO -0.028 0.144 0.169* -0.021 
LOSS 0.006 -0.006 0.015* 0.043* 
ROA -0.0004 -0.003* -0.003* 0.0001 
MTB -0.001* -0.001 0.00003** 0.00003** 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Where: COMP represents CEO compensation; AUDQ is the audit quality; INSTOWN is the 
institutional ownership; CONOWN is the concentrated ownership; LEV is the firm’s leverage; 
SIZE is the firm’s size; ROA represents the firm’s profitability; MTB represents the firm’s growth; 
CFO represents the firm’s cash flow; LOSS represents the firm’s loss. 
(Refer to Appendix I, J, K and L for complete regression tables, as provided by STATA 11) 
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7.14. Summary 
In summary, in the presence of low cash holding levels within UK firms, the corporate 
governance mechanisms appear to be more effective in restraining EM practices, as 
suggested. In addition, the moderation effect of CEO compensation appears to be 
effective in the presence of ownership concentration, which contributes towards reducing 
managerial opportunism as well. Hence, the presence of low cash levels within UK firms 
is revealed to add value in making the mechanisms more effective towards restraining 
EM levels. In UK HCASH firms, however, none of these governance mechanisms is 
found to be effective in restraining EM practices. 
Meanwhile, in the US context, the presence of low cash levels within firms reveals neither 
the corporate governance mechanisms nor the moderation effects to be valid for reducing 
managerial opportunism. In comparison with LCASH firms within the US, HCASH firms 
tend to act similarly in wiping the effectiveness of either one of the factors in reducing 
the participation of EM, which indicates that the moderating role of CEO compensation 
is not such an effective strategy in reducing managerial opportunism in the US market, 
regardless of the cash levels available.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
Excessive participation of earnings management by CEOs was witnessed in the past 
decade, leading to the firms’ bankruptcies. Therefore, in order to avoid corporate failures, 
this research seeks to restrain managerial opportunism and earnings management 
practices, in order to enhance the transparency of the financial reporting process. This 
will help reduce the information asymmetry between managers and their shareholders, 
leading to lower conflicts of interests between the two parties. Hence, in doing so, the 
impact of governance mechanisms as well as the impact of cash holdings on EM are 
analysed, to determine what constrains EM practices within the two contexts of the UK 
and the US. In addition, the moderating role of CEO compensation on the associations 
between four determinants of EM is analysed, these are the audit quality, the institutional 
ownership, the concentrated ownership, and the cash holdings in relation to EM practices. 
Analysing the impact of these joint effects on EM help determine if incorporating CEO 
compensation with other factors, can be an effective strategy for reducing EM practices. 
Moreover, the impact of the moderation effect of CEO compensation is analysed in low 
and high cash holding firms. This analysis relies on the concept that lower cash levels are 
associated with less managerial opportunism, and hence, this analysis is performed in 
order to reveal the effectiveness of the remaining corporate governance mechanisms as 
well as the joint effects, within firms holding low levels of cash in comparison to firms 
holding high levels of cash. The findings related to these analyses were explained in 
details in the previous chapters and will be summarized in this chapter. Therefore, this 
chapter first summarises the findings of this research study, and presents the practical and 
theoretical implications of the findings, then illustrates the limitations facing this 
research, and finally proposes some ideas for future research.  
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8.2. Summary of the Key Findings 
This research is designed to find what restrains EM practices in the UK and the US 
markets. For the purpose of this research, the analysis is conducted on the FTSE 350 
index and the S&P 500 index, through the period of twelve years, from 2005 until 2016. 
The findings of the first empirical chapter indicate that CEO compensation encourages 
the participation of EM in the UK market. This positive relation can be due to managers’ 
desires to manipulate the firms’ earnings in order to deserve even higher compensation. 
The audit quality is found to have a positive association with EM levels in the US market, 
even though they spend higher audit fees compared to UK firms, in an attempt of 
restraining EM practices. The concentrated ownership is found to have a significant 
impact on EM, in both contexts of the UK and the US. While the presence of block-
holders is found to push managers towards manipulating the firms’ earnings in order to 
achieve their private benefits in the UK market, it is found to be an effective controlling 
mechanism in restraining managerial opportunism in the US market. They may act 
differently due to the different monitoring and controlling mechanisms imposed upon 
them. To further clarify, higher monitoring may be imposed on the US market, as 
apparent by the higher audit fees spent towards acquiring more audit efforts, due to the 
higher responsibilities held by their managers, since they hold the roles of the CEOs and 
the chairmen of the boards. In addition, the presence of cash holdings is observed to have 
no association with EM, in both contexts. Moreover, the institutional ownership is found 
not to be associated with EM, in both contexts of the UK and the US, which reveals 
institutional investors to have ineffective roles in restraining managerial opportunism.  
Furthermore, the second empirical chapter focuses on the moderating role of CEO 
compensation on the associations between the above-mentioned four determinants and 
EM. This analysis finds cash-holdings to be positively associated with EM levels within 
the US firms since managers become entrenched to use the firm’s cash towards achieving 
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their own private benefits, while no association between the two is revealed in the UK 
market. In addition, the moderating role of CEO compensation in the presence of cash is 
found to reduce EM practices, which reveals that CEO compensation can act as a 
moderator and add value, as it is revealed to be such an effective mechanism, in 
constraining EM practices in the US market, while it’s revealed to be such an ineffective 
strategy in the UK context.  On the contrary, none of the moderation effects of CEO 
compensation is found to be effective in reducing EM practices, when moderating the 
relations between either the audit quality, the institutional ownership, or the concentrated 
ownership with EM, in both of the UK and the US markets.  
Moreover, since higher cash holdings are observed to tempt managers to manipulate the 
firms’ earnings in the US, as supported by the entrenchment and the agency theories, 
leading to higher information asymmetry and more conflicts of interests between 
managers and their shareholders, investigation of the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms in low vs high cash holding firms was worth analysing. Hence, the third 
empirical chapter analyses the impact of the determinants of EM in low compared to high 
cash holding firms, to reveal the effectiveness of the remaining corporate governance 
mechanisms, as well as the effectiveness of the moderation effect of CEO compensation 
in restraining EM practices in such firms. The findings reveal that CEO compensation 
has a negative association with EM when cash levels are low in the UK context, which 
reveals its incentive power in motivating managers to produce more transparent financial 
reports. In addition, the audit quality is revealed to restrain the participation of EM in the 
LCASH firms within the UK. While the corporate governance mechanisms appear to be 
more effective in LCASH firms in the UK market, they appear to have no associations 
with EM in either HCASH firms within the UK, or US firms holding different levels of 
cash. The institutional ownership remains insignificant in both contexts, in the presence 
of different cash levels. Ownership concentration is observed to increase EM practices of 
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LCASH firms within the UK, as they push managers towards leading them to their private 
benefits, while they are observed to have no associations with EM in the US context. In 
relation to the moderating role of CEO compensation, the joint effect of CEO 
compensation with audit quality is revealed to have a positive association with EM in the 
UK, rather than a negative one, when low cash levels exist in the UK. This positive 
association can be due to the lower spending on audit service fees by the firms holding 
low levels of cash since these firms give the impression of the lower need for monitoring 
services. While this positive association exist in the UK LCASH firms, this joint effect is 
found to be insignificant in UK HCASH firms or the US market. This analysis also 
reveals that the joint effect of the institutional ownership with CEO compensation, in 
relation to EM, remain insignificant, in the presence of low cash holdings within the UK 
and in both categories of US-listed firms. Moreover, the joint effect of CEO compensation 
in the presence of ownership concentration is found to be a value-adding contribution, as 
it’s found to restrain managerial opportunism, leading to lower levels of EM in LCASH 
firms within the UK. While this finding proves a successful moderation effect of CEO 
compensation in LCASH firms in the UK, it’s revealed to be ineffective in UK HCASH 
firms and both types of firms within the US. Overall, none of the corporate governance 
mechanisms nor the moderation effects prove to be effective in restraining EM practices 
in UK HCASH firms, or US-listed firms, holding higher or lower cash levels. 
 
8.3. Practical and Theoretical Implications of the Findings 
From the above analysis, firms intending to reduce the participation of EM in the UK are 
advised to incorporate the following mechanisms. First, firms must be committed to a 
lower level of compensation for their CEOs. Second, they must reduce the concentrated 
ownership in their firms. Third, in the case of firms holding low levels of cash, they are 
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advised to consider the distribution of higher levels of CEO compensation. Fourth, 
LCASH firms must increase their spending on acquiring higher audit efforts. Fifth, 
LCASH firms must reduce ownership concentration, or distribute high CEO 
compensation in the presence of high ownership concentration. Sixth, LCASH firms are 
advised to reduce the level of compensation in the presence of lower spending on audit 
services. Meanwhile, firms intending to reduce EM practices in the US market are advised 
to incorporate the following mechanisms. First, firms must reduce their spending of audit 
fees. Second, they must increase ownership concentration at their firms. Third, firms must 
reduce the amount of cash available at their firms, or incorporate the strategy of 
distributing CEO compensation in the presence of cash holdings. Following these 
strategies will help reduce the participation of EM in both markets, leading to higher 
reliability of the firms’ reported earnings and lower conflicts of interests between 
managers and shareholders. Hence, investors are advised to invest in firms following the 
above-mentioned strategies in order to have a clearer picture of their firms’ financial 
positions. 
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8.4. Limitations 
One of the limitations facing this research is making the managerial ownership part of the 
analysis, due to the unavailability of its data, since no clear definition was available to 
indicate the percentage of shareholdings held by managers. Analysing the impact of the 
managerial ownership on EM would have added value to this research. In fact, analysing 
the joint effect of the CEO compensation with the managerial ownership was expected to 
be an effective strategy in restraining EM practices, within the two contexts of the UK 
and the US, as the two are directly related to managers. This analysis would have been 
important to analyse the joint impact of the two mechanisms on reducing managerial 
opportunism and earnings’ manipulations accordingly.  
In addition, a wide range of UK data related to the short-term and the long-term 
components of CEO compensation is missing. So even though incorporating the two 
components into the analysis would have provided a clearer picture of which component 
encourages the participation of EM and which better restrains EM, taking them into 
consideration would have reduced the number of observations available for analysis, 
which would have resulted in biased conclusions or would have been too limited to give 
a statistically significant outcome. Therefore, analyzing the impact of the short-term as 
well as the long-term components of CEO compensation on EM was not possible to 
accomplish.  
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8.5. Suggestions for Future Research 
The findings of this research can open new areas for analysis such as observing the 
moderating role of CEO compensation in relation to real earnings management, rather 
than accrual-based earnings management. In addition, analysing the moderating role of 
incorporating high-quality audits is also worth studying, to reveal the power of auditing 
services in restraining managerial opportunism and further enhancing the transparency of 
the financial reporting processes. Moreover, the mediation effect of cash holdings on the 
participation of EM can be analysed, since the presence of cash holdings is found to 
significantly impact firms and managers’ opportunistic behaviours. Additionally, 
performing a comparative analysis between a developed country and a developing 
country might also add value to distinguish which factors are more effective in restraining 
managerial opportunism and EM practices within the two different markets. Furthermore, 
performing an analysis on how to restrain manipulations conducted by managers through 
the use of classification shifting as an EM method, may also add value in improving the 
reliability of the firms’ reported earnings.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Additional Analysis- UK Regression Results 
 
Table 1: Additional Analysis- UK Regression  
 
Additional Analysis- Testing Heteroscedasticity for UK Regression 
 
Table 2: Additional Analysis- UK Robust Regression Results 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(116, 362) =     2.31            Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .70828333   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03309071
     sigma_u    .05156191
                                                                              
       _cons     .3755413   .2106987     1.78   0.076    -.0388058    .7898884
         mtb    -.0012792   .0007174    -1.78   0.075      -.00269    .0001315
         roa    -.0014247   .0003228    -4.41   0.000    -.0020594   -.0007899
        loss     .0139975   .0073807     1.90   0.059     -.000517     .028512
         cfo     .0403781    .047196     0.86   0.393    -.0524346    .1331908
        size    -.0339622   .0235756    -1.44   0.151    -.0803246    .0124002
         lev      .000534   .0003477     1.54   0.125    -.0001497    .0012176
        cash     .0105764   .0369649     0.29   0.775    -.0621164    .0832693
      conown     .1126536   .0470434     2.39   0.017      .020141    .2051662
     instown     -.022479   .0252824    -0.89   0.375    -.0721979    .0272398
        audq    -.0240439   .0147198    -1.63   0.103    -.0529909    .0049031
        comp     .0184413   .0093541     1.97   0.049     .0000461    .0368364
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7738                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,362)          =      6.56
       overall = 0.0300                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0001                                        avg =       4.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.1661                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       117
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       490
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (117)  =  59812.78
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
                                                                              
         rho    .70828333   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03309071
     sigma_u    .05156191
                                                                              
       _cons     .3755413    .244711     1.53   0.128    -.1091397    .8602222
         mtb    -.0012792   .0005574    -2.30   0.024    -.0023832   -.0001753
         roa    -.0014247    .001337    -1.07   0.289    -.0040727    .0012233
        loss     .0139975   .0126084     1.11   0.269     -.010975    .0389699
         cfo     .0403781   .0669654     0.60   0.548    -.0922554    .1730116
        size    -.0339622   .0324253    -1.05   0.297    -.0981846    .0302602
         lev      .000534   .0004016     1.33   0.186    -.0002614    .0013294
        cash     .0105764   .0273312     0.39   0.699    -.0435565    .0647094
      conown     .1126536   .0521577     2.16   0.033     .0093487    .2159585
     instown     -.022479   .0215892    -1.04   0.300    -.0652391    .0202811
        audq    -.0240439   .0344976    -0.70   0.487    -.0923708     .044283
        comp     .0184413   .0092282     2.00   0.048     .0001636     .036719
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 117 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7738                        Prob > F           =    0.0096
                                                F(11,116)          =      2.42
       overall = 0.0300                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0001                                        avg =       4.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.1661                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       117
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       490
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Appendix B: Additional Analysis- US Regression Results 
 
Table 3: Additional Analysis- US Regression 
 
Additional Analysis- Testing Heteroscedasticity for US Regression 
 
Table 4: Additional Analysis- US Robust Regression Results 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(348, 2373) =     2.18           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .29100915   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03493797
     sigma_u    .02238364
                                                                              
       _cons     .1013355   .0607203     1.67   0.095    -.0177349    .2204059
         mtb     .0000321   .0000167     1.92   0.054    -6.19e-07    .0000647
         roa    -.0005243   .0001777    -2.95   0.003    -.0008728   -.0001757
        loss     .0412518   .0041183    10.02   0.000     .0331759    .0493277
         cfo     .0362766   .0205358     1.77   0.077    -.0039934    .0765466
        size    -.0132199   .0066053    -2.00   0.045    -.0261727    -.000267
         lev     .0000151   .0001064     0.14   0.887    -.0001935    .0002236
        cash    -.0116999   .0162365    -0.72   0.471    -.0435391    .0201394
      conown    -.0463798   .0190563    -2.43   0.015    -.0837484   -.0090111
     instown     .0016481   .0104465     0.16   0.875    -.0188371    .0221333
        audq     .0093504   .0055176     1.69   0.090    -.0014693    .0201702
        comp     .0002954   .0037836     0.08   0.938    -.0071242    .0077149
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0701                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,2373)         =     21.48
       overall = 0.0922                                        max =         9
       between = 0.1264                                        avg =       7.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0905                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       349
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      2733
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (349)  =   4.3e+31
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
                                                                              
         rho    .29100915   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03493797
     sigma_u    .02238364
                                                                              
       _cons     .1013355   .0746833     1.36   0.176     -.045552     .248223
         mtb     .0000321   .0000125     2.56   0.011     7.45e-06    .0000567
         roa    -.0005243   .0009223    -0.57   0.570    -.0023382    .0012897
        loss     .0412518   .0089976     4.58   0.000     .0235552    .0589484
         cfo     .0362766   .0688917     0.53   0.599    -.0992199    .1717731
        size    -.0132199   .0090332    -1.46   0.144    -.0309864    .0045466
         lev     .0000151   .0001607     0.09   0.925     -.000301    .0003311
        cash    -.0116999   .0303058    -0.39   0.700    -.0713055    .0479058
      conown    -.0463798   .0233419    -1.99   0.048    -.0922887   -.0004708
     instown     .0016481   .0123657     0.13   0.894    -.0226729     .025969
        audq     .0093504   .0052237     1.79   0.074    -.0009236    .0196244
        comp     .0002954   .0038265     0.08   0.939    -.0072306    .0078213
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 349 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0701                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,348)          =      7.66
       overall = 0.0922                                        max =         9
       between = 0.1264                                        avg =       7.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0905                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       349
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      2733
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Appendix C: Additional Analysis for Moderation- UK Regression Results  
 
Table 5: Additional Analysis for Moderation- UK Regression 
 
Additional Analysis for Moderation- Testing for Heteroscedasticity 
 
Table 6: Additional Analysis for Moderation- Robust Regression Results 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(116, 358) =     2.23            Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .70335589   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03318212
     sigma_u    .05109446
                                                                              
       _cons     .4557126   .5744648     0.79   0.428     -.674037    1.585462
         mtb    -.0011982   .0007264    -1.65   0.100    -.0026267    .0002303
         roa    -.0014372    .000324    -4.44   0.000    -.0020744   -.0007999
        loss     .0141217   .0074065     1.91   0.057     -.000444    .0286874
         cfo     .0407485   .0474051     0.86   0.391    -.0524789     .133976
        size    -.0306306   .0240294    -1.27   0.203     -.077887    .0166259
         lev     .0004704   .0003531     1.33   0.184    -.0002241    .0011648
   comp_cash    -.1162974   .0883978    -1.32   0.189    -.2901416    .0575468
 comp_conown    -.0151202   .0559772    -0.27   0.787    -.1252057    .0949653
comp_instown     .0378021   .0848246     0.45   0.656     -.129015    .2046193
   comp_audq      .003887   .0130048     0.30   0.765    -.0216883    .0294624
        cash     .7434867   .5581461     1.33   0.184    -.3541703    1.841144
      conown     .2050629    .360932     0.57   0.570    -.5047506    .9148764
     instown    -.2599569   .5315946    -0.49   0.625    -1.305397    .7854837
        audq    -.0494282   .0857208    -0.58   0.565    -.2180078    .1191515
        comp     .0017094   .0834418     0.02   0.984    -.1623882    .1658071
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7596                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(15,358)          =      4.91
       overall = 0.0279                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0005                                        avg =       4.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.1708                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       117
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       490
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (117)  =   1.3e+31
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
                                                                              
         rho    .70335589   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03318212
     sigma_u    .05109446
                                                                              
       _cons     .4557126   .4913682     0.93   0.356    -.5175041    1.428929
         mtb    -.0011982    .000584    -2.05   0.042     -.002355   -.0000414
         roa    -.0014372   .0013441    -1.07   0.287    -.0040994    .0012251
        loss     .0141217   .0125886     1.12   0.264    -.0108116    .0390549
         cfo     .0407485   .0667261     0.61   0.543    -.0914109    .1729079
        size    -.0306306   .0329118    -0.93   0.354    -.0958166    .0345554
         lev     .0004704   .0004168     1.13   0.261    -.0003551    .0012958
   comp_cash    -.1162974   .1049781    -1.11   0.270    -.3242198     .091625
 comp_conown    -.0151202    .054849    -0.28   0.783    -.1237556    .0935152
comp_instown     .0378021   .0816698     0.46   0.644    -.1239551    .1995594
   comp_audq      .003887   .0126888     0.31   0.760    -.0212447    .0290187
        cash     .7434867   .6602823     1.13   0.262    -.5642857    2.051259
      conown     .2050629   .3542723     0.58   0.564    -.4966181    .9067439
     instown    -.2599569   .5052896    -0.51   0.608    -1.260747    .7408328
        audq    -.0494282   .0902707    -0.55   0.585    -.2282206    .1293643
        comp     .0017094   .0846028     0.02   0.984    -.1658571     .169276
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 117 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7596                        Prob > F           =    0.0089
                                                F(15,116)          =      2.23
       overall = 0.0279                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0005                                        avg =       4.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.1708                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       117
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       490
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Appendix D: Additional Analysis for Moderation- US Regression Results 
 
Table 7: Additional Analysis for Moderation- US Regression 
 
Additional Analysis for Moderation- Testing for Heteroscedasticity 
 
Table 8: Additional Analysis for Moderation- Robust Regression Results 
  
F test that all u_i=0:     F(348, 2369) =     2.15           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .29036348   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03489307
     sigma_u     .0223199
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1644904   .3893816    -0.42   0.673    -.9280545    .5990737
         mtb       .00003   .0000167     1.80   0.072    -2.70e-06    .0000626
         roa    -.0005126   .0001778    -2.88   0.004    -.0008614   -.0001639
        loss     .0422518   .0041291    10.23   0.000     .0341547    .0503488
         cfo     .0371347   .0205296     1.81   0.071    -.0031231    .0773924
        size    -.0140926   .0068946    -2.04   0.041    -.0276126   -.0005725
         lev     .0000244   .0001065     0.23   0.819    -.0001845    .0002333
   comp_cash    -.0984702   .0341186    -2.89   0.004    -.1653756   -.0315647
 comp_conown     .0350041   .0291502     1.20   0.230    -.0221584    .0921665
comp_instown     .0368698   .0308793     1.19   0.233    -.0236835    .0974232
   comp_audq    -.0047708   .0079475    -0.60   0.548    -.0203556     .010814
        cash      .673255   .2375555     2.83   0.005     .2074167    1.139093
      conown    -.2898676   .2036661    -1.42   0.155    -.6892499    .1095146
     instown    -.2560975   .2151681    -1.19   0.234    -.6780347    .1658397
        audq     .0449428   .0593089     0.76   0.449    -.0713598    .1612455
        comp     .0374455   .0546824     0.68   0.494    -.0697848    .1446757
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0697                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(15,2369)         =     16.46
       overall = 0.0974                                        max =         9
       between = 0.1317                                        avg =       7.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0944                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       349
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      2733
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (349)  =   2.4e+05
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
                                                                              
         rho    .29036348   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03489307
     sigma_u     .0223199
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1644904   .4258448    -0.39   0.700    -1.002044    .6730631
         mtb       .00003   .0000115     2.61   0.010     7.37e-06    .0000526
         roa    -.0005126   .0009156    -0.56   0.576    -.0023135    .0012883
        loss     .0422518    .009151     4.62   0.000     .0242535      .06025
         cfo     .0371347   .0683413     0.54   0.587    -.0972794    .1715487
        size    -.0140926   .0096715    -1.46   0.146    -.0331145    .0049294
         lev     .0000244   .0001566     0.16   0.876    -.0002837    .0003324
   comp_cash    -.0984702     .05027    -1.96   0.051    -.1973413     .000401
 comp_conown     .0350041   .0309323     1.13   0.259    -.0258337    .0958418
comp_instown     .0368698   .0471728     0.78   0.435    -.0559098    .1296495
   comp_audq    -.0047708   .0085686    -0.56   0.578    -.0216236     .012082
        cash      .673255   .3561828     1.89   0.060    -.0272869    1.373797
      conown    -.2898676   .2248689    -1.29   0.198    -.7321407    .1524054
     instown    -.2560975   .3264679    -0.78   0.433    -.8981959     .386001
        audq     .0449428   .0649209     0.69   0.489     -.082744    .1726296
        comp     .0374455   .0604959     0.62   0.536    -.0815382    .1564291
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 349 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0697                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(15,348)          =      5.85
       overall = 0.0974                                        max =         9
       between = 0.1317                                        avg =       7.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0944                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       349
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      2733
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Appendix E: UK Regression for LCASH 
 
Table 9: UK Regression Results for LCASH 
 
Testing Heteroscedasticity for UK Regression (LCASH) 
 
Testing Autocorrelation for UK Regression (LCASH) 
 
Table 10: UK Robust Regression Results for LCASH 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(65, 130) =     1.54             Prob > F = 0.0194
                                                                              
         rho    .75911553   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01699807
     sigma_u    .03017513
                                                                              
       _cons     1.504845   .6820004     2.21   0.029     .1555891    2.854102
         mtb     -.000516   .0005265    -0.98   0.329    -.0015577    .0005256
         roa    -.0004418   .0006137    -0.72   0.473    -.0016559    .0007724
        loss      .005958   .0071019     0.84   0.403    -.0080924    .0200083
         cfo    -.0280338   .0473198    -0.59   0.555    -.1216503    .0655827
        size    -.0379351   .0273754    -1.39   0.168    -.0920941    .0162239
         lev    -.0001103   .0003516    -0.31   0.754    -.0008058    .0005853
 comp_conown    -.0902223   .0527441    -1.71   0.090    -.1945702    .0141257
comp_instown    -.0573739   .0752539    -0.76   0.447    -.2062548     .091507
   comp_audq     .0329744   .0155299     2.12   0.036     .0022504    .0636985
      conown     .5707456   .3449493     1.65   0.100    -.1116954    1.253187
     instown     .3150503   .4781547     0.66   0.511    -.6309217    1.261022
        audq    -.2049792   .1000464    -2.05   0.042    -.4029091   -.0070493
        comp    -.1791652    .093909    -1.91   0.059    -.3649528    .0066225
                                                                              
     abs_DAC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8411                        Prob > F           =    0.1181
                                                F(13,130)          =      1.52
       overall = 0.0008                                        max =         8
       between = 0.0110                                        avg =       3.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.1320                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =        66
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       209
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (66)  =    1370.49
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
           Prob > F =      0.5735
    F(  1,      27) =      0.325
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
                                                                              
         rho    .75911553   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01699807
     sigma_u    .03017513
                                                                              
       _cons     1.504845   .5632666     2.67   0.010     .3799242    2.629766
         mtb     -.000516   .0002457    -2.10   0.040    -.0010067   -.0000253
         roa    -.0004418   .0007342    -0.60   0.549    -.0019081    .0010245
        loss      .005958   .0105934     0.56   0.576    -.0151984    .0271144
         cfo    -.0280338   .0392052    -0.72   0.477     -.106332    .0502644
        size    -.0379351   .0189932    -2.00   0.050    -.0758671   -3.11e-06
         lev    -.0001103    .000281    -0.39   0.696    -.0006714    .0004509
 comp_conown    -.0902223    .030108    -3.00   0.004    -.1503522   -.0300924
comp_instown    -.0573739   .0588367    -0.98   0.333    -.1748788    .0601311
   comp_audq     .0329744   .0134689     2.45   0.017     .0060753    .0598736
      conown     .5707456   .2083033     2.74   0.008     .1547353     .986756
     instown     .3150503   .3785087     0.83   0.408    -.4408837    1.070984
        audq    -.2049792   .0865703    -2.37   0.021    -.3778719   -.0320865
        comp    -.1791652   .0812175    -2.21   0.031    -.3413677   -.0169627
                                                                              
     abs_DAC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 66 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8411                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,65)           =     19.33
       overall = 0.0008                                        max =         8
       between = 0.0110                                        avg =       3.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.1320                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =        66
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       209
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Appendix F: UK Regression for HCASH 
 
Table 11: UK Regression Results for HCASH 
  
Testing Heteroscedasticity for UK Regression (HCASH) 
 
Testing Autocorrelation for UK Regression (HCASH) 
 
Table 12: UK Robust Regression Results for HCASH 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(50, 121) =     1.97             Prob > F = 0.0014
                                                                              
         rho    .64608185   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0355644
     sigma_u     .0480516
                                                                              
       _cons     1.518187    1.37737     1.10   0.273    -1.208681    4.245054
         mtb     .0000426   .0015823     0.03   0.979    -.0030899    .0031752
         roa    -.0026232   .0005677    -4.62   0.000    -.0037471   -.0014993
        loss      .000607   .0147434     0.04   0.967    -.0285814    .0297954
         cfo     .1624137   .0761871     2.13   0.035     .0115812    .3132463
        size    -.0696663   .0423831    -1.64   0.103    -.1535748    .0142421
         lev     .0016027   .0006874     2.33   0.021     .0002418    .0029635
 comp_conown    -.0232661   .1021062    -0.23   0.820    -.2254123    .1788801
comp_instown     .1254675   .1653498     0.76   0.449    -.2018861     .452821
   comp_audq     .0323596   .0338658     0.96   0.341    -.0346868     .099406
      conown     .2457732   .6623844     0.37   0.711    -1.065591    1.557138
     instown    -.7776359   1.032773    -0.75   0.453    -2.822283    1.267011
        audq    -.1533406   .2216627    -0.69   0.490    -.5921803    .2854991
        comp    -.1867279   .2122026    -0.88   0.381     -.606839    .2333831
                                                                              
     abs_DAC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6422                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,121)          =      4.82
       overall = 0.0516                                        max =         8
       between = 0.0175                                        avg =       3.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.3413                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =        51
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       185
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (51)  =   16030.14
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
           Prob > F =      0.3245
    F(  1,      30) =      1.003
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
                                                                              
         rho    .64608185   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0355644
     sigma_u     .0480516
                                                                              
       _cons     1.518187   1.037985     1.46   0.150    -.5666671    3.603041
         mtb     .0000426   .0016838     0.03   0.980    -.0033394    .0034247
         roa    -.0026232   .0012539    -2.09   0.042    -.0051417   -.0001047
        loss      .000607    .012687     0.05   0.962    -.0248755    .0260895
         cfo     .1624137   .1015226     1.60   0.116    -.0415004    .3663279
        size    -.0696663   .0684992    -1.02   0.314     -.207251    .0679184
         lev     .0016027   .0009553     1.68   0.100    -.0003161    .0035214
 comp_conown    -.0232661   .0820584    -0.28   0.778    -.1880853     .141553
comp_instown     .1254675   .1696825     0.74   0.463    -.2153499    .4662849
   comp_audq     .0323596   .0257242     1.26   0.214     -.019309    .0840282
      conown     .2457732   .5404191     0.45   0.651    -.8396906    1.331237
     instown    -.7776359   1.048076    -0.74   0.462    -2.882758    1.327487
        audq    -.1533406   .1783878    -0.86   0.394    -.5116429    .2049618
        comp    -.1867279   .1624591    -1.15   0.256    -.5130367    .1395808
                                                                              
     abs_DAC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6422                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,50)           =      5.99
       overall = 0.0516                                        max =         8
       between = 0.0175                                        avg =       3.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.3413                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =        51
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       185
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Appendix G: US Regression for LCASH 
 
Table 13: US Regression Results for LCASH 
 
Testing Heteroscedasticity for US Regression (LCASH) 
 
Testing Autocorrelation for US Regression (LCASH) 
 
Table 14: US Robust Regression Results for LCASH 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(251, 1105) =     2.47           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho     .4927455   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02492892
     sigma_u    .02456981
                                                                              
       _cons     .2424936   .4120522     0.59   0.556    -.5659995    1.050987
         mtb     .0000381   .0000336     1.13   0.257    -.0000278     .000104
         roa    -.0030913    .000229   -13.50   0.000    -.0035406   -.0026421
        loss     .0153645   .0045013     3.41   0.001     .0065325    .0241965
         cfo     .1690427   .0263526     6.41   0.000      .117336    .2207494
        size     .0042747   .0076871     0.56   0.578    -.0108083    .0193577
         lev     .0001609   .0001327     1.21   0.226    -.0000995    .0004212
 comp_conown    -.0447216   .0426048    -1.05   0.294    -.1283171    .0388739
comp_instown     .0690434   .0337783     2.04   0.041     .0027666    .1353201
   comp_audq     .0039193   .0084365     0.46   0.642     -.012634    .0204727
      conown     .2692209    .292161     0.92   0.357     -.304032    .8424737
     instown     -.501204   .2348674    -2.13   0.033    -.9620404   -.0403677
        audq    -.0316356   .0627341    -0.50   0.614     -.154727    .0914558
        comp    -.0333664   .0579475    -0.58   0.565     -.147066    .0803332
                                                                              
     abs_DAC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2852                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,1105)         =     33.69
       overall = 0.1901                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0477                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.2838                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       252
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1370
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (252)  =  66678.91
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
           Prob > F =      0.7736
    F(  1,     162) =      0.083
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
                                                                              
         rho     .4927455   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02492892
     sigma_u    .02456981
                                                                              
       _cons     .2424936   .4560323     0.53   0.595    -.6556438    1.140631
         mtb     .0000381   .0000231     1.65   0.099    -7.28e-06    .0000835
         roa    -.0030913   .0007105    -4.35   0.000    -.0044906    -.001692
        loss     .0153645   .0071214     2.16   0.032     .0013391    .0293899
         cfo     .1690427   .0604943     2.79   0.006     .0499016    .2881838
        size     .0042747   .0112651     0.38   0.705    -.0179115    .0264609
         lev     .0001609   .0002075     0.78   0.439    -.0002478    .0005695
 comp_conown    -.0447216   .0526301    -0.85   0.396    -.1483744    .0589312
comp_instown     .0690434   .0610725     1.13   0.259    -.0512366    .1893233
   comp_audq     .0039193   .0094721     0.41   0.679    -.0147356    .0225743
      conown     .2692209   .3615382     0.74   0.457    -.4428142     .981256
     instown     -.501204   .4290814    -1.17   0.244    -1.346263    .3438547
        audq    -.0316356    .071407    -0.44   0.658    -.1722689    .1089976
        comp    -.0333664    .067058    -0.50   0.619    -.1654344    .0987016
                                                                              
     abs_DAC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 252 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2852                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,251)          =      6.78
       overall = 0.1901                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0477                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.2838                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       252
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1370
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Appendix H: US Regression for HCASH 
 
Figure 15: US Regression Results for HCASH 
 
Testing Heteroscedasticity for US Regression (HCASH) 
 
Testing Autocorrelation for US Regression (HCASH) 
 
Table 16: US Robust Regression Results for HCASH 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(251, 1090) =     1.57           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho     .2926668   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .04002807
     sigma_u    .02574775
                                                                              
       _cons     .0907596   .6675984     0.14   0.892    -1.219164    1.400683
         mtb     .0000301    .000022     1.37   0.171     -.000013    .0000733
         roa     .0000213   .0002609     0.08   0.935    -.0004905    .0005331
        loss     .0434504   .0068705     6.32   0.000     .0299694    .0569314
         cfo    -.0376599   .0302293    -1.25   0.213    -.0969742    .0216543
        size    -.0307042   .0114449    -2.68   0.007    -.0531607   -.0082477
         lev     -.000301    .000164    -1.84   0.067    -.0006228    .0000207
 comp_conown     .0193108   .0400538     0.48   0.630    -.0592805    .0979021
comp_instown    -.0689979    .051158    -1.35   0.178    -.1693772    .0313813
   comp_audq    -.0028141   .0137104    -0.21   0.837    -.0297158    .0240877
      conown    -.1917312   .2811762    -0.68   0.495    -.7434391    .3599767
     instown     .4977216   .3564022     1.40   0.163    -.2015905    1.197034
        audq     .0385154   .1027746     0.37   0.708    -.1631431    .2401739
        comp     .0196715   .0934462     0.21   0.833    -.1636833    .2030262
                                                                              
     abs_DAC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2454                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,1090)         =      7.46
       overall = 0.0821                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0994                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.0817                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       252
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1355
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (252)  =   2.4e+34
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
           Prob > F =      0.3616
    F(  1,     174) =      0.837
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
                                                                              
         rho     .2926668   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .04002807
     sigma_u    .02574775
                                                                              
       _cons     .0907596   .6901796     0.13   0.895    -1.268522    1.450041
         mtb     .0000301   .0000172     1.75   0.081    -3.71e-06     .000064
         roa     .0000213   .0011147     0.02   0.985    -.0021741    .0022167
        loss     .0434504   .0130453     3.33   0.001     .0177582    .0691426
         cfo    -.0376599   .0766262    -0.49   0.624    -.1885721    .1132523
        size    -.0307042   .0144564    -2.12   0.035    -.0591756   -.0022329
         lev     -.000301    .000214    -1.41   0.161    -.0007226    .0001205
 comp_conown     .0193108   .0385842     0.50   0.617    -.0566793    .0953009
comp_instown    -.0689979   .0600583    -1.15   0.252    -.1872804    .0492846
   comp_audq    -.0028141   .0138583    -0.20   0.839    -.0301074    .0244792
      conown    -.1917312   .2839018    -0.68   0.500    -.7508646    .3674022
     instown     .4977216   .4209971     1.18   0.238    -.3314155    1.326859
        audq     .0385154   .1059138     0.36   0.716    -.1700776    .2471083
        comp     .0196715   .0966259     0.20   0.839    -.1706294    .2099723
                                                                              
     abs_DAC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 252 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2454                        Prob > F           =    0.0003
                                                F(13,251)          =      3.09
       overall = 0.0821                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0994                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.0817                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       252
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1355
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Appendix I: Additional Analysis- UK Regression for LCASH 
 
Table 17: Additional Analysis- UK Regression Results for LCASH 
 
Additional Analysis- Testing Heteroscedasticity for UK Regression (LCASH) 
 
Additional Analysis- Testing Autocorrelation for UK Regression (LCASH) 
 
Table 18: Additional Analysis- UK Robust Regression Results for LCASH 
  
F test that all u_i=0:     F(65, 130) =     1.54             Prob > F = 0.0194
                                                                              
         rho    .75911553   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01699807
     sigma_u    .03017513
                                                                              
       _cons     1.504845   .6820004     2.21   0.029     .1555891    2.854102
         mtb     -.000516   .0005265    -0.98   0.329    -.0015577    .0005256
         roa    -.0004418   .0006137    -0.72   0.473    -.0016559    .0007724
        loss      .005958   .0071019     0.84   0.403    -.0080924    .0200083
         cfo    -.0280338   .0473198    -0.59   0.555    -.1216503    .0655827
        size    -.0379351   .0273754    -1.39   0.168    -.0920941    .0162239
         lev    -.0001103   .0003516    -0.31   0.754    -.0008058    .0005853
 comp_conown    -.0902223   .0527441    -1.71   0.090    -.1945702    .0141257
comp_instown    -.0573739   .0752539    -0.76   0.447    -.2062548     .091507
   comp_audq     .0329744   .0155299     2.12   0.036     .0022504    .0636985
      conown     .5707456   .3449493     1.65   0.100    -.1116954    1.253187
     instown     .3150503   .4781547     0.66   0.511    -.6309217    1.261022
        audq    -.2049792   .1000464    -2.05   0.042    -.4029091   -.0070493
        comp    -.1791652    .093909    -1.91   0.059    -.3649528    .0066225
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8411                        Prob > F           =    0.1181
                                                F(13,130)          =      1.52
       overall = 0.0008                                        max =         8
       between = 0.0110                                        avg =       3.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.1320                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =        66
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       209
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (66)  =    1370.49
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
           Prob > F =      0.5735
    F(  1,      27) =      0.325
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
                                                                              
         rho    .75911553   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01699807
     sigma_u    .03017513
                                                                              
       _cons     1.504845   .5632666     2.67   0.010     .3799242    2.629766
         mtb     -.000516   .0002457    -2.10   0.040    -.0010067   -.0000253
         roa    -.0004418   .0007342    -0.60   0.549    -.0019081    .0010245
        loss      .005958   .0105934     0.56   0.576    -.0151984    .0271144
         cfo    -.0280338   .0392052    -0.72   0.477     -.106332    .0502644
        size    -.0379351   .0189932    -2.00   0.050    -.0758671   -3.11e-06
         lev    -.0001103    .000281    -0.39   0.696    -.0006714    .0004509
 comp_conown    -.0902223    .030108    -3.00   0.004    -.1503522   -.0300924
comp_instown    -.0573739   .0588367    -0.98   0.333    -.1748788    .0601311
   comp_audq     .0329744   .0134689     2.45   0.017     .0060753    .0598736
      conown     .5707456   .2083033     2.74   0.008     .1547353     .986756
     instown     .3150503   .3785087     0.83   0.408    -.4408837    1.070984
        audq    -.2049792   .0865703    -2.37   0.021    -.3778719   -.0320865
        comp    -.1791652   .0812175    -2.21   0.031    -.3413677   -.0169627
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 66 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8411                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,65)           =     19.33
       overall = 0.0008                                        max =         8
       between = 0.0110                                        avg =       3.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.1320                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =        66
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       209
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Appendix J: Additional Analysis- UK Regression for HCASH 
 
Table 19: Additional Analysis- UK Regression Results for HCASH 
 
Additional Analysis- Testing Heteroscedasticity for UK Regression (HCASH) 
 
Additional Analysis- Testing Autocorrelation for UK Regression (HCASH) 
 
Table 20: Additional Analysis- UK Robust Regression Results for LCASH 
  
F test that all u_i=0:     F(50, 121) =     1.45             Prob > F = 0.0527
                                                                              
         rho     .5894143   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03663118
     sigma_u    .04388937
                                                                              
       _cons     1.856019   1.418685     1.31   0.193    -.9526425    4.664681
         mtb    -.0008062   .0016298    -0.49   0.622    -.0040327    .0024204
         roa    -.0028194   .0005847    -4.82   0.000     -.003977   -.0016617
        loss    -.0057625   .0151856    -0.38   0.705    -.0358264    .0243014
         cfo     .1436326   .0784724     1.83   0.070    -.0117243    .2989894
        size    -.0503836   .0436544    -1.15   0.251     -.136809    .0360417
         lev     .0013401    .000708     1.89   0.061    -.0000615    .0027418
 comp_conown     .1053973    .105169     1.00   0.318    -.1028124     .313607
comp_instown     .2291681   .1703096     1.35   0.181    -.1080046    .5663408
   comp_audq     .0423249   .0348817     1.21   0.227    -.0267326    .1113823
      conown    -.7102209   .6822531    -1.04   0.300    -2.060921    .6404791
     instown    -1.400744   1.063752    -1.32   0.190    -3.506721    .7052337
        audq    -.2191947   .2283116    -0.96   0.339    -.6711977    .2328083
        comp    -.2626318   .2185678    -1.20   0.232    -.6953444    .1700808
                                                                              
     abs_DAC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7060                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,121)          =      4.22
       overall = 0.0513                                        max =         8
       between = 0.0063                                        avg =       3.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.3122                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =        51
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       185
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (51)  =    2300.92
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
end of do-file
. 
           Prob > F =      0.1820
    F(  1,      30) =      1.867
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
                                                                              
         rho     .5894143   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03663118
     sigma_u    .04388937
                                                                              
       _cons     1.856019   .9127573     2.03   0.047     .0226924    3.689347
         mtb    -.0008062   .0019302    -0.42   0.678    -.0046831    .0030708
         roa    -.0028194   .0012866    -2.19   0.033    -.0054035   -.0002352
        loss    -.0057625   .0132053    -0.44   0.664    -.0322862    .0207612
         cfo     .1436326   .1079254     1.33   0.189    -.0731419     .360407
        size    -.0503836    .069472    -0.73   0.472    -.1899223     .089155
         lev     .0013401   .0009258     1.45   0.154    -.0005195    .0031997
 comp_conown     .1053973   .1073115     0.98   0.331    -.1101442    .3209388
comp_instown     .2291681   .1638848     1.40   0.168    -.1000041    .5583403
   comp_audq     .0423249   .0226794     1.87   0.068     -.003228    .0878777
      conown    -.7102209   .7213183    -0.98   0.330    -2.159031    .7385896
     instown    -1.400744   1.010878    -1.39   0.172    -3.431151    .6296637
        audq    -.2191947   .1578927    -1.39   0.171    -.5363314    .0979421
        comp    -.2626318   .1432721    -1.83   0.073    -.5504024    .0251387
                                                                              
     abs_DAC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7060                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,50)           =      5.04
       overall = 0.0513                                        max =         8
       between = 0.0063                                        avg =       3.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.3122                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =        51
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       185
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Appendix K: Additional Analysis- US Regression for LCASH 
 
Table 21: Additional Analysis- US Regression for LCASH 
 
Additional Analysis- Testing Heteroscedasticity for US Regression (LCASH) 
 
Additional Analysis: Testing Autocorrelation for US Regression (LCASH) 
 
Table 22: Additional Analysis- US Robust Regression for LCASH 
  
F test that all u_i=0:     F(251, 1105) =     2.47           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho     .4927455   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02492892
     sigma_u    .02456981
                                                                              
       _cons     .2424936   .4120522     0.59   0.556    -.5659995    1.050987
         mtb     .0000381   .0000336     1.13   0.257    -.0000278     .000104
         roa    -.0030913    .000229   -13.50   0.000    -.0035406   -.0026421
        loss     .0153645   .0045013     3.41   0.001     .0065325    .0241965
         cfo     .1690427   .0263526     6.41   0.000      .117336    .2207494
        size     .0042747   .0076871     0.56   0.578    -.0108083    .0193577
         lev     .0001609   .0001327     1.21   0.226    -.0000995    .0004212
 comp_conown    -.0447216   .0426048    -1.05   0.294    -.1283171    .0388739
comp_instown     .0690434   .0337783     2.04   0.041     .0027666    .1353201
   comp_audq     .0039193   .0084365     0.46   0.642     -.012634    .0204727
      conown     .2692209    .292161     0.92   0.357     -.304032    .8424737
     instown     -.501204   .2348674    -2.13   0.033    -.9620404   -.0403677
        audq    -.0316356   .0627341    -0.50   0.614     -.154727    .0914558
        comp    -.0333664   .0579475    -0.58   0.565     -.147066    .0803332
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2852                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,1105)         =     33.69
       overall = 0.1901                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0477                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.2838                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       252
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1370
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (252)  =  66678.91
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
           Prob > F =      0.7736
    F(  1,     162) =      0.083
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
                                                                              
         rho     .4927455   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02492892
     sigma_u    .02456981
                                                                              
       _cons     .2424936   .4560323     0.53   0.595    -.6556438    1.140631
         mtb     .0000381   .0000231     1.65   0.099    -7.28e-06    .0000835
         roa    -.0030913   .0007105    -4.35   0.000    -.0044906    -.001692
        loss     .0153645   .0071214     2.16   0.032     .0013391    .0293899
         cfo     .1690427   .0604943     2.79   0.006     .0499016    .2881838
        size     .0042747   .0112651     0.38   0.705    -.0179115    .0264609
         lev     .0001609   .0002075     0.78   0.439    -.0002478    .0005695
 comp_conown    -.0447216   .0526301    -0.85   0.396    -.1483744    .0589312
comp_instown     .0690434   .0610725     1.13   0.259    -.0512366    .1893233
   comp_audq     .0039193   .0094721     0.41   0.679    -.0147356    .0225743
      conown     .2692209   .3615382     0.74   0.457    -.4428142     .981256
     instown     -.501204   .4290814    -1.17   0.244    -1.346263    .3438547
        audq    -.0316356    .071407    -0.44   0.658    -.1722689    .1089976
        comp    -.0333664    .067058    -0.50   0.619    -.1654344    .0987016
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 252 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2852                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,251)          =      6.78
       overall = 0.1901                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0477                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.2838                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       252
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1370
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Appendix L: Additional Analysis- US Regression for HCASH 
 
Table 23: Additional Analysis- US Regression for HCASH 
 
Additional Analysis- Testing Heteroscedasticity for US Regression (HCASH) 
 
Additional Analysis- Testing Autocorrelation for US Regression (HCASH) 
 
Table 24: Additional Analysis- US Robust Regression for HCASH 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(251, 1090) =     1.56           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .29164863   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03837599
     sigma_u    .02462437
                                                                              
       _cons    -.5456191   .6400445    -0.85   0.394    -1.801478    .7102396
         mtb     .0000303   .0000211     1.44   0.150     -.000011    .0000717
         roa     .0001024   .0002501     0.41   0.682    -.0003883    .0005931
        loss     .0428894    .006587     6.51   0.000     .0299648     .055814
         cfo    -.0205031   .0289817    -0.71   0.479    -.0773693     .036363
        size    -.0192566   .0109725    -1.75   0.080    -.0407863    .0022731
         lev    -.0002458   .0001572    -1.56   0.118    -.0005543    .0000626
 comp_conown     .0232473   .0384007     0.61   0.545    -.0521003    .0985949
comp_instown    -.0430383   .0490465    -0.88   0.380    -.1392746     .053198
   comp_audq    -.0134484   .0131445    -1.02   0.306    -.0392398    .0123431
      conown    -.2234938   .2695712    -0.83   0.407     -.752431    .3054433
     instown     .3170686   .3416924     0.93   0.354    -.3533806    .9875179
        audq     .1181603   .0985328     1.20   0.231    -.0751752    .3114957
        comp     .0886015   .0895894     0.99   0.323    -.0871857    .2643886
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1883                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,1090)         =      6.50
       overall = 0.0617                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0759                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.0719                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       252
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1355
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (252)  =   6.9e+05
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
           Prob > F =      0.7269
    F(  1,     174) =      0.122
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
                                                                              
         rho    .29164863   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03837599
     sigma_u    .02462437
                                                                              
       _cons    -.5456191   .6339438    -0.86   0.390    -1.794146    .7029079
         mtb     .0000303   .0000176     1.72   0.087    -4.44e-06    .0000651
         roa     .0001024   .0010328     0.10   0.921    -.0019317    .0021365
        loss     .0428894   .0119958     3.58   0.000     .0192641    .0665146
         cfo    -.0205031   .0742871    -0.28   0.783    -.1668085    .1258023
        size    -.0192566   .0138511    -1.39   0.166    -.0465359    .0080227
         lev    -.0002458   .0002044    -1.20   0.230    -.0006484    .0001568
 comp_conown     .0232473   .0407185     0.57   0.569    -.0569461    .1034407
comp_instown    -.0430383   .0591424    -0.73   0.467     -.159517    .0734404
   comp_audq    -.0134484   .0126869    -1.06   0.290    -.0384347     .011538
      conown    -.2234938   .3002906    -0.74   0.457    -.8149041    .3679165
     instown     .3170686   .4161168     0.76   0.447    -.5024568    1.136594
        audq     .1181603   .0971294     1.22   0.225    -.0731323    .3094528
        comp     .0886015   .0882222     1.00   0.316    -.0851486    .2623515
                                                                              
    abs_DACC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 252 clusters in firm_id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1883                        Prob > F           =    0.0006
                                                F(13,251)          =      2.92
       overall = 0.0617                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0759                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.0719                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: firm_id                         Number of groups   =       252
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1355
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